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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether a relationship exists between fraudulent financial 
reporting and a variety of corporate governance attributes.  Numerous high profile 
accounting scandals perpetuated over recent years have brought prominence to the 
corporate governance structure employed by US public companies.  Many of 
these scandals involved manipulation of the financial reporting process by high 
level managers.  It is therefore thought that a lack of effective oversight provided 
by the governing bodies engaged to monitor the actions of management may be at 
the heart of the problem. 
 
A review of prior research is used to identify the attributes of corporate 
governance relevant for inclusion in this study and to provide support for the 
posing of twenty directional hypotheses.  The selected corporate governance 
attributes are classified into four broad categories depicting Audit Committee 
Functionality, Board of Director Composition, Ownership Structure, and External 
Auditor Factors.  A matched pair research design is utilised to determine whether 
significant differences exist between the corporate governance attributes 
employed by fraud and non-fraud companies.  A sample of 76 fraud companies, 
identified through an examination of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases issued by the Securities Exchange Commission and drawn from a total 
of 223 companies examined, are tested along with an industry-size matched 
sample of non-fraud companies.  The results of univariate paired t-tests and a 
conditional logistic regression equation find that statistically significant 
relationships do exist between a number of corporate governance attributes and 
fraudulent financial reporting.  Specifically, the study finds that the percentage of 
independent directors on a company’s board, the existence of a nominating 
committee, and the engaging of a Big6 auditor are negatively related to the 
incidence of fraud.  Whereas, the average number of directorships held by audit 
committee members, the duality of the CEO and Chairman of the Board positions, 
and the percentage of company ownership held by outside blockholders are 
positively related to the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
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Are Attributes of Corporate Governance  
Related to the Incidence of 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting? 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The publicly held business corporation is an awesome social invention. 
Millions of individuals voluntarily entrust billions of dollars, francs, 
pesos, etc. of personal wealth to the care of managers on the basis of a 
complex set of contracting relationships which delineate the rights of the 
parties involved.  The growth in the use of the corporate form as well as 
the growth in market value of established corporations suggests that at 
least, up to the present, creditors and investors have by and large not been 
disappointed with the results…” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p.71). 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
While Jensen and Meckling’s conclusion might have been valid in the mid-70’s, 
the present reality portrays a very different picture.  Although individuals are still 
investing billions of dollars of their personal savings in public companies, and on 
the whole the majority are still reaping the benefits of their investments, the 
public’s faith in the corporate form has been badly shaken over recent years.  The 
prevalence with which public companies are falling prey to the incidence of 
fraudulent financial reporting, carried out at the hands of their contracted agent, 
could be partially to blame for a substantial change in this perspective. 
 
Fraudulent financial reporting costs the world’s economies billions of dollars each 
year.  In the US alone the cost of corporate fraud is estimated at $US600 billion 
annually (Frieswick, 2003), and is said to be responsible for severely reducing 
investor confidence in the nation’s capital markets.  Kaminski, Wetzel and Guan 
(2004) described fraudulent financial reporting as “…a matter of grave social and 
economic concern” (p.15). 
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The discernible increase in corporate collapses due to fraudulent financial 
reporting over the last few years has drawn substantial attention to many aspects 
of the financial reporting and corporate governance of publicly traded companies 
in the US.  In an attempt to stem the growing wave of corporate fraud a number of 
Government-commissioned, and industry-sponsored, studies have been 
undertaken aimed at understanding the dimensions of the problem and identifying 
appropriate solutions.  Two such studies include the Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR) released in 1987, and 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997: An Analysis of U.S. Public 
Companies released in 1999 by the Commission of Sponsoring Organisations of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO).  Both reports sought to discover causal 
factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting and identify areas where 
improvements to the corporate financial reporting environment could be made. 
 
One association that has been consistently recognised in not only the above-
mentioned studies but also numerous subsequent studies, has been the 
management level of the persons responsible for financial reporting fraud.  Of 
particular concern is the frequency with which senior management and/or other 
members of the governing body are involved in this type of deceptive behaviour.  
For example, the 1999 COSO report noted that together the CEO and CFO were 
named in 83% of the company frauds investigated by the study.  The NCFFR 
study also recorded similar results of senior management being implicated in a 
vast majority of cases involving financial reporting violations.  These results give 
good reason for concern, particularly considering the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners’ observation that the “…position a perpetrator holds within an 
organisation will tend to have the most significant effect on the size of losses in a 
fraud scheme.  As the level of authority for perpetrators rise, fraud losses rise 
correspondingly” (ACFE, 2005, p.36). 
 
Over the years since these studies were conducted a number of legislative changes 
have been promulgated with the aim of alleviating fraudulent financial reporting.  
One of particular consequence was the 2002 implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOA).  This Act, which contains comprehensive reforms in corporate 
governance, increased the statutory requirements mandatory for companies 
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publicly traded in the US and strengthening the penalties imposed on entities 
contravening these requirements.  The SOA was sanctioned expressly for the 
purposes of protecting investors by not only improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures, but also by deterring and punishing corporate 
and accounting fraud and corruption. 
 
Given the overwhelming association between fraud and senior levels of 
management, it is deemed important to understand the underlying forces that give 
rise to financial statement fraud and whether certain attributes of corporate 
governance are effective in mitigating the likelihood of this deceptive behaviour 
occurring.  To accomplish this the paper will investigate known cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting with the aim of identifying differences in corporate 
governance between fraud and non-fraud companies.  In particular, the objective 
of this study is to establish whether a relationship exists between selected 
corporate governance attributes and the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  It asks whether fraud is associated with a lack of effective corporate 
governance diligently monitoring the actions of management.  Or is there no 
substance to this assumption? 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The approach of this study will be to test a number of related hypotheses to 
determine if elements of corporate governance are associated with the likelihood 
that financial results may be fraudulently reported.  To establish a thorough 
understanding of both fraudulent financial reporting and corporate governance a 
methodical examination of prior research will be conducted.  This examination 
will evaluate the findings of earlier studies in related areas and use this 
information to provide a basis upon which the investigation will be carried out. 
 
The study will draw upon past regulatory research such as the NCFFR to gain an 
understanding of what fraudulent financial reporting is.  The findings of these 
earlier studies will also be utilised to aid in establishing a definition of this type of 
fraud.  The objective will be to create a definition for fraudulent financial 
reporting, based on regulatory findings, that closely corresponds with the intent of 
this study.  Therefore, a thorough comprehension of what constitutes fraud from a 
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regulatory perspective is relevant to discerning how the term will be interpreted 
by this study. 
 
The selection of independent variables and the development of hypotheses will be 
based on the results of prior academic research, with an aim of making particular 
use of those variables already shown to have some degree of explanatory power.  
(This concept is further developed in Chapter 3.)  In addition, this study will draw 
on an agency theory framework to provide support for the inclusion of each 
variable and to explain the interrelationships among them.  Agency theory will 
also be used to identify the underlying relations between the variables so that the 
nature and direction of the relationships can be postulated.  The objective being to 
develop a number of hypotheses that will ultimately provide an understanding of 
whether a significant relationship exists between variables depicting a variety of 
corporate governance attributes and fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
As corporate governance entails a structure for monitoring the actions of a 
company and the persons who run it, the purpose of using attributes of the 
governance system as the independent variables is to ascertain if differences exist 
with regard to the monitoring maintained by entities.  In this respect, it is thought 
that ineffective corporate monitoring may be positively related to the occurrence 
of fraudulent financial reporting.  Therefore, relevance will be afforded to any 
observable differences in corporate governance attributes between the sample of 
fraud companies and their matched non-fraud counterparts. 
 
The SOA was enacted to provide greater assurance for the integrity of financial 
reporting in US listed companies and as such, where it was deemed appropriate, 
new rules were established in relation to corporate governance.  These rules were 
seen as strengthening and broadening the role of corporate governance as a whole, 
but in particular the responsibilities of monitoring bodies such as the audit 
committee, board of directors and external auditors.  By strengthening the 
obligations of these key monitoring players, which along with management are 
considered to have primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of 
fraud (NACD, 1999), the SOA sought to increase the effectiveness of corporate 
governance.  Therefore, this legalisation will be used to provide guidance and aid 
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in the selection and measurement of many of the corporate governance variables 
included in this study. 
 
Prior research, along with the findings of initial descriptive tests conducted on the 
data collected, will be used to determine which statistical testing methods are 
most appropriate for this study.  Specifically, the tests will be performed with the 
objective of providing empirical evidence to answer the primary research 
question: 
 
Is there a relationship between corporate governance attributes and the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting? 
 
1.3 Overview of Fraud 
Fraud is a broad legal term that encompasses a wide range of wrongful acts 
undertaken by an entity or its representatives.  These acts can range from minor 
employee theft or unproductive behaviour, to gross and deliberate distortion of 
corporate records (NCFFR, 1987).  Misappropriation of assets and fraudulent 
financial reporting are of particular concern because they have an adverse affect 
on the integrity of a company’s reported financial condition.  Material 
misstatement of a company’s financial statements, such as that which arises in 
cases of fraudulent financial reporting, can have a detrimental influence on the 
market value, reputation, and ability to achieve the strategic objectives of an entity 
(KPMG, 2004).  This in turn can have serious consequences for a company’s 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, directors, management and other stakeholders. 
 
While fraud can take many forms, fraudulent financial reporting was defined by 
the NCFFR as “…intentional or reckless conduct, whether by act or omission, that 
results in materially misleading financial statements” (1987, p.3).  The investing 
public relies heavily upon the financial statements of a publicly traded company to 
provide an impression of the economic and operational performance achieved by 
the organisation during the previous fiscal year.  When the figures or disclosures 
conveyed in these statements are fraudulently reported, or pertinent information is 
omitted, shareholders and potential investors are manipulated into thinking the 
company is achieving better results than it actually is.  Viton (2003) described 
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management fraud as “…the most costly fraudulent act.  It involves the deliberate 
misstatement of financial statements to reflect financial performance that is better 
than economic reality”(p.22).  As the basis upon which many shareholders make 
their investment decisions, misrepresentations reported in financial statements can 
cause investors to make inaccurate or misinformed investment decisions, which 
could ultimately cost them millions of dollars in lost market capitalisation.  It is 
this type of fraud with which this investigation is concerned, and its meaning is 
further discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
1.4 Overview of Corporate Governance  
The term ‘corporate governance’ is synonymous with the systems by which 
organisations are directed, administered and controlled.  “It encompasses 
authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised 
in the organisation.  It is the control of corporations and systems of oversight and 
the accountability of those in control” (Willis, 2005, pg.87).  Furthermore, 
corporate governance is the process through which an organisation establishes, 
achieves and monitors its objectives.  Hence, an understanding of what corporate 
governance is and how it works may contribute to an awareness of how attributes 
of this monitoring structure may be associated with the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.  It is anticipated that the monitoring aspects of corporate 
governance, which are the predominant focus of this study, may prove to 
significantly differ between fraud and non-fraud companies. 
 
Of primary importance to corporate governance are the relationships and 
responsibilities between the board of directors, management, shareholders and 
other relevant stakeholders.  To this extent corporate governance is fundamentally 
concerned with creating an environment that encourages managers to act in a 
manner that ensures the organisation is properly and honestly managed in the 
interests of the entity itself and its shareholders.  Of equal importance, is the 
existence of conditions whereby managers will be held accountable for their 
actions.  In this manner corporate governance is considered to be a multi-faceted 
influence that deals with issues of fiduciary duty and accountability, as well as 
incorporating economic aspects related to the maximisation of shareholder wealth. 
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It is therefore proposed that a breakdown in the governance structure could be 
what attracts fraudulent behaviour.  Archambeault (2000) described, “An effective 
corporate governance structure should, in addition to ensuring optimal financial 
performance and maximising shareholder wealth, ensure the integrity of financial 
reporting”.  Furthermore, the author determined that, “…failure to prevent the 
occurrence of fraud and financial reporting violations is an ex-post indication of 
ineffective corporate governance” (pg.18).  Likewise, analysis of corporate 
governance structures by DeChow, Sloan and Sweeney determined that there was 
a systematic relationship between financial manipulations and weaknesses in 
oversight.  The authors concluded that, “…poor oversight of management through 
weak governance structures is an important catalyse for earning manipulation” 
(1996, pg.30). 
 
While a structure that adequately governs the conduct of an organisation includes 
both management and other corporate governance participants it is understood 
that a principal weakness in the past has been the “…excessive concentration of 
power in the hands of top management.  Rebalancing or equalising this power is a 
prerequisite for controlling management fraud and promoting accurate financial 
reporting (Tipgos & Keefe, 2004, pg.46).  In what could be thought of as an effort 
to create an improved balance of power, the SOA clearly delineates the roles of 
the various participants in the corporate governance structure, being senior 
management, audit committees, board of directors, and external auditors (Sack, 
2004).  It is considered that by introducing increased statutory requirements for all 
parties involved in corporate governance, especially through maintaining greater 
vigilance over the financial reporting process, the desired effect of attaining better 
control over any abuse of corporate power is more likely to be achievable.  It is 
these monitoring functions, or more precisely how and to what degree they are 
implemented, that may create a difference between fraud and non-fraud 
companies. 
 
1.5 Theoretical Perspective 
This study will draw on agency theory to test whether hypothesised relationships 
exist between corporate governance monitoring bodies, such as audit committees, 
boards of directors and external auditors, and the incidence of fraudulent financial 
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reporting.  It is considered an agency theory framework has the ability to not only 
help explain why a fraud might occur, but also how monitoring mechanisms, such 
as those provided by corporate governance, could be associated with this type of 
deceptive behaviour.  In this way agency theory will help to explain the motives 
of those that commit or allow fraud to occur, explain why the selected variables 
may be relevant to test, and why certain patterns may (or may not) be found in the 
test results. 
 
Nowadays, the vast majority of medium to large size organisations have numerous 
and widely dispersed ownership in the form of shareholders.  It is this kind of 
dispersed ownership arrangement that inhibits shareholders from being more 
actively involved in the management of the companies they own.  In these 
instances an agent is appointed to manage the day-to-day operation of the 
company, thereby creating a situation where there is a separation of ownership 
and control.  Berle and Means (1932) suggested that this distinction between 
ownership and control, which is inherent in the corporate form, could give rise to 
the potential for conflicts of interests between agents and principals.  Hence, the 
separation of ownership and control can lead to an agency problem. 
 
An agency relationship exists when “…the actions of one individual affect both 
his welfare and that of another person in an explicit or implicit contractual 
relationship” (Padilla, 2002, p.5).  Jensen and Meckling recognised that the 
“…contractual relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a 
corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship” (1976, p.6).  As such, 
there are two major problems that can arise in an agency relationship of this 
nature, namely adverse selection and moral hazard.  In 1987 Kotowitz defined 
moral hazard as the “…actions of economic agents in maximising their own utility 
to the detriment of others…” (p.549).  In other words the consequence of 
benefiting oneself inequitably is a ‘moral hazard’ (Hsieh & Tsai, 2005).  For the 
purposed of this study the reference is to the managers who commit fraud and in 
doing so serve there own interests at the expense of others. 
 
The cost of resolving conflicts of interests caused by separation of ownership and 
control are termed agency costs and include the cost of contracting with the agent, 
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and the cost to owners of monitoring the actions of agents.  Agency theory 
recognises that monitoring mechanisms, being “…mechanisms for observing, 
recording and measuring the output of the efforts and strivings of the agent” 
(Moldoveanu & Martin, 2001, p.3), may be quite costly for the principal.  
However, it also acknowledges that such monitoring of agent behaviour is one 
way in which self-interest factors can be moderated.  Corporate governance, such 
as that provided by audit committees, boards of directors, and external auditors, 
enable shareholders to more closely monitor the actions of managers.  Whereas, 
imperfect or ineffective monitoring of agents might encourage managers, in their 
role as corporate agents, to take additional risks that may include committing 
fraud; improving the effectiveness of corporate monitoring may reduce the 
occurrence of this type of deceptive behaviour. 
 
In the context of this study, agency theory will be used to portray why a conflict 
of interests may lead to the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting, and how 
a relationship between this type of fraud and the monitoring mechanisms provided 
by corporate governance may exist.  Thus, taking agency theory into 
consideration it could then be deemed that the predominance with which senior 
management are found to be involved with the occurrence of fraudulent financial 
reporting may be indicative of an agency problem.  For that reason, it may then be 
justifiable to assume that by enhancing corporate governance, monitoring efficacy 
should improve and a reduction in fraud should occur as a consequence.  Given 
these agency assumptions, independent variables will be identified with the aim of 
detecting associations between corporate governance attributes and financial 
reporting fraud. 
 
1.6 Method 
The study will use three databases from which to gather data.  Firstly LexisNexus 
will be used to identify cases of fraudulent financial reporting.  This will require 
an examination of all Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER’s) 
issued by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1 January 2004 
and 30 June 2006 (being the time period covered by this study), to determine 
which cases constitute fraudulent financial reporting.  It will then be necessary to 
establish that sufficient financial and corporate governance data for each of the 
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companies identified in the AAER’s is publicly available.  To accomplish this, 
both the Thomson ONE Banker and SEC EDGAR databases will be utilised, with 
each company being individually checked against these databases to determine 
sufficient information exists. 
 
The Thomson ONE Banker database will provide access to the companies’ 
financial information, which will be electronically downloaded and transferred to 
an Excel spreadsheet.  The EDGAR database will be used to retrieve the 
necessary information pertaining to the corporate governance maintained by each 
company.  This data will need to be collected manually by conducting a review of 
the statutory filings (Form 10-K and/or Proxy Statements) held for each company 
by the SEC and then transferring the information collected onto a spreadsheet.  
Those cases found to constitute fraudulent financial reporting and which have 
accessibility to sufficient data will form the basis of the fraud company sample. 
 
Once the fraud company sample has been determined the matching process to pair 
each fraud company with an industry-size matched control company will begin.  
The Thomson ONE Banker and EDGAR databases will be used to collect the data 
necessary to allow the matching process to be accomplished.  In particular the 
search facility of the Thomson ONE Banker database, which allows explicit 
search criteria to be specified, will be used to identify possible matches for each 
fraud company.  Those companies identified as possible matches then need to be 
individually checked against the EDGAR database to ascertain whether the SEC 
has previously taken action against them pertaining to fraudulent activities.  Any 
company found during this stage to have prior indictments for fraud will be 
eliminated from further inclusion in the matching process.  Of the remaining 
possible matches, the company that most closely resembles the fraud company 
based on the matching criteria (being industry, time, size and stock exchange) will 
then be selected to form the non-fraud company sample. 
 
In a similar manner to fraud companies, all non-fraud companies must have 
sufficient corporate governance data publicly available so that the independent 
variables can be populated.  The EDGAR database will be used to examine the 
SEC filings of each ‘non-fraud’ company to obtain the required information.  
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Once this information has been collected and the matched pairs have been 
confirmed the data will be transferred from the Excel spreadsheet to the SPSS 
system for statistical analysis. 
 
A number of tests will be performed on the fraud companies and their 
appropriately matched non-fraud counterparts to identify attributes of corporate 
governance that may predispose a company to fraudulently report its financial 
statements.  These tests will include paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
to determine whether significant differences exist between the corporate 
governance attributes employed by fraud and non-fraud companies, and also 
provide evidence as to the quality of the matched pairs.  This will be followed by 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation test to evaluate if multicollinearity is present 
among the independent variables and conditional logistic regression to develop 
and test the model.  Lastly, validation tests will be performed to check the 
robustness of the regression model and determine it is sensitive to changes in data 
sets.  The results of these tests will be based on the computed differences in 
corporate governance attributes observed between the pairs of matched fraud and 
non-fraud companies, and ultimately determine which attributes are positively or 
negatively associated with the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  Further 
detail with regard to the methods and databases used in this study is provided in 
Chapter 4. 
 
1.7  Significance of the Study 
This paper will be aimed at providing relevant and insightful information on 
fraudulent financial reporting and in particular the consequence enhancements to 
corporate governance may have on its occurrence.  While some research exists 
with regard to the various aspects of corporate governance, only a small quantity 
is linked with fraudulent financial reporting per se.  The lack of empirical 
evidence linking these two elements adds considerably to the significance of this 
study.  The consequence of fraud, and in particular what corporate governance 
attributes may be associated with its occurrence, is a very important and worthy 
topic of research, and one that could have a substantial impact on a number of 
parties.  Accordingly, it is considered that the findings of this research will be of 
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significant benefit to regulators, professional associations, corporate governance 
bodies, and additionally, the investing public. 
 
As a result of prior research a number of amendments to regulation and legislation 
have been implemented in relation to corporate governance.  It is proposed that 
this research will provide new findings as to the effects regulated enhancements 
(composed under the new corporate governance rules promulgated in the SOA) 
will have on the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  In this regard this 
study will be able to test variables not previously tested in earlier studies due to 
the inaccessibility of the information needed to populate the variables.  New 
regulatory requirements are such that disclosure of certain governance 
information, such as the expertise of the audit committee members, is now 
mandatory, making information not previously obtainable now available for 
testing purposes. 
 
Of relevance to this study are the attributes of corporate governance that depict an 
audit committees’ functionality, a board of directors composition, a company’s 
ownership structure and factors relating to the company’s appointed external 
auditor.  Whilst some research pertaining to the deterrent qualities of audit 
committees’ and board of directors on the occurrence of fraud exists, only one 
previous study has examined the presence of new corporate governance standards 
on the existence of financial statement fraud (Persons, 2005).  It is intended that 
this study will refine and expand upon Persons (2005) findings and thereby 
provide additional evidence to support the existence of a relationship between 
various attributes of corporate governance and fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Taking into consideration the recent amendments made to legislation it is deemed 
timely to investigate whether some of the new rules may have a likely effect on 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  With this in mind the time span 
over which the investigation will be conducted will extend between the years 
2004 and 2006.  It is believed the study will contribute significantly to the 
corporate governance and fraud literature in that it will be the first of this nature to 
analyse this most recent and consequential timeframe.  Furthermore, the study’s 
findings will be closely aligned with many of the corporate governance attributes 
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that are now mandatory under the SOA and new listing rules making the results 
more relevant to present day conditions. 
 
1.8 Organisation of the Report 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  The next chapter provides a 
discussion on the dependent variable, fraudulent financial reporting.  This is 
followed by a review of the relevant literature on corporate governance from 
which the independent variables will be selected for inclusion in a statistical 
model to be used for testing purposes and hypotheses development.  The methods 
chapter will present the research design and provide further information about the 
matching process, variable measurement and chosen statistical model.  Chapter 5 
will report the findings of the study, while a discussion on the implication of these 
findings, examination of the study’s limitations and suggestions for future 
research, will be provided in chapter 6. 
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Chapter Two 
 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Fraud can take many forms and include numerous deceitful actions.  This chapter 
will provide a general understanding of what fraud is and in particular the act of 
fraudulently reporting financial information.  Once this is established the paper 
will use regulatory based studies to aid in the creation of a definition that will be 
used by this study to characterise fraudulent financial reporting.  The rationale for 
establishing this definition and a breakdown on how this study will interpret the 
proposed definition will be addressed, along with the importance of identifying 
this type of fraud. 
 
This chapter will then discuss how it intends to measure fraudulent financial 
reporting.  To undertake this task an examination of the SEC will be performed to 
clarify the role the it plays in legislating and enforcement of the securities laws 
that serve to protect billions of US public investors.  Awareness of how this 
authority works is considered imperative to understanding why enforcement 
proceedings undertaken by the SEC will be used to measure fraudulent financial 
reporting.  This will also help to establish why AAER’s issued by the SEC will be 
the source from which the sample of fraud companies will be drawn. 
 
2.2 What is Fraudulent Financial Reporting? 
In recent years US investors have been hit hard by the numerous blatant cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting found to be prevalent in some of the countries 
biggest and most influential companies.  Frauds perpetrated by such companies as 
Enron, Worldcom, Quest and HealthSouth, to name but a few, have resulted in 
monumental losses for the investing public.  Enron, once the seventh largest 
company by market capitalisation in America, averaging US$90 per share and 
worth US$70 billion in 2000, was by late 2001 the largest bankruptcy in US 
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history.  The cause of the collapse,  “…the largest financial fraud and audit failure 
on record” (Morrison, 2004, pg.125).  With statistics like these it is 
understandable that financial reporting frauds ‘…have helped to fuel a massive 
loss of confidence in the integrity of American business and have contributed to a 
very sharp decline in the U.S. stock market” (Carson, 2003, p.389). 
 
Many of these financial reporting scandals include such actions by management 
as manipulating earnings, misapplication of accounting principles and/or failing to 
report significant events. More specifically, many prior studies (Persons, 2006; 
Bédard, Chtourou & Courteau 2004; Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma, 2004; 
Archambeault, 2002; Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2000; Beasley, 1999) have found 
that fraudulent financial reporting generally involves: 
• Manipulation, falsification or alteration of accounting records or 
supporting documents from which financial statements are 
prepared 
• Misrepresentation in, or intentional omission from, the financial 
statements of events, transactions, or other significant information 
• Misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, 
classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure (Grice Sr., 
2001, p.11). 
 
These actions, which are usually perpetrated in an attempt to improve the 
company’s financial appearance, can severely corrupt the legitimacy of the 
accounting statements and distort the disclosures presented in the financial report.  
As such, the issuance of materially misleading financial statements by a company 
listed on one of the US stock exchanges is a violation of the Securities Act 1933 
and/or the Securities Exchange Act 1934.  The anti-fraud provisions contained 
within these Acts, namely, section 17(a) of the Securities Act 1933 and section 
10(b) (in conjunction with Rule 10(b)-5) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, 
make it unlawful for any person to use any manipulative or deceptive device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, in connection with the offer or sale of any security. 
Pursuant to these provisions it is also a violation to use any untrue statement of a 
material fact, or omit to state a material fact that would be necessary to make a 
statement not misleading. 
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To further comprehend what constitutes fraud and how this deceptive behaviour is 
regulated against under US law, a review of selected regulatory based studies such 
as the NCFFR, COSO, Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 was undertaken.  Since 
it is the investing public that suffers most from fraudulent financial reporting and 
as regulation can be seen as a formal expression of public expectations of what is 
and what should occur, it would appear justified to look to regulation for further 
guidance on what constitutes this type of fraud.  Knowledge of current and past 
regulation can also help to understand what the courts determine as fraudulent 
financial reporting.  The review of the above mentioned studies therefore enabled 
an appreciation to be gained of their findings and the implementation of any 
changes that were proposed to address concerns relating to fraudulent financial 
reporting.  A discussion of the findings of these studies is provided in Appendix 
A. 
 
In brief, the review identified a number of areas that have been deemed significant 
to regulatory and oversight bodies with regard to fraudulent financial reporting.  
Specifically, the studies demonstrated that senior management were typically at 
the heart of fraudulent activity and further established some causal factors that 
helped to explain why this was so.  Techniques commonly used by perpetrators to 
misrepresent the financial statements of a company were also recognised and 
evidence was provided to support the belief that it is primarily revenue and asset 
accounts that are manipulated.  This action along with the fact that the fraudulent 
behaviour is principally perpetrated by senior management has lead to the opinion 
that override of the internal control system is the most likely avenue used to 
tamper with the necessary accounting transactions and orchestrate many of the 
frauds that occur.  This type of interference with the accounting system can 
provide signals of abuse that necessitates the effective functioning of a company’s 
corporate governance structure. 
 
The regulatory studies under review also served to further establish the 
importance of researching fraudulent financial reporting.  The studies impress 
upon the reader the significance of ensuring the accuracy of the financial reports 
issued by public companies.  Investments made by the public are a key source for 
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many companies of obtaining the capital funds necessary to function adequately 
and expand their operations.  If the oversight structure is not functioning 
adequately and senior management is able to override internal controls 
unhindered, manipulated financial statements may ultimately be presented to a 
company’s shareholders.  This practise can have severe consequences for 
shareholders and therefore it is of the utmost importance that investors can depend 
on a company’s financial report to give a true and fair view of the company they 
have investing in. 
 
2.3  Fraudulent Financial Reporting Defined 
A reasonably broad definition of fraud is that it generally involves “…a deliberate 
misrepresentation, which causes another person to suffer damages, usually 
monetary losses” (Infozech, 2005, pg.2).  Or, more specifically in relation to 
fraudulent financial reporting, it has been defined as “…intentional or reckless 
conduct, whether by act or omission, that results in materially misleading 
financial statements” (NCFFR, 1987, p.3).  This latter definition more closely 
equates with the focus of this study, which is aimed at investigating whether a 
relationship exists between various corporate governance attributes and fraudulent 
financial reporting.  To provide a better understanding of what this type of fraud 
involves and ultimately propose a definition by which this study will measure 
fraudulent financial reporting, the meaning of various aspects of the NCFFR 
definition will be examined in greater detail. 
 
2.3.1 Intentional or Reckless Behaviour 
Fraud is an act that typically involves intent and deception.  In addition to 
intentional deceptive behaviour, the definition offered by the NCFFR includes 
reckless conduct, which broadens the performance of this type of deed to those 
that should have known better but chose to ignore the signs.  Fraudulent financial 
reporting is therefore considered to include persons that act with the intention of 
defrauding others, along with persons that act in a reckless manner.  Fraud of this 
nature does not however incorporate acts of pure error that result in materially 
misleading financial statements. 
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To act with intent can be further explained in terms of a person’s knowledge of 
the underlying facts.  It is said that a person acts knowingly if they are aware that 
their conduct will cause harm but willingly pursues their course of action anyway.  
“To act knowingly means to do so voluntarily and deliberately, and not owing to 
mistake or some other innocent reason” (The Gale Group, 1998, pg.2).  Whereas, 
to act recklessly entails, for instance, a person who entertains serious doubts, or 
should with regard to their position or comprehension of the subject matter 
harbour serious doubts, as to the veracity of a fact but chooses not to act on those 
suspicions.  In other words,  
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he/she consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or 
that a result will follow…and such disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would 
exercise in the situation (Municipal Code Corporation, 1998, pg.2). 
 
2.3.2 Materiality 
In particular, fraudulent financial reporting pertains to conduct of the above nature 
that results in a material misrepresentation of the financial statements of an entity.  
To determine what is material and what is not requires consideration of both 
qualitative and quantitative factors and as such is not a simple calculation.  
Consequently, accessing materiality requires judgement to be made on what 
would or would not be considered likely to influence the decision of a 
knowledgeable investor given a specific set of circumstances (SEC, 1999).  
Accordingly, the US Supreme Court has previously determined that, “A fact is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in making his investment decision”.  It was further judged by 
the Court that “…to fulfil the materiality requirement there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
made available” (Horwich, 2000, pg.1024).  However, due to inherent difficulties 
and the complexity involved in qualitative analysis, quantitative methods have 
predominantly been used to calculate materiality. 
 
Over the years a quantitative 5% ‘rule of thumb’ has often been used by 
management and accountants to aid in the identification of “potentially material 
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transactions and events” (Vorhies, 2005, pg.2).  In reference to this, it is generally 
thought that a reasonable and prudent investor’s decision would not be influenced 
by a 5% or less fluctuation in activities reported in the financial statements.  
However, it has been found that caution should be exercised in using this 5% 
threshold as it is not deemed to included misstatements or omissions in the 
financial report that are as a result of “…particularly egregious circumstances, 
such as self dealing or misappropriation by senior management” (Horwich, 2000, 
pg.1025).  The SEC also advise that it is inappropriate to rely solely on a 
quantitative approach that dictates what is material simply by exceeding or not a 
predetermined numerical threshold, and that such a reliance “…has no basis in the 
accounting literature or the law” (SEC, 1999, pg.2). 
 
The SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin no. 99 addresses issues pertaining to 
materiality.  In this bulletin the SEC reminded registrants that while they do not 
object to a ‘rule of thumb’ approach being used as a preliminary step in assessing 
materiality, this type of quantitative measurement “…cannot appropriately be 
used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant considerations” (SEC, 1999, 
pg.2).  Similar to the definitions given by US Supreme Court and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board1, the SEC considers that the most relevant factor 
concerning materiality lies with the significance of an item to the financial 
statements user.  “A matter is ‘material’ if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable person would consider it important” (SEC, 1999, pg.2). 
 
2.3.3 The Perpetrators 
Fraudulent financial reporting can be perpetrated by a number of different players 
in the corporate environment but in reality it usually involves either management 
or those undertaking governance duties.  In this regard it is generally management 
that actually orchestrates and carries out the fraud, and therefore acts with intent.  
While on the other hand, it is those in monitoring positions, such as boards of 
directors, audit committees and external auditors that act recklessly by not having 
                                                          
1  The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgement 
of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have been changed or influenced by the 
inclusion or correction of the item. 
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assessed the risk correctly or acted on their reservations as to the accuracy of the 
assertions presented in the financial report. 
 
Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman (2000), claim that, 
By definition fraudulent financial reporting involves intent and 
deception.  Typical frauds involve scheming by highly motivated, 
clever teams of knowledgeable managers with the capacity for 
considerable political persuasion and intimidation of both their own 
employees and their auditors (p.236). 
 
As indicated by the above interpretation, a company’s senior management is 
normally the main offender when it comes to actually devising and executing the 
scheme to defraud.  This primarily comes about because of the position managers 
hold and their ability within that position to override internal controls, or as the 
above implies, persuade employees to do so on their behalf.  In support of this 
assertion the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, found that 
“…many financial statement frauds have been perpetrated by intentional override 
by senior management of what might otherwise appear to be effective internal 
controls” (AICPA, 2005, pg.1).  It has been suggested that management may 
override controls to achieve a number of objectives, chief amongst them being to 
create an artificial picture of the company’s economic condition.  To achieve this 
fraudulent image managers may “…intentionally misstate the nature or time of 
revenue by recording fictitious business transactions or changing the timing of 
legitimate transactions; establishing or reversing reserves to manipulate results; 
and altering records related to significant or unusual transactions” (Morrow, 2005, 
pg.1). 
 
On the other hand, reckless behaviour by persons in a position of corporate 
governance is normally as a consequence of inadequate monitoring of 
management.  Persons holding monitoring positions, such as the members of a 
company’s board of directors, or audit committee and also the elected external 
auditor are appointed to these positions of influence to oversee the running of the 
company on behalf of its owners, the shareholders.  When these persons (whom 
are generally considered appropriately skilled to undertake the monitoring task) 
fail to adequately assess the risk or at least apply a healthy amount of scepticism 
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and take appropriate action when doubts exist, they are deemed to have acted in a 
reckless manner. 
 
Taking all the above into consideration it was deemed that for the purposes of this 
paper fraudulent financial reporting would be defined as: 
The conscious effort by management or other members of the 
governance body to sanction, or otherwise support, the production of 
materially incorrect financial reports. 
 
2.3.4 Interpretation of the Definition 
Similar in essence to the NCFFR definition, this definition also seeks to 
distinguish that the fraud was intentionally executed by the use of the words 
‘conscious effort’, which is taken to infer intent and awareness.  Furthermore, 
fraudulent financial reporting can be ‘sanctioned’; meaning authorised or simply 
allowed to occur, by management or other members of the governance body.  
‘Support’ is deemed to have been given in cases where it is obvious that the 
circumstances under which the fraudulent activities occurred were such that 
failure to detect a problem represents a dereliction of duties and consequently the 
conduct of the party involved is thought to be reckless.  The inclusion of this 
expression is seen as embodying situations where although the party involved was 
not directly aware of the fraud, their position of authority is such that they should 
have known something was amiss and taken appropriate action to allay their 
suspicions. 
 
For the purposes of this report the governance body of a company is considered to 
include not only the board of directors and its appointed committees, but also the 
appointed external auditor.  This was deemed appropriate because of the 
monitoring function performed by the external auditor, which is considered a very 
important part of the governance of a company.  If we interpret the term 
governance to include all the processes, systems, and controls that are used to 
safeguard and grow a company’s assets, then the external auditor could be judged 
(a medium whose purpose is) a control used to protect the interests of the public 
in much the same manner as a board of directors.  Therefore, the definition for 
this study includes instances where any member of the management or 
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governance body of a company sanctions or otherwise supports the occurrence of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Finally, the term ‘materially incorrect’ is deemed to include the common 
knowledge interpretation of materiality discussed in subsection 2.3.2, and pertains 
to information that is of an accounting nature.  Furthermore, the use of this 
materially incorrect information in the production of financial reports is intended 
to encompass all types of financial statements and disclosures made in both the 
interim or annual reports of a public company. 
 
2.8 The Securities Exchange Commission 
Companies found to be flaunting the bounds of reliable corporate reporting in 
violation of US anti-fraud provisions may find themselves the subject of a SEC 
enforcement proceeding.  As such SEC enforcement actions are used as a proxy 
for companies in which fraudulent financial reporting is deemed to have occurred.  
The following sets out the SEC’s authority over financial reporting in the US.  It 
also establishes how the SEC comes to issue an enforcement action and why 
doing so is a reasonable indicator of fraud. 
 
The SEC is the regulatory authority that administers both the Securities Act 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act 1934, and in doing so has oversight 
responsibility for financial reporting in the US.  This oversight responsibility 
means that the SEC is actively involved in monitoring the integrity of the 
financial statements reported by publicly listed companies.  Bearing in mind the 
purpose of their obligations and the intent of the Acts they administer, the SEC 
has declared one of its missions as protecting the interests of investors.  In 
fulfilment of this mission the SEC has judged that, 
The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United 
States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, 
whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to 
certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as 
they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to 
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public. This 
provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge 
for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only 
through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate 
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information can people make sound investment decisions (SEC, 2006, 
pg.2). 
 
In accordance with the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934 
it is a violation to issue materially misleading financial statements.  The anti-fraud 
provisions contained within these two Acts confer upon the SEC wide-ranging 
powers to investigate possible infringements and take enforcement proceedings 
against any offender found to be in violation of these securities laws.  These 
powers allow the Commission to bring enforcement actions against entities or 
individuals for such misconduct as misrepresentation or omission of important 
information about securities, manipulating the market prices of securities, and/or 
insider trading.  “The violators may be a company, directors, officers or 
employees, a company’s attorneys, an accounting firm or individual accountants, 
or any other party involved in the preparation of false financial information or 
other information required by the SEC” (Licata, Bremser & Rollins, 1997, 
pg.539). 
 
The SEC uses a number of avenues to determine when enforcement action may be 
necessary.  Since listed companies are required by law to disclose documents to 
the SEC, including financial reports, proxy materials, and any other information 
relating to the sale or disposal of securities, this allows staff to undertake routine 
reviews of disclosure records filed by these entities.  Through this review process 
it is possible to check whether publicly listed companies are meeting their 
disclosure requirements and/or if it is considered a potential violation of the 
securities laws have in the past, or may currently be occurring.  The Enforcement 
Division of the SEC acquires evidence pertaining to possible violations from 
many sources, “…including from its own surveillance activities, other Divisions 
of the SEC, the self-regulatory organisations and other securities industry sources, 
press reports, and investor complaints” (SEC, 2006, pg.8). 
 
Enforcement actions may be filed in the Federal Court or internally before an 
administrative law judge depending upon the seriousness of the offence and the 
technical nature of the matter concerned (SEC, 2006).  While a few violators may 
choose to contest the indictments laid by the SEC, most choose to settle the case 
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without admitting or denying the charges.  In fact, it is estimated that more than 
three-quarters of all enforcement cases end in settlement (Swartz, 2006). 
 
Where the choice to settle a case is elected, a motion for settlement is offered by 
the alleged offender and negotiated with the SEC who takes into consideration the 
appropriateness of the offer bearing in mind the nature of the proceedings and the 
public interest.  In the event a settlement is sanctioned in a fraudulent financial 
reporting case, a cease and desist order would normally be imposed either with or 
without the issuing of a disgorgement order or monetary penalty and the 
requirement to restate financial statements (SEC, 2003).  In so offering and 
accepting a motion to settle the alleged offender waives their rights to further 
judicial proceedings and consents to the disciplinary terms of the settlement. 
 
As the Commission is a government agency and only has access to limited funds 
it must choose what cases it considers are worthy of pursuing.  The probability of 
a successful prosecution is high on the agenda and hence great importance is 
placed upon the evidence able to be obtained.  Whilst this does create a limitation 
for this type of research (see Chapter Six for further discussion on this limitation), 
it does provide an amount of certainty as to the probability that the offence 
occurred.  Therefore, taking this aspect into consideration along with the fact that 
many settlements incur substantial monetary penalties, entities that choose to 
settle without a formal judicial hearing will be included in the sample of fraud 
companies, regardless of the fact that the charges were neither admitted nor 
denied.  The inclusion of settled cases was further deemed applicable on account 
that earlier research of this nature (Persons, 2005; Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 
2004; Kaminski, Wetzel & Guan, 2004; COSO, 1999; Beasley, 1996) also 
considered their selection appropriate. 
 
When the SEC takes enforcement proceedings against an offender an Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) is issued.  AAER’s are legal briefs 
that provide a detailed summary of the relevant facts of each case brought by the 
SEC in relation to auditing or accounting matters.  The AAER will generally give 
a list of the named defendants and some background as to their designation, 
history with the company, and what part they played in the fraud.  It also 
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describes the alleged offences and the remedy sought by the SEC, the period 
covered by the fraud, as well as giving a brief account of the fraudulent activities 
undertaken and the techniques used.  While AAER’s only relate to public 
companies listed on one of the US stock exchanges, and thereby subject to SEC 
regulation, they are the source most predominantly used for selecting fraud 
companies.  In addition to the research listed above, other studies that have used 
AAER’s as a method of sample selection include Geriesh, 2003; SEC, 2003a; 
Archambeault, 2002; Saksena, 2001; Bonner, Palmrose and Young, 1998; and 
McMullen, 1996. 
 
Taking into consideration the above, as well as keeping in mind that the purpose 
of the aforementioned Acts administered by the SEC is - “(a) to provide investors 
with material financial and other information concerning securities offered for 
public sale; and (b) to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit, and other fraudulent acts 
and practices in the sale of securities generally” (Fanning & Cogger, 1998, pg.3), 
it would appear that the use of enforcement proceedings taken by the SEC is an 
appropriate measure by which to identify the occurrence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, fraud will be considered to 
have occurred where an AAER has been issued alleging a violation against 
section 17(a) of the Securities Act 1933 and/or section 10(b) (in conjunction with 
Rule 10(b)-5) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934.  These two sections are 
deemed the anti-fraud provisions of the Acts that deal specifically with 
misrepresentations made my public companies regarding their financial condition. 
 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has served to provide a general understanding of what fraudulent 
financial reporting is.  To achieve this a literature review of prior regulatory fraud 
research was performed with the aim of providing a more comprehensive 
understanding of what is considered to constitute this type of fraud.  The review 
covered four studies believed to be of significant importance, and included such 
aspects of fraud as the predominant perpetrators, causal factors, commonly used 
techniques, and the role of audit committees and external auditors.  A common 
theme shared by all of these studies appears to endorse the belief that 
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strengthening corporate governance may aid in restraining the incidence of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Prior to settling on a definition to be used by this study, various aspects of the 
NCFFR definition of fraud were discussed and the meaning of several words 
examined in greater detail.  A definition that characterises fraudulent financial 
reporting for the purposes of this paper was then given along with guidance on 
how the definition would be interpreted. 
 
The chapter’s final objective was to discuss how the study intends to measure the 
occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting.  This was achieved by discerning 
what the SEC’s responsibility with regard to financial reporting of public 
companies in the US is, and how the issuance of an enforcement action by this 
regulatory authority could be used as a measure of fraud.  The following chapter 
undertakes a further review of the fraud literature but from a Corporate 
Governance stance.  This review is intended to provide support for the inclusion 
of the independent variables depicting a variety of governance aspects that have 
been shown to have deterrent qualities in the fight against financial statement 
fraud. 
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Chapter Three 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will firstly look at what, in general terms, corporate governance is.  It 
will then identify and justify the independent variables to be used in this study as 
proxies for corporate governance attributes.  A review of prior corporate 
governance and fraud literature will be used to justify the inclusion of each 
independent variable and provide an understanding of why these attributes may be 
associated with the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
The independent variables depicting corporate governance attributes have been 
grouped into four categories that include Audit Committee Functionality, Board 
of Directors Composition, Ownership Structure and External Auditor Factors.  
Once support for the inclusion of each variable has been provided a number of 
individual hypotheses will be posed.  In some instances two similar hypotheses 
will be posed, one relating to the distinct number and the other based on a 
percentage.  This has been done to take into account that more accuracy can be 
achieved in some cases by a percentage-based calculation rather than a discrete 
number.  In this regard it was considered that by using a discrete number-based 
answer the sheer variability amongst the paired samples for several of the 
corporate governance attributes might distort the test results.  The results of 
testing the hypotheses will be furnished in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
In a speech to the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Sir Adrian Cadbury 
determined, “The corporate governance framework is there to encourage the 
efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship 
of those resources.  The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society” (2000, pg.1).  As recognised earlier in this 
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paper, the separation of ownership and control that is inherent in the corporate 
form can give rise to the potential for conflicts of interest between owners and 
their appointed agents who manage the day-to-day operation of the company 
(Berle & Means, 1932).  To constrain any divergence in interests and ensure 
appropriate accountability of resources it is necessary for a comprehensive 
structure of controls that encourages efficient performance and responsible 
behaviour to operate within the organisation. 
 
Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001) described the corporate governance system as 
covering “…all the mechanisms that ‘govern’ the managers’ behaviour and 
delineates their discretionary latitude” (pg.108).  Corporate governance has also 
been described as dealing with “…the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997, pg.737).  Persons (2006) noted, “One scenario, which greatly 
casts doubt on whether stockholders will be able to receive reasonable return, is 
when a corporation is engaged in fraudulent conduct” (pg.27).  Accordingly, 
corporate governance is used to deter any conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers that may result in fraudulent behaviour causing a 
reduction in shareholder wealth. 
 
As stockholders play a substantial role in supplying the necessary capital to 
corporations and because the outlay of personally monitoring companies actions 
would be to costly for individual investors, it is essential that oversight of the 
fiduciary duty owed to these investors is competently performed by the corporate 
governance structure.  Hermanson’s 2006 study, which contributed ten 
fundamental conclusions about corporate governance, determined that, “Effective 
corporate governance is critical to investor confidence in the financial markets” 
(2006, pg.45).  Although countless interpretations of corporate governance exists, 
regardless of which rendering is used, it would appear that the authority of the 
governing body affords a degree of control over management and provides for 
processes by which the actions of managers can be monitored and held to account. 
 
In today’s corporate environment a good governance structure includes an 
adequately functioning audit committee, a thoughtfully composed board of 
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directors, balanced ownership structure, and an independent and vigilant external 
auditor.  However, to ensure optimal oversight is achieved by these monitoring 
mechanisms they all need to work mutually and in conjunction with a 
comprehensive system of internal controls.  Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 
recognised that “…one of the most important functions that corporate governance 
can play is in ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process” (2002, 
pg.587).  In this realm of thinking effective oversight of the financial reporting 
process by the aforementioned monitoring mechanisms is thought to improve the 
accuracy of what is reported to shareholders and act as a deterrent against possible 
fraudulent behaviour by managers. 
 
Taking into consideration that effective corporate governance may mitigate the 
incidence of financial reporting fraud, it could therefore be postulated that cases 
where fraudulent reporting has been found to occur may be as a consequence of 
lax supervision of top management by monitoring mechanisms.  This chapter is 
aimed at providing support for the inclusion of various attributes of corporate 
governance that will be used as independent variables in testing this conjecture.  
In this respect it is proposed that significant differences in the corporate 
governance attributes may exist between fraud and non-fraud companies, and that 
these differences might help explain how effective governance is related to the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
3.2 Audit Committee Functionality 
In 1940 the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) acknowledged the concept of 
an audit committee and proposed the establishment of such committees in US 
publicly traded companies.  The purpose of the audit committee was seen as 
serving the important function of ensuring the accuracy of the financial reports 
presented by the entities that they served (Buchalter & Yokomoto, 2003).  It 
wasn’t however, until the 1970s that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) first 
required the board of directors of their registrants to appoint an audit committee.  
In so requiring, the NYSE was of the opinion that “…a strong audit committee 
could stimulate improvements in financial reporting and control and strengthen 
the credibility of corporate reports” (Vanasco, 1994, pg.19).  The Nasdaq Stock 
Market (NASDAQ) and American Stock Exchange (ASE) did not follow the 
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NYSE’s example until the 1980s, when it became a requirement to maintain an 
audit committee for all companies listed on the major American stock exchanges. 
 
In his September 1998 speech, now commonly known as the ‘Numbers Game’ 
speech, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that “…qualified, committed, 
independent and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable 
guardians of the public interest” (1998, pg.5).  Consequently, it is considered audit 
committees play an integral oversight role, particularly when it comes to 
providing some protection for the investing public from financial reporting 
shenanigans.  Or, as Verschoor determined, “Audit committees are needed 
because, simply stated, without investor confidence, there isn’t the necessary 
capital for businesses to thrive” (Verschoor, 2001, pg.3).  Therefore, it would 
appear that an audit committee is a vital ingredient in the corporate governance 
mosaic, such that their existence is seen as providing a safeguarding quality so 
that investor interests are protected and confidence in the equity markets can be 
maintained. 
 
The audit committee is a separately designated committee composed of members 
of the board of directors.  One of the committees’ primary roles is to oversee the 
financial reporting process, a responsibility that can include such duties as: 
• Reviewing all financial statements prior to their release 
• Analysing the existing, and any subsequent changes to, 
accounting policies and principals 
• Monitoring the effectiveness of the internal control system 
• Evaluation of the entities exposure to fraud 
• Examination of any significant transactions, and appraisal of key 
management estimates (Archambeault, 2002). 
 
To be capable of satisfactorily fulfilling responsibilities of such a consequential 
nature it is paramount that the committee performs effectively.  Accordingly, 
audit committee functionality has attracted a lot of scrutiny over recent years.  In 
particular, the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
(BRC) on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees and the 
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) in 2002 have transformed and 
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strengthened many of the minimum standards for compliance applicable to audit 
committees.  These minimum standards are aimed at ensuring audit committees 
comprise the attributes considered pertinent to function effectively in their role as 
corporate governance monitors.  Attributes that have been offered as enhancing 
effectiveness are the independence, competence and diligence of the audit 
committee members. 
 
3.2.1 Independence 
The SOA recognised the importance audit committee impartiality plays in the 
oversight of management, and as a result has been instrumental in requiring 
improved standards of independence.  Section 301 of the Act requires the audit 
committee to be comprised solely of independent directors.  An independent audit 
committee member is a person who is not affiliated with the company in any way, 
and does not accept compensation (including consulting, advisory, or other 
compensatory fee) from the company, other than in their capacity as a member of 
the board of directors and any board committee. 
 
The independence of audit committee members was seen as pertinent in the 
attempt to provide a form of corporate governance whose unbiased conduct could 
be counted upon to appropriately monitor the financial activities of the company 
and safeguard against questionable accounting practices being used.  While it is 
not the audit committee’s responsibility to guarantee the accuracy of a company’s 
financial statements, the independence of the audit committee is considered to 
offer some assurance to the investing public as to the reliability of the financial 
assertions made by the entity.  The BRC Report recognised that,  
In its oversight capacity, the audit committee is neither intended nor 
equipped to guarantee with certainty to the full board and shareholders 
the accuracy and quality of a company’s financial statements and 
accounting practices.  Proper financial reporting, accounting, and audit 
functions are collaborative efforts conducted by full-time professionals 
dedicated to these purposes.  The audit committee, as the first among 
equals, oversees the work of the other actors in the financial reporting 
process -- management, including the internal auditor, and the outside 
auditors -- to endorse the processes and safeguards employed by each 
(1999, pg.38). 
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3.2.2 Competence 
The competence of audit committee members is also of the upmost importance to 
the effectual functioning of the committee.  The National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD) acknowledged the important role played by the audit 
committee and as a consequence expressed a heightened need for members to 
possess accounting and/or related financial expertise (1999).  The SEC judged 
that, “Without some level of financial competence, members of an audit 
committee may be unable to adequately perform their vital corporate duties” 
(SEC, 2003b, p.4).  The investing public can not seek comfort in simply the 
provision of an audit committee, that committee has to have the knowledge and 
skills to be capable of doing the job (Hermanson, 2006). 
 
Effective monitoring of financial information by competent audit committee 
members is thought to further motivate management to provide an accurate 
account of the company’s economic state of affairs, and hence reduce the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting.  The NYSE acknowledged the 
significance the audit committee plays in the oversight of management when it 
introduced listing requirements to ensure that committees’ achieved at least a 
minimum level of competence in accounting and financial matters.  Furthermore, 
to reinforce the concept that competent audit committee members are essential to 
improving oversight, the SOA implemented legislation requiring disclosure of 
whether the audit committee is composed of at least one member who possesses 
accounting or related financial management expertise.  And, while this rule 
comprises a disclosure requirement only, companies that do not have a expert 
serving on their audit committee must disclose that fact and offer an explanation 
as to why they have not retained the services of such an expert (Morrison & 
Foerster, 2003). 
 
Given that a great number of the past corporate scandals have hinged on the 
quality of disclosures in the company’s financial statements, and given the 
complexities of these disclosures, along with financial reporting requirements as a 
whole, it would seem justified to require at least one member of the audit 
committee to have financial reporting expertise.  This kind of expertise is believed 
to greatly enhance the audit committee’s chances of detecting, or at least 
 33
discouraging, questionable financial practices.  Financial sophistication gained 
through past employment, professional certification or comparable experience in 
accounting or finance by at least one member of the audit committee can have a 
beneficial effect on the relative level of understanding of the whole committee.  
Increased comprehension of accounting regulations is likely to reduce the 
possibility that questionable accounting practices or judgements will go 
unnoticed. 
 
In addition to the above stipulations, many of the listing authorities of the various 
US stock exchanges now compel all audit committee members to be no less than 
financially literate.  Listing rules define financial literacy as “…the ability to read 
and understand fundamental financial statements, including a company’s balance 
sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement” (Rezaee, Olibe & Minmie, 
2003, pg.534).  An audit committee member’s ability to ask probing questions 
about a company’s accounting practices and financial risks, and the members 
ability to then intelligently evaluate the answers, necessitates the possession of at 
least a rudimentary level of financial literacy (BRC, 1999).  Furthermore, it is 
considered that the involvement of individuals on the audit committee that have 
an understanding of accounting and financial issues can help educate other less 
knowledgeable board members about the risks associated with financial reporting 
(COSO, 1999). 
 
3.2.3 Diligence 
Another aspect considered to be fundamental to the improved functioning of the 
audit committee is the diligence of its members.  Diligence is deemed the process 
factor in achieving audit committee effectiveness (DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault & Reed, 2002).  As a consequence it is considered that the 
diligence of an audit committee is characterised by the persistence with which its 
members execute their oversight duties. 
 
Robert Herdman, the Chief Accountant for the SEC, determined that an effective 
audit committee requires a commitment of both quality and quantity of time.  
Quality time is needed to ensure the critical corporate governance, accounting and 
disclosure issues are given the appropriate attention and quantity of time to permit 
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thorough deliberations and discussion to occur (2002).  A significant degree of 
commitment to the company is needed by audit committee members so that they 
have adequate time to prepare for and attend meetings, along with a willingness to 
learn and stay abreast of the company’s business environment and topical issues 
(BRC, 1999).  Furthermore, while one hundred percent attendance would be 
admirable, it is of more consequence that each member is attentive and 
appropriately participates during the committee meetings.  Entering into pro-
active discussion with senior management and external auditors regarding the 
companies critical accounting practices and policies adopted can be of substantial 
benefit to a member’s core understanding and hence the value of their 
contribution to the committee (Herdman, 2002).  In this respect Kowhn and Ueng 
noted that, “…there simply is no substitute for thoughtful people willing to 
deliberate long and to probe deeply” (2005, pg.122). 
 
The above assertions would seem to indicate independent corporate audit 
committees, whose members possess a degree of financial sophistication and are 
willing to devote sufficient time to discharging their monitoring duties, provide 
superior performance of oversight functions.  This deduction is supported by a 
modest amount of research that has been conducted over the years into a variety 
of issues surrounding the audit committee.  The following review of the prior 
literature will provide support for the inclusion of the independent variables 
classified within the Audit Committee Functionality category. 
 
3.2.4 Number of Members (NmbACMem) 
The Blue Ribbon Commission report (1999) recommended that audit committees 
of listed companies with a market capitalisation of over $200 million should be 
composed of a minimum of three members.  The foundation for this judgement is 
related to the complicated nature of the responsibilities undertaken by the audit 
committee.  In particular, the commission determined that the complexity of 
reviewing accounting and financial matters merited a significant number of 
directors be dedicated to the committee.  Bedard, Chtourou & Courteau (2004) 
considered a minimum of three members provided “…the necessary strength and 
diversity of expertise and views to ensure appropriate monitoring” (pg.12).  It was 
also recognised that while three members was the recommended minimum, the 
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benefits additional members could bring to the committee should be weighed 
against the possibility of incremental cost brought about by poorer communication 
and decision-making associated with larger groups.  “The objective is to have a 
committee not so large as to become unwieldy, but large enough to ensure 
effective monitoring” (Bedard et al., 2004, pg.18).  To achieve this it was 
generally recommended that no more than a maximum of five or six members 
should form the audit committee. 
 
In support of this judgement, Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) 
hypothesised there would be a positive relationship between audit committee size 
and financial reporting quality.  After taking into consideration that audit 
committees were less likely to suffer from many of the problems facing larger 
sized boards of directors, such as slower decision making and a tendency to be 
predisposed to management manipulation caused by fragmented and less cohesive 
groups, the authors still found a significant relation existed.  Univariate test results 
identified a significantly positive relationship between audit committee size and 
financial reporting quality, such that the number of members on the committee 
increased the quality of the financial statements issued.  The authors also verified 
that the results were robust to different measures of financial reporting quality. 
 
Along the same lines, Lin, Li and Yang (2006) found evidence to suggest that a 
negative association was present between the size of an audit committee and the 
occurrence of earnings restatement.  While earnings restatement is not fraudulent 
financial reporting per se, it does indicate the inclination to manipulate financial 
reports, and has been associated with an increased tendency to commit fraud 
(Palmrose & Scholz, 2002).  This negative association indicates that as the 
number of members on an audit committee increased the occurrence of earnings 
restatement decreased.  In addition, the researchers ascertained that this result 
remained stable to changes in committee size measurement, from the actual 
number of members to a dichotomy of whether the committee existed of at least 
four directors (Lin et al., 2006). 
 
Univariate tests conducted in a 2002 study by Archambeault also found that fraud 
companies tended to have smaller audit committees than their no-fraud 
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counterparts.  It was contemplated that the reason for these findings could result 
from smaller committees not possessing enough manpower to adequately oversee 
the financial process, or alternatively that with fewer members the committee held 
less expertise.  In either case it is apparent that the size of a company’s audit 
committee can influence the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  It is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
 
H1: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
audit committee members’ increase. 
 
3.2.5 Independence of Members (NmbIndAC and %IndAC) 
The extent to which audit committee members are independent from management 
can have positive effects on the objectivity and credibility of a company’s 
financial reporting system.  Prior research (Persons, 2005; Uzun, Szewczyk & 
Varma, 2004; Bédard et al., 2004; Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2000; Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides, 2000) also concur that audit committee 
independence improves the integrity of financial statements.  These studies found 
a relationship between the independence of the audit committee and the likelihood 
of a company succumbing to some form of financial reporting manipulation. 
 
More specifically, Persons (2005) found that fraud firms were more likely to have 
audit committees that did not comprise solely of independent directors.  Beasley 
et al. (2000) produced similar results when focusing their research specifically on 
three volatile industry sectors, technology, health care and financial services.  The 
study found that the audit committees of fraud companies within the three 
industries were less independent than their non-fraud industry benchmarks.  
Whereas, Abbott et al. (2000) and Uzun et al. (2004) attained results that 
confirmed a lower incident of misstated or fraudulent financial reports in 
companies that had a completely independent audit committee. 
 
Additional research has investigated the relationship between audit committees 
and earnings management.  While earlier studies of this nature, such as that 
conducted by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), focused on the existence of an 
audit committee, later research has focused more prominently on the 
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independence of the members of such a committee.  For example, Klein used a 
sample of 687 publicly traded US companies to investigate whether the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals (as a proxy for earnings management) was related to 
audit committee independence.  After controlling for a number of other factors 
identified as being related to abnormal accruals and audit committee composition, 
the author found that earnings management was more pronounced for firms that 
had audit committees comprised of less than a majority of independent directors 
(Klein, 2000). 
 
In addition, research conducted by Bedard et al. (2004) and Klein (2002a) both 
found negative relationships between audit committee independence and earnings 
management.  Bedard et al. (2004) considered three aspects of independence, 
“The number of non-related outside members, whether these members are 
managers in other firms, and whether they participate in the firm’s stock option 
plans” (pg.7).  They found that audit committees composed solely of unrelated 
outside directors significantly decreased the probability of earnings management.  
Whilst, Klein (2002a) on the other hand, found that it was the presence of a 
majority of outside directors, rather than the independence of the entire audit 
committee, that had a significant effect on the level of abnormal accruals reported 
by a company. 
 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) also referred to the importance of audit committee 
independence when their research found that independent and more highly 
knowledgable audit committee members were more likely to support external 
auditors if a dispute with management over proper revenue recognition arose.  A 
study by Carcello & Neal (2003) found that the higher the percentage of affiliated 
directors (insiders) in the audit committee the more likely the external auditor is 
of being dismissed subsequent to issuing a going-concern report.  Both of these 
studies further highlight the importance of appointing independent members to the 
audit committee.  Therefore it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
independent audit committee members’ increase; and 
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H3: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage 
of independent audit committee members’ increase. 
 
3.2.6 Competence of Members (NmbACFE and %ACFE) 
A number of studies have found significance between having a financial or 
accounting expert on the audit committee and the occurrence of earnings 
management or fraud (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Baswell 
& Mauldin, 2004; Felo, Krishnamurthy & Solieri, 2003; Abbot, Parker, Peters, & 
Raghunandan, 2002; Archambeault, 2000).  Consistent with many of these studies 
is the notion that competent members of the audit committee, particularly those 
with financial expertise, are valuable in providing enhanced oversight of a firm’s 
financial reporting practices.  In this regard, the inclusion of a financial expert on 
the audit committee “…is likely to affect the committee’s overall assessment of 
the quality of a company’s financial reports” (Baswell et al., 2004, pg.5). 
 
One of the specific corporate governance issues analysed by Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) was the use of independent directors with financial expertise on the audit 
committee.  The authors used a sample of 159 public companies that restated their 
earnings in 2000 or 2001 and an identical number of industry-size matched 
control companies that did not restated earnings during that period.  Using a 
definition similar in spirit to that adopted by the SEC, Agrawal et al. defined a 
financial expertise as those directors with a CPA or CFA, or experience in 
corporate financial management (e.g., as CFO, treasurer, controller, or VP-
Finance).  Both univariate tests and a matched-pairs logistic regression model 
detected a significant difference between restating and non-restating firms and 
audit committees with at least one independent member with financial expertise. 
 
Mangena and Pike’s 2005 investigation into the quality of interim financial 
reports was based on the mean responses of 79 investment analysts who gave their 
opinion of the perceived importance of 113 items of information disclosed in the 
interim reports of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.  The study 
hypothesised that there would be a positive significant relationship between the 
quality of interim financial reporting and the presence of financial expertise on the 
audit committee.  In accepting this hypothesis the authors stated that the 
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“…results appear to suggest that audit committees which include members with 
accounting or financial management expertise are likely to encourage 
management to disclose higher levels of investor-oriented information in interim 
reports” (Mangena & Pike, 2005, pg.340). 
 
A 2004 study conducted by Baswell et al., investigated the change in financial or 
accounting expertise amongst members of audit committees subsequent to the 
enactment of Section 407 of the Sarbines Oxley Act, 2002.  The study found that 
firms significantly increased the number of members on their audit committee 
with accounting experience.  Their findings also confirmed however, that 
“…many firms continue to rely on the weaker definition of financial expertise as 
CEO/President without direct accounting or finance experience for regulatory 
compliance…” (pg.4).  Given that this result indicates an over reliance by 
companies on persons who do not have direct accounting or finance experience 
the authors urged reconsideration of the definition used by the SOA to limit the 
scope of persons who could be deemed financial experts. 
 
Finally, in 1999 a survey was carried out by Read and Raghunandan to provide 
insight into whether an audit committee’s effectiveness would improve if they 
adopted the recommendations on independence and director qualifications that 
were proposed by the Blue Ribbon Commission.  The survey results implied that 
“independent audit committees whose members have expertise in accounting or 
finance are more likely to execute their duties and act as reliable guardians of the 
public interest” (2001, pg.3).  Of further interest however, were the findings of 
Felo, et al. (2003) who suggested that “…mandating greater expertise on audit 
committees rather than simply requiring one expert on the audit committee may 
be beneficial to investors” (pg.1).  This study therefore not only tests for the 
number of ‘financial experts’ on the audit committee, but more precisely the 
percentage of the committee that are considered to have ‘financial expertise’.  
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
ACFE’s on a company’s audit committee increase; and 
 40
H5: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage 
of ACFE’s on a company’s audit committee increase. 
 
3.2.7 Number of Meetings (NmbACMeet) 
The frequency with which an audit committee holds meetings per year has often 
been used as a proxy for diligence (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004; Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal & Riley, 2002; DeZoort et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2000; 
Beasley, Carcello & Hermanson, 1999).  More often than not the use of this 
measurement for diligence is as a result of the ready availability to the 
information required to populate the proxy.  In contrast it has been noted that 
many of the other attributes that could indicate an audit committee’s diligence are 
not observable by researches and therefore lack the measurement capabilities 
required for inclusion in many corporate governance studies (DeZoort et al., 
2002). 
 
Although not a specific stipulation of the SOA the number of meetings held per 
year by an audit committee is also considered to enhance functionality and 
improve oversight of the financial reporting process.  The increasing frequency of 
audit committee meetings shown to be prevailing in compliant firms is thought to 
be representative of the growing importance given to this matter (Read et al., 
2001).  Furthermore, the Report of NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit 
Committees indicated that the diligence of the audit committee is of critical 
importance when they suggested as a ‘rule of thumb’ at least four half-day audit 
committee meetings per year (1999).  The stance that more frequent audit 
committee meetings enhances functionality, therefore helps to achieve the 
objective of effective corporate governance. 
 
An analysis of proxy data in 1999 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) identified that most fraud companies either 
did not have an audit committee, or had an audit committee that met less than 
twice annually.  The authors of the report opined that, “In such an environment, 
the external auditors may have had little support or oversight from the board, and 
company executives may have been in a better position to commit fraud” (Beasley 
et al., 1999).  It was proposed that oversight is destined to suffer when insufficient 
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time is spent undertaking monitoring functions such as financial oversight, risk 
analysis, and assessment of management integrity. 
 
A study conducted by Abbott et al. (2000), used the number of meetings held by 
the audit committee as a preliminary proxy to represent the breadth of compliance 
by public companies with BRC audit committee activity recommendations.  The 
proxy identified a significant negative relation between the number of meetings 
held and the misstatement of financial reports.  A further study by the same 
authors in 2004 investigated the impact on misstatements when a threshold level 
of four audit committee meetings per year was used.  Consistent with their earlier 
research a significantly negative association was found to exist between financial 
report restatements and audit committees that met at least four times per annum.  
Similarly, results of a study conducted by Carcello et al., led the authors to 
propose that an audit committee that “…demonstrates greater diligence in 
discharging its responsibilities… may seek an enhanced level of oversight of the 
financial reporting process” (2002, pg.372). 
 
Along with several of the above named studies2 that have indicated a negative 
relation between the number of meetings held by an audit committee and 
fraudulent reporting, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) reported that the 
frequency of audit committee meetings is associated with reduced levels of 
discretionary current accruals.  The diligence of audit committees has also been 
found to positively influence external audit coverage and as a result is positively 
associated with audit fees (Lee & Mande, 2005).  Moreover, companies with 
suspicious changes in external auditors were found to be less likely to meet on a 
regular basis (Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001). 
 
The above studies point at an increase in audit committee meetings leading to 
improved functionality and oversight by this monitoring body and hence reducing 
the likelihood of fraudulent activity.  It is expected that a more diligent audit 
committee, measured by the number of meetings held per year, will be less likely 
to incur incidences of fraud.  In this frame of mind it is hypothesised that: 
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H6: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
audit committee meetings increase. 
 
3.2.8 Committee Membership (AvgACTen and AvgACDtrships) 
Relatively new to corporate governance research is the testing of variables 
measuring such attributes as the length of tenure and the number of directorships 
held in unaffiliated companies by members of the audit committee.  While these 
attributes have been included in a limited number of recent studies (Persons, 
2005; Yang, 2002), variables measuring similar attributes in the board of directors 
have been tested slightly more regularly and may therefore provide some 
indication as to viability of testing these variables.  In this way, it is considered 
the results for testing these attributes in a board of directors setting will be 
comparable to testing them in a subset of this group, from which the audit 
committee is composed. 
 
Understandably a director’s lack of seniority on the board, and subsequently as a 
member of it’s monitoring committees, can affect their ability to scrutinise top 
management.  It has been suggested that the length of time a director serves on the 
board can effect the member’s willingness to challenge senior management’s 
actions (Beasley, 1996).  On the other hand, longer tenure on the board (or 
committee) may make a member more inclined to raise concern over questionable 
accounting practices (Person, 2005).  In this regard it is considered that newer 
members to the board (or committee) may be more susceptible to group pressures 
to conform.  Furthermore, new members may hold some concern over the 
retention of their position following the challenging of certain decisions made or 
practices undertaken by management.  This can especially be the case given that 
senior management is often heavily involved in identifying and recommending 
directors to serve on the board and it’s monitoring committees (Beasley, 1998).  It 
is also proposed that, “A committee with high turnover may not be as effective as 
possible given the investment of time required of audit committee members to 
understand the company’s business, financials and other relevant information” 
(Emmerich, Racz & Unger, 2005, pg.73). 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
2 DeZoort, et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2000; and Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000. 
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In support of these theories, Beasley (1996) found that the likelihood of financial 
reporting fraud is a decreasing function of the average tenure of outside directors.  
Univariate tests performed by the author identified that the average tenure of 
directors in fraud companies was 3.8 years of service.  Whereas, the same tests on 
matched no-fraud companies produced a result of 6.6 years of service, giving 
quite a substantial difference between the two.  Beasley concluded that the 
“…mere inclusion of outside members on the board of directors may not be 
sufficient to prevent occurrences of financial statement fraud.  Instead, the board’s 
effectiveness in preventing such fraud may be affected by…the length of the 
tenure of board service by outside directors” (1998, pg.58). 
 
Abbott et al’s. (2000) study of tenure for board of director members also 
concurred that longer service was associated with a decrease in the incidence of 
fraud.  Of a similar nature, Yang (2002) found a significantly negative relation 
existed between audit committee tenure and earnings management.  In 
consideration of this finding the author suggested that committee members with 
longer tenure might be more effective in limiting earnings management.  While a 
study conducted by Bedard et al. revealed that the average tenure of outside 
committee members had a negative effect on the likelihood of abnormal accruals.  
“Thus, knowledge of the company’s operations and of its executive directors 
acquired though experience as a member of the board seems to be effective in 
constraining aggressive earnings management…” (Bedard et al., 2004, pg.29) 
 
Persons (2005) examined the relationship between fraudulent financial reporting 
and certain corporate governance attributes.  Using a logit regression analysis on a 
sample of 111 fraud firms and their matched no-fraud counterparts, she found that 
the likelihood of fraud is lower when audit committee members have longer 
tenure.  Persons considered this result indicated that motivating audit committee 
members to serve for longer periods of time could be beneficial to improving 
corporate governance efforts.  In consideration of these studies, Hypothesis 7 
therefore proposes that: 
 
H7: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the average 
tenure of Audit Committee members’ increase. 
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Consistent with the earlier research into the diligence of audit committee 
members, being able to contribute fully to a committee takes time.  If a member of 
the audit committee holds a number of directorships in other companies it may 
place constraints on the amount of time he or she can dedicate to any particular 
entity.  This can have a detrimental effect on the monitoring quality of the audit 
committee as a whole, whereby individual members become too busy to 
comprehensively undertake their duties.  In this regard, Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) considered three or more directorships would make a director very 
busy. 
 
Thinking along the same lines, the NYSE introduced new listing standards for 
public companies regarding the number of audit committees a member of their 
audit committee can serve on.  And while the listing rule does not actually limit 
the number, it does discourage registrants from allowing members to serve on 
more than three audit committees.  The exchange does however require that if this 
guideline is exceeded then the board of directors must determine that the 
simultaneous service does not impair the ability of the director to serve effectively 
on the company’s audit committee.  A survey undertaken by Windram and Song 
in 2004 upheld the concept of this recommendation when their results confirmed 
that on average the audit committee chairman of top Fortune 500 companies in the 
UK held more than three outside directorships.  The survey showed that audit 
committee chairpersons cited the single greatest impediment to audit committee 
effectiveness was a lack of time (Windram & Song, 2004). 
 
Once more, Beasley (1996) and Persons (2005) are the primary studies that have 
so far investigated a relation between outside directorships and fraudulent 
financial reporting.  Both report the existence of a significantly negative 
relationship, which indicates that the likelihood of fraud is lower in firms that 
have audit committee members with fewer outside directorships.  In a similar, but 
UK orientated study, Song and Windram (2004) used a logit regression to 
benchmark financial reporting quality against English financial reporting 
standards during the 1991 to 2000 period.  A sample of UK companies that had 
been subject to adverse rulings by the Financial Reporting Review Panel were 
tested to identify the impact audit committee characteristics had on the probability 
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of compliance with financial reporting standards.  Their results showed that 
“…multiple directorships could undermine audit committee effectiveness in 
financial reporting” (2004, pg.195). 
 
Other empirical studies that have incorporated additional outside directorships as 
a variable have included Carcello et al. (2002) who, using an agency framework, 
found that a positive relationship existed between audit fees and the number of 
outside directorships held in other corporations by board of director members.  
Therefore, when the assumption that higher audit fees is a surrogate for audit 
quality is applied their results indicate that directors with more outside 
directorships improve audit quality.  Another study (Shivdasani & Yermack, 
1999) investigated whether the involvement of the CEO in the selection of new 
directors influenced the nature of appointments to the board.  It was hypothesised 
that when CEO’s are involved in the appointment process, directors predisposed 
to monitor CEO actions are less likely to be appointed.  Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) found a significantly positive association between appointments of ‘busy’ 
directors (directors who are employed and serve on three or more boards, or 
retired and serve on six or more boards) and CEO involvement. 
 
As shown above the research into the consequences that multiple directorships 
have on corporate governance, and in particular fraud, is somewhat limited.  
However, it is considered that the predominant view is that directors who spread 
their time too thin by taking on too many additional outside directorships may 
compromise their ability to monitor management well.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H8: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the average 
number of directorships held by Audit Committee members’ increase. 
 
3.3 Board of Director Composition 
A substantial body of research exists with respect to corporate governance 
provided by a company’s board of directors.  A key element of providing effectual 
board oversight is said to entail not only the monitoring of management actions 
but also requires a board to work with senior management to achieve corporate 
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legal and ethical compliance (BRC, 1999).  The BRC described the oversight 
functions of the board as, “…ensuring that quality accounting policies, internal 
controls, and independent and objective outside auditors are in place to deter 
fraud, anticipate financial risks and promote accurate, high quality and timely 
disclosure of financial and other material information to the board, to the public 
markets, and to shareholders” (1999, pg.20). 
 
The composition of the board is of particular importance in ensuring effective 
governance oversight.  Board composition not only refers to the independence of 
its members but also the processes observed for nominating new members to sit 
on this corporate governing council and, some may say more importantly, whether 
the board is chaired by an impartial person.  Individually each of the above 
features of board composition can either improve oversight or create monitoring 
problems.  However, a board that combines large qualities of inside directors3, a 
chairman who is also the CEO, and one that does not have a functioning 
nominating committee may be more susceptible to incidents of fraudulent 
financial reporting. 
 
The level of independence of a company’s board of directors has been shown to 
be an integral part of effective corporate governance, and thus an increase in 
board independence may bring about a reduction in fraudulent financial reporting.  
Klein (2003) noted that, “The empirical research, on a whole, supports the 
markets’ view that increasing director independence will lead to more transparent 
and more reliable financial reports” (p.352).  Furthermore, the COSO study found 
that fraud companies’ board of directors were generally not independent, and 
suggested that a board’s “…effective monitoring of management relies on 
independent (emphasis added) experts devoting sufficient time and energy to their 
task” (COSO, 1999, p.44).  In this manner, independence is seen as heightening 
the objectivity of the monitoring functions performed by this governance body. 
 
As a consequence of falling investor confidence caused by perceived deficiencies 
in corporate governance the NYSE, NASDAQ and ASE have taken steps to 
                                                          
3 An insider director is an officer or employee of the company or one of its subsidiary; or an 
officer of an affiliated company. 
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increase the level of independence in corporate boards.  New listing standards 
adopted by these exchanges require the majority of the board to have no material 
relationships with the firm and lengthens the ‘cooling off’ period for board service 
by former employees of the issuer or its auditor from three to five years.  The 
NYSE considered that requiring a majority of independent directors would 
increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging 
conflicts of interest.  This action in itself stresses the importance with which some 
regulatory agencies view BOD independence, and brings to light the notion that 
this factor could be a critical ingredient in the fight against fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
 
Other factors that are believed to merit attention when considering a board of 
directors’ composition is whether the CEO doubles as the chairman of the board 
and if the company has a nominating committee in existence, through which 
unbiased appointments to the board can be made.  In relation to these board of 
director attributes there exists a modest amount of literature to support separating 
the two most powerful positions in a public company, that of the CEO and 
chairman of the board.  A small amount of evidence can also be found that 
suggests the existence of a nominating company is beneficial to ensuring the 
impartiality of members appointed to serve on a company’s board of directors. 
 
When a CEO of a company also serves as its chairman of the board an unhealthy 
power concentration can occur (Dunn, 2004).  It has been found that the 
performance of these dual roles can create twice the power, which can be “…used 
wisely or it can be abused” (Gavin, 2003, pg.8).  In this way power centralisation 
in the hands of just one person who performs both key positions of the CEO and 
chairperson may be detrimental to the optimal functioning of the board of 
directors.  It is not uncommon for some board of directors to be in thrall of, or 
even submissive to, their CEO’s (Ward, 2003).  This disposition can be very 
unproductive especially when seeking answers to probing questions about the 
company’s financial results, or justification for accounting practices used.  
Therefore, it is considered duality of the CEO and chairperson positions could 
limit the effectiveness of the board of directors as a corporate monitor. 
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Equally problematic is the environment created when the CEO is responsible for 
the nomination and appointment of new board members.  In this regard it would 
seem unreasonable to expect a board member who has been appointed by the 
CEO and relies on his/her endorsement for future renomination, to delve into 
problem areas that might require the challenging of the CEO’s decision, or put 
other top management under scrutiny.  The fear of creating an adversarial 
relationship that could ultimately deprive the member of their position on the 
board may lead to less emphasis being placed on controversial matters, such as 
financial misrepresentations.  Strier alleged that, “In a perverse corruption of 
intention, the representatives of the shareholders, the boards of directors, are often 
de facto selected and therefore controlled by the top management they presumably 
monitor” (2005, pg.82).  The operation of a nominating committee is seen as 
alleviating, to some degree, this ‘beholden’ effect. 
 
The nominating committee is another sub-committee of the board of directors.  
Two of the most important duties a nominating committee is charged with are the 
identification of qualified candidates to become board members and the selection 
of nominees for election as directors.  And while many nominating committees 
are currently not totally independent of top management, the concept of a group of 
individuals partaking in the decision-making process does point to a more 
objective setting for appointments to the board.  It is thought that this reasonably 
unbiased method of selection will enhance a board’s impartial monitoring of 
management and thus improve corporate governance oversight. 
 
The above assertions suggest that the composition of the board of directors is 
paramount to effective corporate governance.  It can also be surmised that the 
quality of oversight generated by this monitoring body could benefit from a board 
with more independent and objectively selected director’s lead by an impartial 
chairperson.  Therefore, it is important to identify whether these proposed 
attributes of corporate boards also have a bearing on the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.  The literature introduced below is aimed at determining this 
factor by ascertaining what prior research has discovered.  Furthermore, the 
review will draw upon prior findings to support the posing of several hypotheses. 
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3.3.1 Number of Directors (NmbDtrs) 
Persons (2006) included board size as a variable in her study aimed at identifying 
corporate governance attributes that could potentially reduce the likelihood of 
non-financial reporting fraud.  Her test results, which were based on logit 
regression analysis, indicated not only that the independence of the board of 
directors helps to reduce the likelihood of non-financial reporting fraud, but also 
that “…smaller board size is likely to be more effective in monitoring 
management” (2006, pg.37).  Persons recognised that the ineffectiveness of larger 
boards was also reflected in the NYSE’s intention to limit the current rule, which 
permits a 27-member board, to a maximum of eight members. 
 
Likewise, Song and Windram (2004) found when testing the impact board of 
director and audit committee characteristics have on the probability of compliance 
with UK financial reporting standards, that larger board size increased the 
probability of companies committing financial reporting violations.  Larger boards 
are also considered to be associated with lower profitability and decreasing firm 
value (Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998), as well as being easier for the CEO 
to control (Person, 2006).  Conversely, small sized boards are considered to be 
more profitable (Matolcsy, Stokes & Wright, 2004), and be a determinant of audit 
committee independence (Klein, 2002b). 
 
An explanation for favouring smaller boards over larger ones was given by 
McColgan (2001).  After reviewing the literature it was considered that corporate 
boards became less effective as they grew in size due to “…larger boards being 
slower to react to decisions that require immediate course of action” (pg.21).  
Increasing the number of members on the board can lead to boards losing their 
ability to operate decisively, such that directors may “…become less candid in 
their ability to be critical of one another, thus making for less efficient decision 
making” (McColgan, 2001, pg.21).  This line of thought has been mimicked by a 
number of other researchers (Chiang, 2005; Matolcsy et al., 2004, Uzun et al., 
2004; Felo et al., 2003).  Chiang deemed that, “Efficiency is reduced if the 
number of directors is too large because there is an increased difficulty in 
achieving agreement concerning decisions” (2005, pg.96). 
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While a variable measuring the number of members on the board of directors has 
been included quite frequently in various corporate governance studies it has often 
produced insignificant results (Carcello & Nagy, 2004a; Matolcsy et al., 2004; 
Uzun et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley et al., 2000; Beasley, 1996).  
Furthermore, a few studies have contended that larger boards do have their 
benefits.  One such study, Beasley and Salterio (2001), found that larger boards 
were positively related to firms who voluntarily create audit committees 
composed of outsider members with a breadth of relevant financial reporting and 
audit committee knowledge and experience.  Additionally, Vafeas (1999) found 
that the number of board meetings held by a company is positively related to 
board size.  However, Vafeas did point out that although the size of corporate 
boards is positively related to board activity, this was consistent with larger 
groups requiring more time to attain a given level of output.  “In firms with larger 
boards, board meeting time seems to be partly wasted due to inefficient board 
sizes.  Firm value4 rises significantly as board size declines” (1999, pg.124). 
 
Based on the above, it is considered more support is offered for the position that 
larger sized boards of directors are more akin with fraudulent financial reporting 
and therefore the following hypothesis is posed: 
 
H9: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the number of 
directors on a company’s board increase. 
 
3.3.2 Board Independence (NmbIndDtrs and %IndDtrs) 
One of the earlier studies on fraudulent financial reporting, and one that has also 
been regularly cited in subsequence research on this topic, is a study undertaken 
by Beasley (1996).  Beasley was an early advocator of board of director 
independence when in 1996 he empirically tested the prediction that including 
larger proportions of outside members on the board of directors reduced the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud.  Using logit regression to analyse 75 
matched fraud and no-fraud firms, Beasly found that the latter had significantly 
                                                          
4 Firm value is defined as the market-to-book ratio of the company. 
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higher percentages of outside directors5 occupying positions on the board of 
directors than were present on the boards of fraud firms. 
 
Similarly, Uzun et al. (2004) examined how various characteristics of the board of 
directors and it’s oversight committees, including audit, compensation, and 
nominating, affected the occurrence of corporate fraud.  Their study covered the 
period between 1978 and 2001 and used logit regression models to test a series of 
variables on samples of fraud and industry-size matched no-fraud companies.  The 
findings indicated that board composition and the structure of oversight 
committees were significantly correlated to the incidence of corporate fraud.  Of 
particular relevance was their finding that as the “…number of independent 
outside directors increased on a board and in the board’s audit and compensation 
committees, the likelihood of corporate wrongdoing decreased” (2004, p.33). 
 
A good many other studies have also found an association between board of 
director independence and either fraud (Persons, 2006; Farber, 2005; Persons, 
2005; Beasley, 1998), or earnings management (Niu, 2006; Peasnell, Pope & 
Young, 2005; Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002b).  For example, in an industry-by-
industry comparison between the board characteristics of fraud companies and 
their matched no-fraud industry benchmarks, Beasley et al. (2000) revealed that 
the percentage of boards with a majority of outside directors was much higher in 
no-fraud companies when compared to fraud companies.  Persons (2006) found 
that the likelihood of non-financial reporting fraud is lower if the board of 
directors has a larger proportion of outside independent directors.  While, Niu’s 
(2006) test results provided evidence that, similar to US firms, Canadian firms are 
also more susceptible to earnings management when their board of directors are 
less independent.  Niu found a significant negative association between the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals and the level of independence of directors on the 
boards of Canadian firms (2006). 
 
In addition, the independence of a board of directors has been found to be 
significantly related to a number of other aspects.  Firstly, board independence is 
                                                          
5 An outside director is defined as having no disclosed relationship (other than stock ownership) 
between the director and the company or its officers. 
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negatively related to the likelihood of auditor resignation (Lee, Mande & Ortman, 
2004) and positively related to audit committee independence (Klein, 2002a).  
Webb (2004) found that independent boards are more socially responsible, 
whereas Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) found an independent board of 
directors was associated with lower cost of debt financing.  Greater board 
independence has also been shown to be associated with higher levels of 
voluntary disclosures, such that “…boards with a majority of independent 
directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosures than firms with 
balanced boards” (Cheng & Courtenay 2006, pg.262). 
 
Beasley and Petroni (2001) found that the likelihood of an insurer employing a 
brand-named auditor that specialises in the insurance industry increases in the 
percentage of the board of directors considered to be outsiders.  An independent 
board of directors is also more likely to pay their CEO equitably, basing their 
remuneration more closely on the performance of the company chief (Ghosh & 
Sirmans, 2005).  In a similar manner, Mishra and Nielsen (1999) found that 
“…independent boards make greater use of compensation contracts to bring the 
financial interests of managers in line with those of shareholders” (pg.22). 
 
Finally, in 2004 Ryan and Wiggins conducted research aimed at discovering 
whether the structure of director compensation mitigated or reinforced barriers to 
effective governance.  They opined that although directors may have 
“…incentives that diverge from those of shareholders, the evidence suggested that 
directors on independent boards receive compensation packages that are more 
closely tied to stock-price performance” (pg.4).  In this way it was considered that 
equity based compensation paid to directors offered incentives to monitor, which 
in turn provided increased corporate governance oversight.  Their tests found that 
as the independence of the board increased so too did equity based compensation 
of directors.  They believed their results supported the premise that board of 
director independence enhances shareholder welfare (Ryan et al., 2004). 
 
The results of earlier studies would appear to support the notion that boards 
structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more effective in their 
oversight duties thereby constraining management from indulging in accounting 
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practices that may lead to earnings management or fraud.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H10: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
independent directors on a company’s board increase; and 
H11: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage 
of independent directors on a company’s board increase. 
 
3.3.3 Duality of CEO and Chairman (CEO=Chair) 
Duality occurs when the same person occupies both the CEO and chairman of the 
board positions.  It is proposed that the objectivity and quality of governance 
oversight by the board of directors may suffer if the CEO also chairs the board.  
The board of directors, whose duties include overseeing management on behalf of 
the firm’s shareholders, could be constrained if they are lead by the same person 
they are supposedly tasked with monitoring.  Centralisation of power in a 
company can result in the CEO being able to exert undue influence over the board 
by setting board agendas, managing meetings and controlling the flow of 
information to the members of the board (Persons, 2006). 
 
Another issue that also needs consideration is that, “The board has a significant 
role in the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO…” 
(Uzun et al., 2004, pg.36).  These duties become exceedingly difficult if the CEO 
also serves as the chairman of the board.  Such duality of the two positions is said 
to eliminate “…an additional monitoring mechanism - that of an independent 
overseer of the CEO” (Abbott et al., 2004, pg.84).  Not only is it doubtful that the 
CEO would be capable of completely ignoring his personal interests to focus on 
performing the chair’s monitoring function, but it is also disputable that the CEO 
would not use the chairman position to pressure the board into a preferential 
assessment of his/her performance as head of the company.  In this way inequity 
of remuneration or continuity of service may arise due to the impartiality of a 
CEO who is also chairman of the board. 
 
Several other authors share these sentiments.  Webb (2004) believed that “…a 
board more likely to protect shareholders from agency problems would be one 
with separate individuals controlling the firm and the board” (pg.271).  A board of 
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directors is also seen as ineffective in discharging their monitoring duties if 
management dominate over board matters (Rahman & Ali, 2006).  Furthermore, 
Carcello & Nagy considered that a person holding both positions could “…yield 
significant internal influence and power and may have the wherewithal to 
orchestrate a financial fraud” (2004a, pg.61). 
 
Both Beasley (1996) and DeChow et al. (1996) found significant relationships 
between CEO duality and fraudulent financial reporting.  They posited that 
companies subject to fraud or earnings manipulation are more likely to have 
boards dominated by management and a CEO who simultaneously serves as 
chairman of the board.  Interestingly, when Persons (2006) compared her results 
for the incidence of non-financial fraud with those of Beasley and DeChow et al., 
she found that the three studies, covering both financial and non-financial fraud, 
had the same two corporate governance features in common.  The author believed 
that increasing the proportion of outside independent directors on the board and 
separating the CEO and chairman positions would reduce the likelihood of non-
financial fraud occurring.  In conclusion, Persons was of the opinion that recent 
regulatory reform of corporate governance could be further improved by 
“…disallowing a person to serve as both the CEO and the BOD chairman” (2006, 
pg.36). 
 
Efendi, Sirvastara and Swanson (2004) investigated the incentives that led to a 
rash of accounting restatements towards the end of the 1990’s.  Their study 
compared companies that announced a restatement in 2000 or 2001 to matched 
control firms and hypothesised that restatement firms would have a CEO who is 
also chairman of the board more frequently than their matched control firms.  The 
authors found that restating firms had weaker corporate governance as a result of 
these firms being more inclined to combine the CEO and board chairman 
positions.  It was also found that the board of directors of restating firms where 
duality existed were “…more likely to give the CEO a salary increase that is not 
warranted by the firm’s performance” (Efendi et al., 2004, pg.3).  Support for this 
finding is also provided by Core et al. (1999) and Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) 
who found that CEO’s who double as the company’s chairman of the board are 
paid more than CEO’s who do not hold both positions. 
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Two other studies, one conducted on Australian firms (Sharma, 2004) and the 
other on UK firms (O’Sullivan, 2000), confirmed US companies were not the only 
ones to suffer adverse effects from CEO duality.  Similar to Beasley and Dechow 
et al., the Australian study identified that duality was more pronounced in fraud 
firms than no-fraud firms.  Whereas, tests performed by O’Sullivan detected a 
negative relation between CEO duality and non-executive representation on the 
boards of large UK companies (2000). 
 
Duality of the CEO and chairman of the board positions has also be found to have 
a significantly negative relation on the likelihood of boards voluntarily including 
outside directors with financial reporting knowledge and experience on the audit 
committee (Beasley & Salterio, 2001).  Equally, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) found 
that, “When the CEO does not chair the board, firms decrease the percentage of 
insiders by a greater margin than do firms with dual CEO/chairs.  The firms with 
separate CEOs and board chairs replace most of these insiders with outsiders” 
(pg.26).  Furthermore, non-segregation of the two positions has been proffered as 
a catalyst for dysfunctional monitoring by board of directors.  It is proposed that 
such deficiencies in oversight are likely to increase organisational costs and 
subsequently lower organisational performance (Brockmann, Hoffman & Dawley, 
2006). 
 
Taking into consideration the above findings it is judged that separating the 
positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board may be of consequence to 
ensuring the board of directors is an effective monitoring device.  It is therefore 
hypothesised that: 
 
H12: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in company’s 
that have a CEO that is also the Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
 
3.3.4 Nominating Committee (NomExist and NmbNomMem) 
Although the nominating committee does not have a direct monitoring function 
per se, the committee is central to the effective performance and functioning of 
the board of directors over time.  This is due to the nominating committee being 
tasked with the duties of identifying and selecting appropriate candidates for 
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nomination to the board.  “Indeed, new director and board committee nominations 
are among a board’s most important long-term functions” (Uzun et al., 2004, 
pg.37). 
 
The nominating committee has only recently emerged as a variable for testing 
corporate governance effectiveness, and in particular, incorporated into research 
concerning fraudulent activities.  Amongst the limited amount of research 
available, Uzun et al. (2004) tested whether the boards of directors of fraud 
companies were less likely to have a nominating committee than boards in 
matched no-fraud companies.  As a contrast, Persons (2005) tested the 
independence of the nominating committee when she hypothesised that the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud was lower when a nominating committee is 
comprised solely of independent directors.  While both studies produced 
insignificant results, it was considered this could be as a consequence of the 
limited number (approximately 14%) of both fraud and non-fraud firms that 
actually had an independent nominating committee at the time the research was 
undertaken (Persons, 2005). 
 
Klein (2006) examined the relation between earnings manipulation and whether 
the CEO sits on the board’s nominating committee.  It was asserted that more 
independent corporate governance structures produce fewer manipulations of 
earnings by management.  Univariate tests found that “…the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is positively related to whether the CEO is on the board’s 
nominating committee…  Thus, earnings manipulation appears to be positively 
correlated with the CEO’s power over board matters” (2006, pg.21).  Earlier 
studies by Klein also produced evidence of a negative impact with regard to the 
independence of the board of directors when the CEO sits on the nominating 
committee (2000) and similar effects on audit committee independence (1998).  It 
was thought that the CEO’s reluctance to select independent nominees for 
appointment to the board of directors, and hence it’s sub-committees, was most 
likely to have caused these findings. 
 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) who studied whether appointments to the board 
of directors can be influenced by CEO involvement in the nominating process 
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provide some support for the above assertion.  The authors “…examine the 
likelihood that appointees are independent outside directors, ‘gray’ outsiders who 
have conflicts of interest, or corporate insiders” (1999, pg.1830)6.  They found 
that where nominating committees did exist the CEO is a member of that 
committee about 33% of the time.  Analysis of logit regression models identified 
that board independence increased from 28% when the CEO is involved in the 
nomination process to 55% when he/she is not.  The results indicate that less 
independent and more ‘gray’ outsiders are appointed to the board when the CEO 
is a sitting member of the nominating committee or where no separate committee 
exists (Shivdasani et al., 1999). 
 
As suggested by Klein’s 1998 research, it is possible that audit committee 
independence is also effected by the existence of a nominating committee.  It is 
considered that because the road to an independent board of directors starts with 
the applicants selected for nomination, the existence of a nominating committee 
can have an effect on the audit committee independence also.  Robert Herdman, 
Chief Accountant for the SEC, questioned “…whether independent parties, not 
the CEO/Chairman, should be responsible for nominating members of the audit 
committee” (2002, pg.2).  In support of this, Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and 
Hu, (2006) found in their study of Swiss public companies that the existence of a 
nominating committee was associated with a higher degree of independence and 
nationality diversity. 
 
Prior research tends to support the existence of a nominating committee to ensure 
future improvement to the independence and functionality of the board of 
directors and its sub-committees.  In the same manner as other board committees, 
it is important to assemble the right ‘mix’ and quantity of persons to bring about 
effective oversight.  Although law or regulation does not prescribe the exact 
number of members, the nominating committee, like the audit committee, should 
contain enough members to ensure that duties can be effectively performed, but 
not so large as to be cumbersome.  Taking this into account it has been judged that 
                                                          
6 A gray director or gray ‘outsider’ is a non-management director who has either 
economic or personal ties to the firm or the firm’s management. 
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the nominating committee should consist of no fewer than three members.  In 
light of the foregoing it is hypothesised that: 
 
H13: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur when a 
Nominating Committee exists within the company’s board of 
directors; and 
H14: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
Nominating Committee members increase. 
 
3.4 Ownership Structure 
It is said that one way to prevent fraud is through the development of an 
appropriate ownership structure (Cafferty, 2004).  In consideration of this there 
are two trains of thought.  The first is that company shareholdings held by 
management and other employees of the entity can be useful in reducing agency 
conflicts and aligning the interests of management with shareholders.  The second 
is that ownership by persons independent of the company increases monitoring of 
management activity, particularly that of the financial reporting process, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of accounting fraud occurring. 
 
Stockholdings held my management is otherwise known as insider ownership.  It 
is theorised that as insider ownership increases, the need for monitoring decreases 
as a result of the insiders interests being more closely aligned with that of other 
owners/shareholders (Jensen et al., 1976).  Conversely, it has also been found that 
as management ownership levels rise it can create a power concentration whereby 
insiders become entrenched and exercise an excessive amount of control over the 
board (Pergola, 2005).  This power concentration may enable insiders to negate 
monitoring mechanisms and engage in opportunistic behaviour such as 
manipulating earnings or fraudulently reporting the financial position of the 
company.  “Thus, greater stock ownership by managers increases the power of the 
internal constituency but decreases the power of the external constituency in 
influencing corporate performance” (Han & Suk, 1998, pg.144). 
 
Managers that have large stockholdings also have the voting rights to substantially 
sway the decision-making process.  McColgan (2004) asserted that, “With larger 
voting power managers can make decisions which maximise their utility from the 
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company…” (2004, pg.50).  Furthermore, it is considered that increased stock 
ownership may also cause managers to falsely report earnings in a hope of 
manipulating the stock price of shares prior to disposing of them (Cheng & 
Warfield, 2005). 
 
Similar to Jensen et al’s theory on insider ownership (1976), it is considered that 
as the level of shareholdings held by outsiders’ increase, monitoring of 
management also increases.  Outsiders with substantial holdings in a company, 
such as institutional investors, tend to focus more attention on the entities 
financial condition and the disclosures produced in the accounting statements.  
“The fiduciary duty that these institutions owe to their own shareholders or 
investors suggests that they have incentives to be concerned about the corporate 
governance of the firms they invest in” (Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 2003, pg.88).  
These outsiders are also “…more likely to question and challenge management” 
(Persons, 2006).  In this way, large blockholders play a more pronounced 
monitoring role than the average outside investor, but both have a positive effect 
on the control environment.  This positive effect emanates from the fact that 
control is then spread around outsiders and not concentrated in the hands of 
management. 
 
It would appear that the ownership structure of a company could be of critical 
importance to the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms employed to reduce the 
likelihood of fraud occurring.  Below is a sample of some of the more recent 
studies that have investigated the relevance of company ownership structures. 
 
3.4.1 Director Ownership (%InsDtrOwn and %OutDtrOwn) 
A recent study conducted by Pergola suggested that the quality of financial 
reporting might vary with the levels of management ownership in a company.  
The author proposed a ‘U’ shaped relationship existed, such that earnings quality 
is increased at the low and high extremes of management ownership levels.  Tests 
found that earnings quality was reduced when management ownership was 
between 30%-50% (2005).  Han and Suk (1998) also found the ‘U’ shaped 
relationship to hold true when considering the effect of ownership structure on 
firm performance. 
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Dunn (2004) compared firms convicted of financial statement fraud that had large 
concentrations of ownership power to firms lacking this type of ownership power 
and found that fraud was more likely in the former.  When modelling the 
relationship he identified that excessive power was positively related to illegal 
corporate behaviour.  He considered that “…the decision to issue fraudulent 
financial statements is more likely to occur when there is a concentration of power 
in the hands of insiders” (2004, pg.408). 
 
In a study of UK companies subject to adverse rulings by the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel, Song and Windram found that director share ownership could 
undermine audit committee effectiveness in financial reporting.  When 
considering their results the authors took into account prior literature on director’ 
remuneration that suggested stock and option based plans might encourage risk-
taking behaviour.  In countering this notion it recognised that, “If risky projects do 
not have good outcomes, there is a motivation to manipulate accounting 
numbers…” (Song & Windram, 2004, pg.203).  
 
In support of inside ownership creating motivations to misstatement financial 
information Klein (2006) found a significant positive relation between earnings 
management and CEO shareholdings.  It was deemed the result was “…consistent 
with the view that CEOs may manipulate earnings to increase their short-term 
stock returns” (pg.3).  Furthermore, univariate tests conducted by Agrawal et al., 
(2005) found a significant difference in the median size of ownership holdings by 
insiders of firms that needed to restate their financials between January 2000 and 
December 2001, and a matched sample of control firms that did not. 
 
Similar to outside blockholders it is expected that outside directors also have 
greater incentive to monitor management.  Consistent with prior literature, 
Anderson et al. suggested that “…professional directors and directors with equity 
stakes are associated with greater monitoring” (2004, pg.322).  It is also 
considered that outside shareholders are associated with more optimal contracting 
with managers, reducing the influence managers have over their compensation 
(Bebchuk & Fired, 2003; Cyert et al., 2002; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2000). 
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Beasley found that the board’s effectiveness in preventing fraudulent financial 
reporting was affected by the extent of equity ownership levels in the company 
held by outside directors (1996).  His findings indicated that as outside director 
ownership in a firm increased the likelihood of financial statement fraud 
decreased.  The shareholdings held by board directors is therefore considered to 
be a key component to ensuring adequate oversight of management and protecting 
against fraudulent behaviour, hence it is hypothesised that: 
 
H15: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the 
percentage of company ownership held by Inside Directors increases; 
and  
H16: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage 
of company ownership held by Outside Directors increases. 
 
3.4.2 Blockholder Ownership (NmbOutBlock and %OutBlockOwn) 
Blockholders can come in a number of different forms, such as individual 
investors, pension funds, mutual funds, corporations, private equity firms, money 
managers, banks and trusts.  The latter forms also being know as institutional 
investors (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2006).  Regardless of the what type of form 
they come in, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found large outside blockholders who 
are not affiliated with management possess greater incentives to monitor the 
companies activities more closely due to their larger proportional stake in the 
firm.  “[O]wning a larger stake makes the return on the company’s shares more 
significant for the large shareholder, hence it biases her [the shareholder] towards 
intervention” (Maug, 1998, pg.67).  As most blockholders own at least 5% of the 
common stock of the entity, shareholders also have a greater ability to monitor 
and ‘voice’ their concerns or objections due to their quantity of voting rights.  
This aspect also provides some measure of control over the firm, which enables 
the blockholder to “…affect the BOD composition and other governance changes” 
(Person, 2006). 
 
Wang (2004) took into consideration the fact that only firms where the incidence 
of fraud has been detected are observable and therefore other firms could be either 
innocent or ‘undetected fraudulent firms’.  Consequently, she used econometric 
methods to account for the ‘unobservability’ of undetected frauds.  Her bivariate 
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probit model showed that the presence of blockholders increased fraud detection 
and discouraged the occurrence of fraud.  In particular, test results found a 10% 
increase in blockholder ownership tended to increase the probability of fraud 
detection by 1%, and decrease the probability of fraud by 3.8%.  Wang noted that, 
“…larger block ownership holdings and institutional holdings are associated with 
higher likelihood of detection and lower ex-ante propensity to commit fraud, 
which implies the important role of shareholder monitoring in combating fraud” 
(2004, pg.1). 
 
The finding that blockholder ownership counters fraudulent activity has also been 
found to be consistent in the Australian context.  As a consequence of greater 
concentrated ownership by Australian institutional shareholders, Sharma (2004) 
observed that when compared to the US, these shareholders might play an even 
more prominent role in monitoring management.  “Accordingly, being aware of 
the institutional investor’s role and their close investment relationship with the 
firm, management may refrain from engaging in fraudulent behaviour” (Sharma, 
2004, pg.112). 
 
Along with the studies that have identified the benefits that can be attributed to 
blockholders as having over the incidence of fraud (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 
1996; Sharma, 2004, Wang, 2004; Persons, 2006), a number of other studies have 
identified additional positives related to blockholders.  Yeo, Tan, Ho, and Chen 
(2002) found evidence of a positive relationship between external unrelated 
blockholdings and the informativeness of earnings.  This finding is posited to 
offset the entrenchment effect.  Likewise, research by Chung, Firth, and Kim 
(2002) recognised that institutional investor ownership created a less opportunistic 
environment for earnings management.  The authors found less use of 
discretionary accruals, and hence greater earnings informativeness, when 
institutional investors owned a large percentage of a company’s outstanding 
shares.  Studies have also found unaffiliated blockholders to be positively 
associated with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board of directors 
(Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 2003; Berry, 2000). 
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Moreover, outside blockholder ownership has additionally been associated with 
tighter control over executive compensation (Cronqvist et al., 2006; Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2001).  Hartzell and Starks (2003) found a positive 
association between institutional ownership and pay-for-performance sensitivity 
relating to executive compensation and a negative association when testing for 
excess salary.  These results were considered to be consistent with larger 
shareholders having greater influence over the firm and in particular management 
and the policies they implement. 
 
The above findings support the view that blockholders play an active monitoring 
role in the corporate governance environment, and that this role can potentially 
reduce the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting.  It is therefore 
hypothesised that: 
 
H17: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of 
outside Blockholders having ownership rights in the company 
increases; and 
H18: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage 
of company ownership held by outside Blockholders increases. 
 
3.5 External Auditor Factors 
The external auditor is also considered to have an impact on the efficacy of 
corporate governance, and hence the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  
As the investing public relies upon the external auditors to provide some 
assurance that the financial statements of a company are not misleading, it is 
imperative that the corporate governance provided by this monitoring body is not 
impaired in any way.  Thus, it is thought that the external auditing function should 
be performed by an independent source providing a competent and impartial 
opinion of the company’s financial performance. 
 
The monitoring function performed by external auditors is believed to play an 
integral part in ensuring quality oversight of a companies financial reporting 
practices is achieved.  Opportunities to defraud or misrepresent earnings can 
present themselves in many forms, including unusual or complex accounting 
transactions and/or the use of subjective judgment in accounting estimates 
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(NCFFR, 1987).  To adequately deal with these types of issues requires a 
professional understanding of accounting intricacies.  Therefore, the provision of 
an unbiased and informed professional opinion regarding the accuracy of financial 
records, and disclosures therein, by an external auditor can improve governance 
oversight and lessen the opportunities of a company or its individuals to commit 
financial reporting fraud. 
 
The capabilities of a company’s appointed external auditor have been shown to be 
of significance to the overall monitoring of an entity.  The use of a healthy amount 
of profession scepticism and a willingness to develop new auditing skills as 
methods change have been acknowledged as enhancements that could improve the 
monitoring effectiveness of an auditor (AICPA, 2002).  Furthermore, the 
increased emphasis on auditors to identify fraudulent financial reporting serves to 
demonstrate the importance this source of oversight can bring to the perceived 
veracity of the financial reporting process. 
 
For an external auditor to provide satisfactory oversight with regard to reducing 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting it is proposed that several factors 
may affect the resolve of the auditor and consequently the amount of effort put 
into challenging the company’s reporting decisions.  These factors include the 
length of tenure the auditor has had with the company, and the type of accounting 
firm involved.  For example, whether the auditor retained is one of the previously 
known Big 67 accounting firms or not. 
 
The auditor’s length of tenure has created conflicting views about whether shorter 
or longer tenures are more suited to ensuring the auditor’s independence and 
objectivity is retained.  The two schools of thought are that extended tenures are 
considered to result in a conflict of interests caused by the close relationship and 
familiarity between the auditor and the client that is formed over the years of 
working together.  It is believed that longer tenure makes the auditor become stale 
in their approach to an audit and lose some professional scepticism towards the 
client, which is considered vital to ensuring financial reports are free from 
management manipulations (George, 2004).  In other words, it could be 
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considered that with familiarity comes complacency.  Additionally, it is 
speculated that “…the trust that develops between the auditor and client over the 
auditor’s tenure may lead to greater auditor responsiveness to the client’s needs, 
and consequently, less imposition of restrictions on the client” (Burilovich & 
Kattelus, 1997, pg.11). 
 
Conversely, short tenure can result in audit failures due to lack of knowledge 
about the client’s business operations.  Gaining an understanding of these 
operations can take time; hence mistakes may be more likely to occur when an 
auditor is unfamiliar with the financial and operational processes of a client or the 
error patterns relative to the industry the client operates in (Carcello & Nagy, 
2004a).  Furthermore, it is considered longer tenure can provide the auditor with 
the necessary insights to better assess the risks a client poses (Lin, Li & Yang, 
2006). 
 
It has also been noted that auditors may be more susceptible to management 
influence in the earlier years of the engagement as a result of the auditor still 
being in the process of recouping start-up costs.  This can make the auditor of the 
newly acquired client more vulnerable to threats of dismissal, than the same threat 
issued to an incumbent auditor would pose (Iyer & Rama, 2004).  Fear of 
dismissal may also make short tenure auditors more likely to accede to a client’s 
point of view.  This willingness to appease the client could be a by-product of the 
auditor wanting to preserve their reputation.  In this way, it is thought that 
termination by a client too early into the engagement may cause damage to the 
auditor’s reputation (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). 
 
In 1999 Gul stated that, “A long tradition in the auditing literature has assumed 
that the market for audit services is one which can be characterised as quality 
differentiated, with two levels of quality depending on the size of the audit firm” 
(pg.92).  While some of the perception that organisations and decision-makers 
have about the differences in audit quality between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors 
may be as a result of a ‘bigger is better’ mentality, evidence produced by prior 
research would suggest there is some substance to this viewpoint.  A number of 
                                                                                                                                                               
7 Due to amalgamations and the like, these accounting firms are now known as the Big 4. 
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studies state that Big 6 accounting firms are widely viewed as producing higher 
quality audits than non-Big 6 firms (Carcello et al., 2004; Francis, Maydew & 
Sparks, 1999; Gul, 1999; Ragnunandan & Rama, 1999).  One rationale put 
forward for this argument is that Big 6 (then known as Big 8) firms, “…possess 
technological advantages that lead to the detection of more material errors in 
client financial statements” (McMullen, 1996, pg.94).  In this regard it is posed 
that greater technology allows for more sophisticated fraud detection techniques 
to be used than what is available in smaller accounting firms.  Carcello and Nagy 
(2004b) also cite size differences when they describe Big 6 firms as ‘quality-
differentiated suppliers’ and suggested that a lower incidence of fraud is likely 
when a Big 6 accounting firm is retained. 
 
Several other explanations for the size of the auditing firms differentiating quality 
have also been noted.  Colbert and Murray 1999 believed the association was 
related to auditor reputation.  The authors were of the opinion that larger auditing 
firms “…have a greater incentive to guard their reputations because of the larger 
quasi-rents they could possibly loose by performing substandard work” (pg.268).  
They also cite a mutual monitoring incentive brought about in larger firms by the 
fact that partners have significant amounts of human capital tied to the firm’s 
reputation.  “Thus, firm size could be an effective quality indicator” (Colbert et 
al., 1999, pg.268).  It is also believed that larger, better known accounting firms 
can bring credibility to the audited financial statements (Ahmad, Houghton & 
Yusof, 2006; Krishnamurthy, Zhou & Zhou, 2006; Krishnan, 2003; Francis & 
Krishnan, 1999). 
 
Another issue that might also lend some weight to the perception of differentiated 
quality of Big 6 audits could be associated with the concept of independence.  If a 
portion of auditor independence is thought to be linked to the relative reliance an 
auditor attaches to the retention of a specific client, then non-Big 6 auditors are 
more likely to be influenced by the ‘materiality’ of keeping the client happy.  This 
is particularly the case if the client is a major source of income for the auditor.  
Due to the size of Big 6 accounting firms and the extensive number of clients 
these firms attract, dependence on specific clients is less likely to be an issue.  
Whereas smaller firms may be more dependent on the retention of a few clients, 
 67
especially in the highly competitive world of audit services, larger clients may not 
be so readily affected by this situation.  This reliance in smaller accounting firms 
could present independence issues, such that the client may be capable of 
influencing the actions of the auditor in such a way as to persuade accounting 
anomalies to be overlooked. 
 
However, there is another potential rationale for why Big 6 auditors are less likely 
to be involved with fraud companies, that being that size does not so much 
differentiate quality of auditing but more so the ability to pick and choose 
clientele.  Larger auditing firms, such as the Big 6, predominantly avoid taking on 
clients that are deemed high risk, thereby leaving these clients, of somewhat 
questionable standards to the smaller auditing firms.  It follows then that as high-
risk clients must be audited by someone a number of the clients taken on by non-
Big 6 firms are those that have previously been rejected by Big 6 firms on the 
basis of riskiness.  Right or wrongly this can create the illusion that the quality of 
the smaller auditing firms is not so reliable when their clients are caught 
manipulating the rules.  Therefore, in reality it is not so surprising that fraudulent 
companies are more likely to be audited by non-Big 6 firms when consideration is 
given to the practice observed by Big 6 auditing firms to avoid high-risk clients. 
 
This notion of risk avoidance is further supported by the fact that Big 6 auditing 
firms are less likely to take on clients in financial stress (Raghunandan & Rama, 
1999).  Therefore, as financial stress has been shown to be associated with the 
inclination to manage earnings or commit fraud (Carcello et al., 2004; Lee, 
Ingram & Howard, 1999), it follows that Big 6 auditing firms may be less likely 
to have clients that fraudulently report their financial condition.  However, it must 
be noted that this situation is not necessary brought about by a differentiation in 
the quality of auditing. 
 
These observations are all indications of why factors relating to the external 
auditor, in particular their length of tenure and audit firm type, are important to 
corporate governance, and in turn may play a part in reducing the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting.  Below is a sample of the literature that has 
previously investigated these issues. 
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3.5.1 Auditor Tenure (AudTen) 
By comparing firms cited for fraudulent financial reporting between 1990 and 
2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population 
of non-fraud firms, Carcello and Nagy (2004a) were able to study the relationship 
between auditor tenure and fraud.  The authors posed two hypotheses – 
“H1: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given short auditor 
tenure (three years or less) as compared with medium auditor tenure 
(four to eight years); and 
H2: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor 
tenure (nine years or more) as compared with medium auditor tenure 
(four to eight years)” (Carcello et al., 2004, pg.59). 
 
The results of both univariate and multivariate tests supported Hypothesis 1, 
finding a significant positive relation existed between short auditor tenure and 
fraudulent financial reporting (p<0.01).  On the other hand, Hypothesis 2 was 
unsupported when the tests failed to find any association between financial 
reporting fraud and long auditor tenure.  In response to these results the authors 
deemed fraudulent financial reporting to be “…more likely to occur in the first 
three years of the auditor-client relationship” (2004, pg.55). 
 
While the research pertaining to auditor tenure and fraud per se is scarce, the 
length of auditor tenure has been studied quite extensively in relation to audit 
‘quality’.  Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) examined prior audit reports for a 
sample of companies entering into bankruptcy during the period 1996-1998.  
Their research utilised multivariate analysis to test for an association between the 
length of auditor tenure and the type of audit opinion issued on financial 
statements immediately prior to the client declaring bankruptcy.  The objective of 
the study was to highlight if the duration of the auditor-client relationship had a 
bearing on audit reporting failures.  Tests found a positive association existed 
between auditor tenure and the likelihood of a prior going-concern modified audit 
report being issued to a subsequently bankrupt company.  Within the scope of the 
study it was found that a clean audit report was more likely to be issued by a 
‘newer’ auditor prior to a company declaring bankruptcy.  Their findings support 
the conjecture that audit reporting failures are more likely to occur in the initial 
years of an audit engagement.  Hence the results were “…consistent with the 
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position that auditors may be more influenced by their newly obtained clients in 
the earlier years of the engagement” (Geiger et al., 2002, pg.74). 
 
The relationship between auditor tenure and earning quality was investigated by 
Myers, Myers & Omer, (2003).  To test for an association the authors used 
absolute abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals to proxy for earnings 
quality.  A significantly negative relation between auditor tenure and positive 
(income-increasing) accruals was found, along with a significantly positive 
relation between auditor tenure and negative (income-decreasing) accruals.  These 
results were interpreted by the authors as suggesting that, “…in the current 
environment, longer auditor tenure, on average, results in auditors placing greater 
constraints on extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial 
performance” (Myers et al., 2003, pg.779). 
 
A variable measuring the length of auditor tenure also appears in a number of 
other studies testing the management of earnings through the use of discretionary 
accruals.  In 2003 Ghosh and Moon found that absolute discretionary accruals and 
the use of large negative special items to manage earnings decrease as the auditor 
tenure became longer.  Another study, by Davis, Soo and Trompeter (2000), 
found that clients of auditors with short tenure (measured as 1 to 2 years) have 
higher discretionary accruals and lower earnings response coefficients.  The 
authors deemed that this was indicative of auditors with shorter tenure providing 
lower information credibility and lower information quality.  Contrary to this 
finding, test results further identified that clients of auditors with long tenure 
(measured as 3 to 5 years) had lower discretionary accruals and higher earnings 
response coefficients.  This was deemed to indicate that auditors with longer 
tenure provided both higher information credibility and information quality.  
Furthermore, the results also showed that as the length of auditor tenure increased 
from six to fifteen years, client management had less reporting flexibility (Davis 
et al., 2000). 
 
Similar results for reporting flexibility were reported by Lee and Mande (2003) 
who undertook research to examine how the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 would affect an auditors incentives to curtail earnings management 
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by their clients.  In multivariate tests the audit tenure variable produced a 
significantly negative result, which the authors considered offered confirmation 
that “…firms appear to have less reporting flexibility over time with the same 
auditor” (Lee et al., 2003, pg.103).  It is thought that by allowing less flexibility in 
reporting earnings the auditor might reduce their likelihood of being subject to 
litigation.  Following along these lines, Fanning and Cogger (1998) considered a 
possible explanation for a significantly negative association between litigation and 
auditor tenure may be that a longer tenure auditor will elicit more scrutiny of 
known problem areas, including discretionary accruals.  Or, conversely, the high 
cost of learning a company’s business in the early years of an engagement might 
preclude an effective audit from being conducted by newly appointed auditors. 
 
The above findings would suggest that there is reason to consider the length of 
tenure when determining the relative ability of the external auditor to act as a 
corporate monitor in identifying, and taking action against, fraudulent financial 
reporting.  It is therefore, hypothesised that: 
 
H19: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the tenure of a 
company’s external auditor increases. 
 
3.5.2 Big 6 Auditor (Big6Aud) 
Similar to auditor tenure, prior research into the association between auditor type 
and fraud is limited.  However, Carcello et al. (2004) did find companies with a 
fraud-related SEC enforcement action were less likely to use a Big 6 auditor than 
their matched non-fraud counterparts.  The study concluded that the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting is lower for companies whose audit services are 
provided by a Big 6 accounting firm.  Another study conducted by the same 
authors provided evidence that auditor industry specialisation offered positive 
benefits in deterring fraudulent financial reporting.  It was opined that “…the 
major accounting firms have organised their audit practices along industry lines, 
reflecting a belief that industry specialisation leads to higher quality audits” 
(Carcello & Nagy 2004b, pg.651).  Their tests found a negative relation between 
industry specialisation and fraudulent financial reporting, and it noted that the 
relation was even stronger for clients of Big 6 accounting firms. 
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Of a comparable nature, several studies have reported an association between 
auditor type and earnings manipulation (Siagian, 2002; Reynolds & Francis, 2000; 
Francis & Krishnan, 1999; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998).  
Siagian (2002) found that companies that used a non-Big 5 (previously Big 6) 
audit firm increased the probability of earnings manipulation.  A study conducted 
by Becker et al. (1998) used a sample of 10,379 Big 6 and 2,179 non-Big 6 firm 
years, and found support for their hypothesis that clients of non-Big 6 auditing 
firms reported income increasing discretionary accruals relatively more than 
clients of Big 6 firms. 
 
Furthermore, Krishnan (2003) noted the existence of an association between stock 
returns and discretionary accruals for clients of Big 6 auditors, and that this 
association was greater than that of firms audited by non-Big 6 auditors.  It was 
also found that a greater association was present between discretionary accruals 
and future profitability for clients of Big 6 auditor than that of non-Big 6 auditors.  
These results suggested that the informativeness of discretionary accruals is 
higher, while the risk of earnings management is lower, when auditing services 
are provided by a Big 6 auditor.  In summation, Krishnan determined that “…the 
findings are consistent with the notion that higher audit quality is associated with 
Big 6 auditors, and this is reflected in the security returns of clients of Big 6 
auditors” (2003, pg.124).  Similar findings to Krishnan’s were also noted by 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2006). 
 
In support of the quality-differentiated supposition, Krishnan and Schauer (2000) 
found evidence to confirm larger auditing firms were capable of achieving better 
audit quality than smaller accounting firms achieve.  The study used a proxy for 
audit quality that was based on the client’s compliance with eight GAAP reporting 
requirements.  Test results showed that non-compliance decreased as one shifted 
through the categories of small non-Big 6 auditor to the large non-Big 6 auditor, 
and finally from large non-Big 6 auditor to a Big 6 auditor. 
 
Other studies record additional characteristics common to Big 6 auditors that are 
likely to have a bearing on the audit quality and hence the potential for fraudulent 
financial reporting going undetected.  Raghunandan and Rama (1999) 
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documented the likelihood of a Big 6 accounting firm serving as the successor 
auditor was lower when the auditor change was caused by the resignation of the 
predecessor.  Subsequent analysis found that the likelihood of a Big 6 auditor 
accepting a client whose predecessor auditor had resigned was minimal and that 
these observations were further accentuated when the company was in financial 
distress.  Whereas, a study by Coffee (2001) reported that approximately 76% of 
all US publicly listed companies were audited by Big 5 (previously Big 6) 
auditors.  This was considered an indication that the five (six) major accounting 
firms were relatively independent of their clients and that no single company was 
material to the operating revenue of a Big 5 firm.  Finally, in a review of the 
literature Cohen et al. (2002) also indicated that “…audit committee members 
perceive that financial reporting quality will be positively affected by having a 
large auditor, as larger firms are more likely to disclose discovered errors” 
(pg.597). 
 
Collectively the above mentioned studies seem to endorse the notion that Big 6 
auditors are not found to audit fraudulent companies less often that non-Big 6 
auditors.  And while not whole-heartedly supported, these studies appear to 
support the supposition that size makes a difference in audit quality, although it 
can be considered questionable as to exactly why this differentiation exists.  
Nevertheless, it is suggested that Big 6 auditors may have an impact on the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting occurring.  The final hypothesis of this 
investigation therefore proposes that: 
 
H20: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur when a company 
retains the services of a Big6 auditor. 
 
3.6 Deficiencies in the Literature 
Although a vast body of research exists with regard to the various aspects of 
corporate governance, only a small quantity is linked with aspects of fraudulent 
financial reporting per se.  Furthermore, while some research pertaining to the 
deterrent qualities of audit committees’ and board of directors’ on the occurrence 
of fraud also exists, only one previous study has examined the presence of new 
corporate governance standards on the existence of financial statement fraud 
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(Persons, 2005).  This study will draw upon and extend Persons’ (2005) 
framework by refining and expanding the number of independent variables, 
thereby testing a number of additional distinct hypotheses. 
 
Also, the timing of previous studies lack the ability to show if the implementation 
of legislation and revision of regulations have had any consequential effect on the 
incidence of financial statement fraud.  The timeframe for the research will 
distinguish this report from earlier ones, as it will have the advantage of including 
data made available by the implementation of a variety of new rules aimed at 
strengthening corporate governance.  Whereas, to the best of my knowledge, 
earlier studies have included data collected only as late as October 2003, this 
study will incorporate data to the end of June 2006.  This aspect is significant in 
that it will permit the inclusion of up to three years more data than has previously 
been tested and that this data will more closely reflect the current conditions of 
corporate governance in public companies. 
 
3.7 Summary 
The foregoing literature review of prior research undertaken was aimed at 
providing support for the inclusion of the various independent variables selected 
in this study to represent attributes of corporate governance that are likely to have 
a bearing on the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  Four categories of 
corporate governance were covered by the review, Audit Committee 
Functionality, Board of Director Composition, Ownership Structure, and External 
Auditor Factors.  Research of particular relevance to each of the four categories 
was thoroughly reviewed and the subsequent findings used to aid in the posing of 
twenty directional hypotheses.  (A complete list of these hypotheses is presented 
below in Table 1.)  The shear volume of prior research able to be reviewed was of 
substantial benefit and provided the means by which the direction of the 
hypotheses could be predicted.  This capability potentially enables more precision 
to be achieved during the testing phase.  The results of tests conducted to accept 
or reject the proposed hypotheses are included in Chapter 5, while in the 
following chapter an explanation of the research methods utilised is presented. 
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List of Hypotheses Posed 
Audit Committee Functionality: 
H1: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of Audit 
Committee members’ increase 
H2: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of independent 
directors on a company’s Audit Committee increase 
H3: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage of 
independent directors on a company’s Audit Committee increase 
H4: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of ACFE’s on a 
company’s Audit Committee increase 
H5: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage of ACFE’s on 
a company’s Audit Committee increase 
H6: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of meetings held 
by Audit Committees increase 
H7: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the average tenure of Audit 
Committee members’ increase 
H8: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the average number of 
directorships held by Audit Committee members’ increase 
Board of Director Composition: 
H9: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of directors on a 
company’s board increase 
H10: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of independent 
directors on a company’s board increase 
H11: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage of 
independent directors on a company’s board increase 
H12: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in company’s that have a CEO 
that is also the Chairman of the board of directors 
H13: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur when a Nominating Committee 
exists within the company’s board of directors 
H14: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of Nominating 
Committee members’ increase 
Ownership Structure: 
H15: Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the percentage of company 
ownership held by Inside Directors increases 
H16: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage of company 
ownership held by Outside Directors increases 
H17: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the number of outside 
blockholders having ownership rights in the company increases 
H18: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the percentage of company 
ownership held by outside blockholders increases 
External Auditor Factors: 
H19: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the tenure of a company’s 
external auditor increases 
H20: Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur when a company retains the 
services of a Big6 auditor 
TABLE 1 – List of Hypotheses Posed 
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Chapter Four 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether there is a relationship between certain 
corporate governance attributes and the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  In particular, the objective is to ascertain whether fraudulent financial 
reporting is related to any of the variables classified into four broad categories of 
corporate governance, being audit committee functionality, board of director 
composition, ownership structure and external auditor factors.  To investigate the 
potentiality of such a relationship existing, a sample of fraud companies was 
selected and examined.  Then to enable tests to determine whether a relationship 
exists, the identified fraud companies were matched with companies very similar 
in nature based on a number of business characteristics, such as industry and size.  
This identification of a matched non-fraud company for each fraud company 
provided a control group from which differences in corporate governance 
attributes could be distinguished. 
 
Statistical analysis of the data was then performed using the computer 
programme, SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences).  SPSS provided a 
platform where both univariate and multivariate testing methods could be applied 
to the case/control research design utilised by this study.  Under this application, 
tests of comparison between fraud and non-fraud companies were capable of 
being executed, along with logistic regression analysis to determine relationships 
among the data and the strength of each of the tested variables to predict fraud. 
 
This chapter will serve to provide a description and analysis of the methods 
applied in collecting and preparing the data deemed necessary to test for the 
existence of a relationship between fraud and attributes of corporate governance. 
Firstly the chapter will identify and discuss the databases used to collect the 
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information necessary to conduct the study.  The fraud sample selection and the 
matching process will then be explained, followed by a description of how each of 
the independent and control variables were measured.  Finally, a review of the 
research design and selection of the analysis methods utilised will be provided.  
While the methods employed by this study will be discussed in this chapter, the 
results emanating from those choices will be presented in Chapter Five. 
 
4.2 Databases 
Several databases were used in the sample selection and data collection phases of 
this study.  Initially the LexisNexus database was utilised to distinguish cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting, which ultimately resulted in the identification of 
the fraud-company sample.  LexisNexis is a searchable archival database that 
offers access to promulgated legislation and many legal documents.  Included in 
this database are all AAER’s, which detail the legal inditements brought against 
entities by the SEC under the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934.  As such, LexisNexis was used to populate the dependent variable, 
fraudulent financial reporting.  (More information relating to this database and the 
use of AAER’s is provided in the following section.) 
 
Both the Thomson ONE Banker and EDGAR databases were then used in the 
collection of data necessary to allow the matching process to be accomplished.  
The Thomson ONE Banker database, administered by Thomson Financial, 
provided the financial data needed for matching, along with a search tool capable 
of customising searches by set criteria.  Thomson ONE enables customised 
searches to be undertaken in relation to data compiled on over 28,500 active and 
9,500 inactive companies worldwide.  The database also allows time series data to 
be retrieved for up to a 10-year period.  To this end the database was searched to 
not only retrieve information relating to a precise time period, but also using 
matching criteria such as Standard Industry Code, Listing Exchange, and Total 
Assets to identify a selection of companies capable of being matched to a specific 
fraud company.  The information retrieved enabled a relatively accurate match of 
fraud and non-fraud companies to be achieved. 
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Finally, the EDGAR system, which is a database administered by the SEC, was 
used extensively throughout the study, not only for matching purposes but also to 
provide the necessary corporate governance information.  Access to the EDGAR 
database is publicly available via the worldwide web, from which a wide array of 
financial, listing and other general information about US public companies can be 
obtained.  To satisfy certain obligations under US legislation all listed companies 
must submit quarterly and annual filings to the SEC, which include a great 
number of financial and operational disclosures.  Filings available on EDGAR 
include a company’s Form 10-K and Proxy Statements, which provide a 
comprehensive overview of the registrant’s business.  These documents discuss 
such issues as proposals for new additions to the board of directors, a variety of 
information about directors’ and management, including their employment history 
and qualifications, as well as shareholding structures and other declarations made 
by company management.  The information available on EDGAR was therefore 
used to populate the independent variables depicting various aspects of corporate 
governance. 
 
4.3 Fraud Sample Selection 
Generating a sample of fraudulent companies is limited to cases of discovered 
fraud only, and as such cases of fraud as yet undiscovered are not available to be 
studied.  Therefore, to the extent that a complete list of all companies that have 
fraudulently reported their financial statements does not exist (Beneish, 1997), it 
is appropriate that fraud companies are identified through a review of discovered 
cases of fraud described in AAER’s issued by the SEC.  As the US Government 
delegates enforcement powers concerning fraudulent financial reporting to the 
SEC, these enforcement releases form a verified basis on which a sample of fraud 
companies can be selected.  Furthermore, as numerous earlier studies (Beasley, 
1996; McMullen, 1996; Bonner, Palmrose and Young, 1998; Saksena, 2001; 
Archambeault, 2002; Geriesh, 2003; Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 2004; and 
Persons, 2005), have used the same fraud identification process, this method of 
sample selection will facilitate comparison of this study’s findings with those of 
prior research. 
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AAER’s, retrievable via the NexisLexis database, summarise the SEC’s 
accounting-based enforcement actions and describe investigations into alleged 
violations of the accounting provisions sanctioned under US securities law.  The 
term ‘alleged’ is used because a large portion of enforcement actions brought by 
the SEC are settled without the charges being admitted or denied (see Chapter 2 
for a more thorough discussion on this topic).  Therefore, AAER’s from which the 
sample of fraud companies are drawn, describe both settled and litigated cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting issued by the SEC. 
 
Fraud companies were identified based upon a review of enforcement actions 
taken against organisations and individuals alleged to have violated SEC 
regulations in relation to anti-fraud provisions.  AAER’s recorded on the 
LexisNexis database as being issued between 1 January 2004 and 31 June 2006, 
specifically, numbers 1937 to 2455, were completely reviewed to distinguish 
entities that were considered to have committed fraudulent financial reporting.  In 
accordance with the definition and measurement criteria given in Chapter 2 of this 
report, fraudulent financial reporting was deemed to have occurred if an AAER 
recorded an alleged violation of Sections 17(a) of the Securities Act 1933 and/or 
section 10(b) (in conjunction with Rule 10(b)-5) of the Securities Exchange Act 
1934. 
 
All companies falling within the above-mentioned range were examined and of 
the original 519 AAER’s issued 17 were either not assigned by the SEC or 
missing from the database.  A thorough examination of the remaining 502 
eliminated a further 279 AAER’s because they either related to administrative 
proceedings8 or the release pertained to enforcement action taken against 
companies already recorded in an earlier AAER (i.e. multiple AAER’s existed for 
many of the cases).  As a result 223 AAER’s related to unique cases of alleged 
SEC anti-fraud violations, all of which were drawn in for use in this study. 
 
A firm was selected as a fraud company if – (1) the fraud was considered to 
constitute fraudulent financial reporting, (2) the fraud period was clearly 
                                                          
8 Administrative proceedings relate to such issues as reinstatement of privileges to appear before 
the SEC as an accountant or lawyer. 
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mentioned in the AAER, (3) the firm filed either a Form 10-K or Proxy Statement 
with the SEC during the initial fraud year, (4) financial statement information for 
the year prior to the initial fraud year9 is available from either SEC filings or the 
Thomson ONE Banker database, and (5) the fraud company is not a financial 
institution10.  Each one of the five above-mentioned parameters was considered 
important to either the sample identification or data collection stages of this study. 
 
First and foremost it was paramount to determine that the alleged offence did 
constitute the study’s definition of fraudulent financial reporting.  Secondly, it 
was necessary to be able to ascertain the period of the fraud, particularly when it 
was deemed the fraudulent reporting began, so that the most accurate and relevant 
governance and financial data could be gathered.  In this regard it was considered 
that governance data collected from the Form 10-K or Proxy Statement filed with 
the SEC needed to relate to the period when the fraud was first identified as 
having occurred.  This was in order that the aspects of governance in effect during 
the fraud period could be examined.  Whereas, the financial data for each entity 
needed to relate to the period prior to the fraud to ensure the data used more 
accurately reflected the true, non-manipulated, financial position of the company. 
 
Finally, it was relevant to distinguish financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) from 
other entities so that these could be excluded from selection.  This action was 
taken in accordance with prior research (Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Carcello & 
Nagy, 2004a; Dunn, 2004; Geriesh, 2003), which determined that financial 
institutions tended to be highly regulated, and as such may invoke requirements 
that go beyond the monitoring of regular publicly traded entities.  It is believed 
that the inclusion of financial institutions might have skewed test results with 
regard to governance attributes. 
 
In addition to the information provided in the AAER’s sourced from LexisNexis, 
data needed to be gathered from the SEC EDGAR and Thomson ONE Banker 
databases.  These databases were used to establish whether sufficient information 
                                                          
9 Financial information based on non-fraudulent figures is needed to accurately measure the ‘size’ 
of each fraud company for matching purposes. 
10 A financial institutions was considered to be any company that had a Standard Industry Code 
between 6000 to 6999. 
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for the fraud company existed and was available for utilising in the matching 
process and to populate the independent variables.  Of primary importance was 
the need to establish that the fraud company did in fact lodge a Form 10-K or 
Proxy Statement for the applicable period and that these documents contained all 
the necessary information regarding corporate governance attributes.  To achieve 
this the appropriate SEC filing for each company needed to be reviewed and the 
relevant data manually transferred to an Exel spreadsheet.  A search of the 
Thomson ONE Banker database was also needed to verify that relevant financial 
information was available for the year prior to the initial fraud year. 
 
The above mentioned selection process reduced the number of AAER’s from 223 
unique fraud cases to 113 companies considered to have committed fraudulent 
financial reporting.  This outcome is illustrated in Table 2, which depicts the 
elimination of 22 cases relating to incidents not considered to constitute 
fraudulent financial reporting, 4 cases where the fraud period was not stated, 59 
companies that did not have the relevant information publicly available in either 
the SEC of Thomson ONE Banker databases, and 16 financial institutions.  A 
further 9 companies were eliminated as a result of no appropriate match being 
able to be identified.  The final selection yielded a sample of 113 fraud 
companies. 
Fraud Sample Selection 
Number of AAER between 1 January 2004 and 31 June 2006 502 
Less:  
Multiply AAER recordings for a unique case or AAER pertaining to 
administrative proceedings 
279 
AAER not considered to constitute fraudulent financial reporting 22 
AAER where the fraud period was not determinable 4 
AAER issued against companies with no available Form 10K/Proxy or 
financial statement data 
59 
AAER issued against financial institutions 16 
AAER issued against company where no appropriate match could be 
identified 
9 
Balance 113 
TABLE 2 – Fraud Sample Selection 
 
Upon establishment of the final selection of fraud companies the EDGAR 
database was used to identify the industry sector SIC code of each entity.  This 
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information, along with the data gathered thus far in the identification and 
selection of the fraud sample, was then used in the matching process to establish a 
suitable control group of non-fraud companies. 
 
4.5 The Matching Process 
Fraud companies were matched to non-fraud companies via a specific matching 
process.  This process included matching a fraud company with a non-fraudulent 
counterpart within the same industry sector, based on SIC coding, and took into 
account the timing of the fraud to ensure the data for each pair came from the 
same period.  Company size, based on total assets, was also taken into 
consideration along with the US stock exchange on which the company was 
listed.  It is proposed that matching via this comprehensive set of criteria would 
improve the calibre of matched pairs and hence the quality and precision of the 
test results. 
 
For the purposes of this matching process the industry sector was based on the 
Standard Industry Code (SIC) assigned to each company dependent upon the 
industry they operate in.  This code was able to be sourced from both the SEC 
EDGAR and Thomson ONE Banker databases.  Where an industry was classified 
under a number of codes the primary SIC was used.  The year prior to the initial 
year of fraud was used for matching purposes and ensured the financial data for 
both the case and control sample groups came from the same time period.  This 
additionally enabled the actual performance of the fraud company, prior to 
manipulation, to be used to match the pairs. 
 
The size criterion was determined by the value of Total Assets specified in the 
annual financial report issued in the fiscal year preceding the fraud period.  To 
match the pairs on a size criterion was deemed important because of the need to 
ensure both the fraud and non-fraud companies shared a relatively similar 
availability to resources and were therefore capable of implementing comparable 
corporate governance structures.  The criterion used to match by stock exchange 
was quantified as the national securities exchange/stock market the company was 
registered with at the time the fraud occurred.  Matching on this criterion was 
thought to control for any differences in corporate governance requirements 
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across the various exchanges.  Information for both the size and exchange 
criterions was gathered from the Thomson ONE Banker database. 
 
The matching process utilised the Thomson ONE Banker database to search for 
appropriate matches based on the criterion data (ie. SIC code, time, size and 
exchange) of each fraud company.  Exact matches of the time and exchange 
criterion were sought, while acceptable limits were established within which the 
SIC coding and size criterions were permitted to deviate.  These limits were set to 
emulate earlier studies, such as Beasley (1996), which permitted industry matches 
to two digit SIC code, and a 30% margin, above or below the total assets of the 
fraud company, for matching by size. 
 
Possible matches for the fraud companies were identified through the use of 
customised searches of the Thomson ONE Banker database.  Excel spreadsheets 
were used to collate the data furnished from each search, which was then sorted 
and assessed so that the closest possible matches could be identified.  Those 
companies that most closely fit the matching criterion were then checked within 
the SEC’s EDGAR database, firstly to confirm that the possible match had not 
previously been the subject of fraud allegations.  And, secondly, to ensure a Form 
10-K or Proxy Statement for the appropriate time period was available.  If the 
possible match was not recorded by the SEC for prior fraudulent activity and the 
appropriate data was available, the entity that most closely matched the fraud 
company criterion was then selected for the non-fraud control sample.  This step 
of the matching process sometimes necessitated the checking of numerous 
possibilities before a suitable match could be found. 
 
4.5 Measurement of the Independent Variables 
The following sections provide detailed information about how each independent 
variable was measured.  The variables have been grouped into four corporate 
governance categories, each incorporating individual variables depicting specific 
attributes pertaining to either audit committee functionality, board of director 
composition, ownership structure or external auditor factors.  The individual 
variables that comprise each of these categories are discussed below. 
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To populate the majority of the independent variables identified in Chapter 3 of 
this report, this study made use of the information provided in each company’s 
Form 10-K and Proxy Statement.  Both of these filings contain relatively the same 
information, most of which pertains to matters related to corporate governance.  
The annual filing of the Form 10-K was predominantly used to provide all the 
necessary information to populate the variables.  However, if for any reason the 
Form 10-K was unavailable or the required information was not specified therein, 
the company’s Proxy Statement was used as an alternative to source the data. 
 
4.5.1 Audit Committee Functionality 
The functionality of an audit committee, being the independence, competence and 
diligence of its members is considered to be of vital importance to its role in 
providing effective oversight of the financial reporting process.  With this level of 
importance taken into consideration a number of variables were selected to depict 
audit committee functionality.  These variables and the chosen method of 
measurement for each are discussed below. 
 
The first variable in this category is the number of audit committee members 
(NmbACMem), which is calculated simply as the number of members reported by 
the company in their Form 10-K as forming the committee.  The number and 
percentage of independent audit committee members variables are based on how 
many of these members are considered under SEC regulations to be independent.  
Section 301 of the SOA stipulates that an audit committee member is deemed to 
be independent if that person is not affiliated with the company in any way, and 
does not accept compensation (including consulting, advisory, or other 
compensatory fee) from the company, other than in the member’s capacity as a 
member of the board of directors and any board committee. 
 
As the above requirements indicate, the independence of members appointed to 
the audit committee, is of quite substantial consequence.  The personal details 
provided in the Form 10-K of each committee member was scrutinised to 
establish whether they conformed to the requirements stipulated in Section 301.  
The number of audit committee members considered to be independent was 
recorded (NmbIndAC), along with the percentage of independent members 
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(%IndAC).  This latter variable, which was calculated as the proportion of 
independent members to total committee members, was included for the 
additional precision the ratio method of measurement would bring to the test.  In 
this regard, it was determined that due to the varying number of members on audit 
committees a percentage variable would provide a more comparable proportionate 
method of measurement.  Additionally, while this variable could have been 
measured in a dichotomous manner, for example, depicting whether at least the 
majority of the committee were considered independent or not (which has been 
used in prior studies), it was believed that the scale type variable included in this 
study gave greater precision in tests. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 the competence of the audit committee members has 
had a positive effect on the quality of this committee’s governance oversight 
capabilities.  In reflection of this concern regulation in the form of listing rules 
were implemented to ensure that all members of the audit committee are 
financially literate11 and that at least one member has financial or accounting 
expertise.  The competence of the audit committee was therefore measured in this 
study by the number and percentage of members considered to be ‘Audit 
Committee Financial Experts’ (ACFE).  The term ‘Audit Committee Financial 
Expert’ is defined by the SEC in Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K as a person who 
has the following attributes: 
• An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and 
financial statements 
• Experience preparing, auditing, analysing or evaluating financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of 
accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and 
complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised 
by the registrant’s financial statements, or experience actively 
supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities 
• An understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting 
• An understanding of audit committee functions 
 
                                                          
11 The NASDAQ and ASE rules define financial literacy as the ability to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements, including a company's balance sheet, income statement, and 
cash flow statement. 
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The requirement to disclose whether a company has at least one ACFE serving on 
its audit committee, as specified under section 407 of the SOA, only became 
effective for fiscal years ending on or after 15 July 2003.  The above four 
specifications were therefore used as a guideline when determining the presence 
of an ACFE prior to that period.  Specifically, it was determined that for the 
purposes of this study, and where no disclosure was available, members would 
qualify as a ACFE based on whether or not they had an education and/or 
experience as a principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, controller, 
public accountant or auditor.  Consideration was also given to those persons that 
had experience in one or more positions that involve the performance of similar 
accounting or finance functions. 
 
The personal details described in the Form 10-K for each committee member was 
scrutinised to establish which, if any, of the members qualified as an ACFE.  The 
number of audit committee members considered to be ACFE’s (NmbACFE) was 
recorded along with the percentage of ACFE’s (%ACFE).  As alluded to earlier, 
the inclusion of this latter variable, which was calculated as the proportion of 
members qualifying as an ACFE to total committee members, was deemed 
relevant due to the additional precision able to be gained from this method of 
measurement. 
 
As with earlier studies the number of meetings is used to indicate the level of 
diligence exercised by a board or committee.  Form 10-K filings note the number 
of meetings held each year by the audit committee.  These filings additionally 
record where, for whatever reason, no meetings of the committee were held 
during the year.  This information was used to populate the NmbACMeet variable.  
In the rare occasion when no reference was made to the number of meetings held 
in the Form 10-K, the Proxy Statement or audit committee charter for the 
company was reviewed to gauge the number of meetings that the committee 
would typically engage in. 
 
The tenure of the audit committee members is also considered an important aspect 
of the committee’s overall functionality.  The AvgACTen variable, which 
represented the tenure of the audit committee members was measured by 
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calculating the number of years each member had retained a position on the 
company’s board of directors.  Again, this information was able to be sourced 
from the Form 10-K, which specified the year the member was first elected to the 
board.  The number of years, including the current year of the filing, was 
calculated for each audit committee member and the sum of years for all members 
on the committee was totalled.  This figure was then averaged to find the mean 
tenure of the committee members, and the result used to populate the AvgACTen 
variable. 
 
In attempting to capture the ‘busyness’ of the directors appointed to the audit 
committee and hence the relative amount of time able to be dedicated to 
preparing, attending and participating in committee meetings, the average number 
of directorships committee members held in other public companies was used.  
The information necessary to populate this variable was again provided in the 
Form 10-K, where the personal details of each director was specified in a list of 
additional companies the member also held directorships in.  The variable, 
AvgACDtrships, was calculated by totalling all other public company 
directorships held by members of the committee and dividing it by the number of 
members to provide an average of directorships for the audit committee as a 
whole.  The average was used as the measure for this variable rather than the sum 
total as it was considered more appropriate due to the wide ranging size of audit 
committees – generally the more members on the committee the larger total 
number of directorships.  Thus using total numbers would have introduced 
unnecessary bias. 
 
4.5.2 Board of Director Composition 
The composition of a board of directors is particularly important to ensuring 
effective governance of a company is achieved.  In this respect the independence 
and manner in which new members of the board are nominated, along with the 
relative impartiality of the board chairperson, is of specific import.  The variables 
selected to depict these aspects together with their chosen method of measurement 
are discussed below. 
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The size of the board of directors has been shown to be a factor in the ability of 
the board to effectively monitor management and efficiently work together to 
oversee the running of the business (Persons, 2006; Chiang, 2005; McColgan, 
2001).  To assess this capability the number of positions available for election to 
the board of directors of each company was examined.  These details were 
gathered from the Form 10-K or Proxy Statement and the total number of 
members stated was used to populate the NmbDtrs variable. 
 
Similar to the independence of audit committee members, it has been found that 
board members that are independent from management can have a positive effect 
on the governance of a company, particularly in relation to fraud (Beasley, 1996; 
Uzun et al., 2004; Persons, 2005; Archambeault, 2000).  Therefore, consistent 
with both the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchange listing rules this study 
determined an independent board member as a person who does not have a 
relationship with the company that may interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.  In particular the 
NASDAQ rules provide certain criteria that are considered to disqualify persons 
from the status of an independent director.  These per se disqualifications include: 
• a director who is, or at any time during the past three years was, 
employed by the company, its parent, or its subsidiary 
• a director who accepted or who has a family member who 
accepted any payments from the company, its parent, or its 
subsidiary in excess of $60,000 during the current or any of the 
past three fiscal years, with certain exceptions 
• a director whose family member is, or at any time during the past 
three years was, employed as an executive officer by the 
company, its parent, or its subsidiary 
• a director who is, or has a family member who is, a partner, 
controlling shareholder, or executive officer of any organization 
to which the company made or received payments for property or 
services, with certain exceptions, in the current or any of the past 
three fiscal years that exceed the greater of 5% of the recipient’s 
consolidated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000 
• a director of the listed company who is, or has a family member 
who is, an executive officer of another entity where at any time 
during the past three years any of the listed company’s executive 
officers served on that entity’s compensation committee 
• a director who is, or has a family member who is, a current 
partner of the company’s outside auditor, or was a partner or 
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employee of the company’s outside auditor who worked on the 
company’s audit at any time during any of the past three years 
(NASDAQ, 2003) 
 
In addition, the NASDAQ rules define a family member as a person’s spouse, 
parents, children or siblings, whether by blood, marriage or adoption, or anyone 
residing in such person’s home.  Using the above provisions as a guideline the 
personal details provided in the Form 10-K of each director of the board was 
scrutinised to establish whether they qualified as independent within the 
requirements stipulated above.  The number of directors of the board considered 
to be independent was recorded (NmbIndDtrs), as well as the percentage of 
independent directors (%IndDtrs).  This latter figure was calculated as the 
proportion of independent directors to the total number of positions available for 
election to the board, and was included for increased accuracy. 
 
Duality occurs when the same person occupies both the CEO and chairman of the 
board positions.  The CEO=Chair is a dummy/coding variable that has been 
specifically constructed to capture this practice.  Where duality existed in a 
company (i.e. the CEO and chairman of the board were the same person) the 
variable was coded as 1.  Conversely, where duality did not exist, the variable for 
the company was coded as 0.  Form 10-K filings for each company provided the 
necessary information to populate this variable. 
 
Whilst a Board of Directors nominating committee does not have a direct 
monitoring function per se, it is thought that the committee is pivotal to the future 
effective performance and functioning of the board of directors.  Two variables 
are used to represent the nominating committee, firstly to ascertain whether the 
committee exists or not, and secondly where a nominating committee does exist, 
to determine the number of members appointed.  Because all the committees 
established by a company are described in the Form 10-K this document was 
again used to source the required data.  NomExist was coded 1 if a nominating 
committee existed and 0 otherwise, whereas the NmbNomMem variable simply 
recorded the number of members appointed to the committee. 
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4.5.3 Ownership Structure 
As described in Chapter 3 the ownership structure of a company has been deemed 
to be of critical, if contradictory, importance to the quality and comprehensiveness 
of the oversight administered in that company (Klein, 2006; Pergola, 2005; Dunn, 
2004; Song & Windram, 2004).  Two variables were used to represent the 
ownership structure of directors on the board of both fraud and non-fraud 
companies.  %InsDtrOwn was calculated as the percentage of stockholdings held 
by all inside directors appointed to the board.  While %OutDtrOwn was 
calculated as the percentage of stockholdings held by all outside directors 
appointed to the board.  For the purposes of this study inside directors were 
deemed to include officers or employees of the company or any subsidiary, 
officers of an affiliated company, former officers or employees of the company 
within the last 3 years, family members of management, or professional advisors 
to the company.  Conversely, outside directors were considered to be all other 
directors that were not categorised as inside directors. 
 
The information used to categorise the directors as either insiders or outsiders was 
sourced from the Form 10-K, along with data regarding each board members 
stockholding.  Whilst it could be judged that the two variables depicting 
%InsDtrOwn and %OutDtrOwn simply measure the reciprocal of each other, it 
was determined that the differing concepts held to explain the positive/negative 
effects of each type of ownership structure was worthy of individual 
consideration.  Thus, both variables were used in tests of opposing hypotheses to 
establish which, if either, concept held true. 
 
Similar to outside director ownership, it was thought that blockholder ownership 
would have a positive bearing on governance oversight.  This notion was based on 
the general consensus of prior studies that outside blockholders have a greater 
ability to monitor than the average shareholder because of the ‘strength’ of their 
voting power (Persons, 2006).  Furthermore, findings propose that large outside 
blockholders have increased incentive to monitor the actions of the companies 
they invest in due to their larger proportional stake in the entity (Cronqvist et al., 
2006). 
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Entities with shareholdings of 5% or more of a company’s outstanding common 
stock were deemed blockholders, with the exception that shareholdings of this 
amount held by either inside or outside directors or management were excluded 
from this category.  Blockholders are generally not affiliated with the company in 
any way other than through their ownership interests.  The Form 10-K provided 
the necessary data to populate the variables, which were calculated as the number 
of entities determined to be outside blockholders (NmbOutBlock) and the total 
percentage of ownership held by all blockholders of the company 
(%OutBlockOwn). 
 
4.5.4 External Auditor Factors 
External auditors are considered of importance to the governance of a company in 
that the public relies upon them to provide some assurance as to the 
appropriateness of the assertions included in the financial report of the company. 
The monitoring functions performed by the external auditor can be influenced by 
a number of aspects.  It has been suggested that an external auditor’s length of 
tenure with the client firm can substantially affect their ability to monitor 
(Carcello & Nagy, 2004a), and/or their susceptibility to management influence 
(Lin et al., 2006). 
 
The length of tenure of the external auditor is measured by the number of years 
the auditing firm has been retained by the client.  Where no specific mention is 
made in the Form 10-K as to the period of auditor retention, a search of the Proxy 
Statement was undertaken.  If neither filing disclosed the length of tenure, a proxy 
of 1 year, being the current period for which the auditor is engaged to audit, was 
used to populate the variable AudTen. 
 
Another issue thought to be of consequence to the effectiveness/quality of the 
monitoring performed by external auditors is the size of the firm providing the 
auditing services.  As referred to in Chapter 3, it has been suggested that Big 6 
auditing firms are more likely to be associated with non-fraudulent companies.  
Although the so-called Big 6 auditing firms have now been reduced to the ‘Big 4’ 
this study retained the earlier designation.  This was due to the fact that during 
much of the research period the ‘Big 6’ were still in existence.  In addition, a good 
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portion of the literature reviewed and upon which this study based it hypotheses, 
referred to the Big 6 auditing firms.  Therefore, Arthur Andersen, Coopers & 
Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Price Waterhouse (or 
there subsequent merged name, i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers) were the auditing 
firms categorised as representing the ‘Big 6’.  A dummy variable is used to 
capture the results of the Big6Aud variable, whereby companies specifying in 
their Form 10-K that the firm engaged to conduct their annual audit was amongst 
the above listed names were coded as 1.  Those companies listing other auditing 
firms were coded as 0. 
 
4.6 Measurement of the Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables discussed above a number of control 
variables were included in the study.  The inclusion of non-corporate governance 
variables to control for additional company characteristics that may influence the 
presence of fraud was considered fundamental to ensuring the tests focused more 
precisely on differences created by variations in corporate governance.  As this 
study is aimed at determining whether a relation between corporate governance 
attributes and the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting exists, it was 
essential that other influencing aspects of fraud were controlled. 
 
Whilst every effort was made to control for normal variations in company 
characteristics through the matching process, this process was unable to fully 
control for non-corporate governance incentives that may influence fraudulent 
behaviour.  Inasmuch as numerous incentives could exist to motivate an entity to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting, a great number, such as management 
style, integrity, and corporate culture are problematic to measure, and 
consequently are unable to be controlled (Archambeault, 2002).  A review of prior 
research determined that of the measurable incentives that exist, four were 
deemed of particular relevance to this study.  The four control variables, Total 
Assets, Leverage, Age, and Growth are considered individually below, along with 
the method of measurement for each variable. 
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4.6.1 Total Assets 
Although total assets was included as a criterion in the matching process it was 
not always possible to precisely match on all four criteria proposed in the research 
design, being time, industry, exchange and size.  In these instances the size 
criterion, which was measured by total assets, was the one sacrificed so as to 
maintain the integrity of the other three.  Taking into consideration the importance 
placed upon ensuring an adequate match in size between the pairs of fraud and 
non-fraud companies, it was deemed a control variable measuring total assets 
would overcome this limitation of the matching process. 
 
The Total Assets variable was recorded based upon the information reported in 
the Thomson ONE Banker database for each company.  This piece of financial 
information was able to be retrieved from a specific field in the database without 
the need for any manual calculations to be performed.  The financial period from 
which the data was obtained was that of the year ended prior to the identified 
initial fraud period. 
 
4.6.2 Leverage 
Leverage represents the debt structure of a company and has been used in 
numerous studies to proxy for closeness to a debt covenant violation (Efendi et 
al., 2004; Erickson et al., 2004; Elayan, Li & Meyer, 2003).  In this regard 
Persons (1995) claimed that, “Higher leverage is typically associated with higher 
potential for violations of loan agreements and less ability to obtain additional 
capital through borrowing” (pg.40).  Consequently leverage has been found to be 
positively correlated with income-enhancing accounting policies, such that 
understating liabilities or overstating assets might be used to avoid debt covenant 
violations.  Efendi et al. suggested that, “If a firm is close to default on 
accounting-based debt covenants, the CEO may misstate the accounting numbers 
to avoid the resultant consequences” (2004, pg.12). 
 
Using a parsimonious stepwise-logistic regression model Person (2005) found that 
fraud firms have higher financial leverage than non-fraud firms, and that financial 
leverage is a significant factor influencing the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud.  Other studies such as Dechow et al. (1996) and Richardson, Tuna, & Wu 
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(2002), have linked leverage with earnings management and financial 
restatements.  Consistent with Persons (2005) study of fraud firms, companies 
implementing fraudulent practices, such as earnings management, were also found 
to have significantly greater levels of leverage than that of their matched control 
companies.  Dechow et al. surmised that even though the AAER’s included in 
their study did not mention avoidance of debt covenant violations as a motivation 
for earnings management, the authors opined that the evidence was “…consistent 
with the existence of such a motivation” (1996, pg.21).  These examples indicate 
that increased leverage may provide an incentive that fosters the fraudulent 
manipulation of the financial results of a company. 
 
Taking the above into account, it was considered that the incentive to manipulate 
financial results in the hope of avoiding a debt covenant violation (and the 
resulting consequences that such violations could bring), needed to be controlled 
against by the inclusion of a variable measuring leverage.  Thus the Leverage 
variable was calculated as the percentage of total debt to total assets.  The 
information required to populate the variable was sourced from the Thomson 
ONE Banker database, which enabled a data field depicting this value to be 
selected as the search criteria. 
 
4.6.3 Age 
The age of a company has been found to be significantly related to fraud 
occurrence.  Beneish (1999) identified that companies more recently listed on a 
national stock exchange were more likely to be found committing fraudulent 
financial reporting.  The cause of this phenomenon was suggested to be due to the 
greater pressure faced by these companies to meet earnings targets (Carcello & 
Nagy, 2004b).  Likewise, it was also proposed by Archambeault (2000) that the 
newer a company is the more incentive it has to distort financial results for the 
purposes of securing initial investment capital. 
 
Taking this into account it would appear that the age of a company might present 
an incentive to fraudulently report financial condition.  Thus the Age variable was 
based on the number of years a company had been listed on one of the US 
national stock exchanges.  A benchmark of 5 years was used as a proxy for age, in 
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this way distinguishing ‘newer’ companies (those listed less than 5 years) from 
‘older’ companies (those listed 5 or more years).  The information necessary to 
populate this variable was gathered from the Thomson ONE Banker database and 
was contingent on whether the company was recorded as being publicly listed and 
whether at least 5 years worth of the financial data preceding the fraud period was 
available on the database.  The Age variable is a dummy variable, which was 
coded 1 for companies that had been listed less than 5 years, and coded 0 for all 
other companies. 
 
4.6.4 Growth 
Consistent with a number of earlier studies (Carcello et al., 2004; Abbott, Parker 
& Peters, 2004; Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley, 1996), the growth of a company is 
represented by a control variable.  It is deemed important to control for an entity’s 
pace of development in this way because in times of rapid growth a company may 
encounter pressure to maintain or exceed anticipated growth rates.  The pressure 
to achieve a targeted rate of growth, or alternatively mask downturns, may create 
the incentive for management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting (Carcello 
et al., 2004). 
 
A company’s rate of growth has also been linked to a weakening of the entity’s 
internal control system, whereby the financial controls may become inadequate to 
support the company’s increased size (Abbott et al., 2000).  This type of decline 
in the functioning of a company’s internal controls could ultimately have a 
negative impact on the accounting system and its ability to accurately record the 
firm’s accounting transactions (Abbott et al., 2004).  In an attempt to account for 
the incentive a company’s rate of growth may have on the risk of financial 
statement fraud, Growth has been included as a control variable. 
 
The Growth variable was measured as the average growth rate of total assets in 
the two years preceding the identified initial fraud period.  Where insufficient data 
was available to calculate the two-year average, the growth rate for the year 
preceding the fraud was used.  The information to populate the variable was 
sourced from the Thomson ONE Banker database, which enabled a data field 
depicting the total assets 1-year growth rate to be selected as a search criterion.  
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When two years worth of data was available these figures were averaged to obtain 
the growth rate. 
 
4.7 Research Design and Selection of Analysis Methods 
A quantitative research approach has been employed in which an inferential 
statistics methodology was applied to provide empirical evidence of the 
hypothesised relationships between selected corporate governance attributes and 
the existence of fraudulent financial reporting.  Firstly, t-tests were used to 
evaluate the differences in means of all non-control variables between identified 
fraud firms and their matched non-fraud firms.  Due to the matched case-control 
design of this research it was essential to perform the t-tests in a paired format.  
This format gives some assurance that the observed differences between the 
samples of fraud and non-fraud pairs is due to test manipulation and not a chance 
result (Field, 2005).  It was deemed important to conduct t-tests to determine 
whether significant differences existed between the corporate governance 
attributes employed by each matched pair because if differences did not exist it 
would have been irrelevant to continue testing the hypotheses posed. 
 
The univariate t-tests were then followed by tests of correlation, which were used 
to test whether linear relationships existed between the explanatory variables.  The 
performance of correlation tests were important to ascertain if multicollinearity 
was liable to be a matter for concern, and if so, to determine what steps needed to 
be taken to rectify the problem prior to moving onto the regression analysis stage 
of testing.  “Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between 
two or more predictors in a regression model” (Field, 2005, pg.174).  As a number 
of predictor/explanatory variables were to be used in the regression equation it 
was pertinent to ensure unique coefficients could be obtained for each 
independent variable without a relationship (correlation) between them affecting 
the results. 
 
A regression equation, which included all of the independent corporate 
governance variables found to be of significance during the earlier testing stages, 
was used to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between 
them and the dependent variable, fraudulent financial reporting.  The Chi-square 
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statistic to measure the ‘goodness of fit’ or significance of the model, and the 
Pseudo R-squared statistic to determine the amount of variance in the dependent 
variable explained by the independent variables (Sekaran, 2003), were utilised to 
analyse the regression results.  Furthermore, the equation was used to assess any 
interaction effects and offer statistical explanation to the hypotheses posed by this 
investigation. 
 
As the variables in this study consisted of both nominal and ratio scale data, Logit 
regression was applied.  Logit allows “…a mixture of categorical and continuous 
independent variables to predict one or more categorical dependent variables” 
(Garson, 1998, pg.1).  As the dependent variable, fraudulent financial reporting, is 
dichotomous (either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, depending upon the presence of fraud or not) 
and the independent variables are either dichotomous (categorical) or ratio 
(continuous), this type of regression model was considered the most appropriate 
for the data being tested. 
 
Also taken into consideration when choosing this method of analysis was Logit’s 
capability to understand the relative importance of the different independent 
variables in predicting the dependent variable.  The appropriateness of using Logit 
was further supported by the fact that testing is conducted on a choice-based 
sample of industry-size matched pairs, which Beasley (1996) explained in the case 
of fraud/non-fraud companies equates to disproportionate sampling from two 
populations.  In other words, “…it is very likely that the true rate of firms 
experiencing financial statement fraud within the total population of publicly 
traded firms is less than 50%” (Beasley, 1996, pg.452).  Therefore, as the sample 
for this study is based on a one-to-one matching process (ie. 50% fraud and 50% 
non-fraud companies) there lies a difference between this sampling approach and 
a purely random sample selection. 
 
In addition to Beasley (1996), Logit regression has frequently been used in many 
of the prior studies undertaken into this field of research (Persons, 2005; Bedard et 
al., 2004; Dunn, 2004; Erickson et al., 2004; Song & Windram, 2004; Uzun et al., 
2004; Archambeault, 2002; Saksena, 2001; McMullen, 1996).  Dunn found that 
Logit regression was particularly relevant to his research due to the fact that his 
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intention was not to “…present a model that will predict when fraudulent 
reporting will occur, nor to classify fraud and no-fraud firms.  Instead, the model 
tests for whether structural power and ownership power are significant factors that 
contribute to fraudulent financial reporting” (2004, pg.404).  In a similar manner 
this study seeks to test whether corporate governance attributes are significantly 
associated with this type of fraud and thereby examines the relationship between a 
company’s governance structure and the likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  Based on the foregoing findings, it was thus determined that Logit 
regression, along with the use of paired t-tests and tests of correlation, duly suited 
the specifications of this study’s research design. 
 
Finally, validation tests were performed to confirm the robustness of the 
regression model.  These tests were accomplished through the application of the 
regression model to a number of random samples selected from the existing 
database each incorporating 80% to 85% of the full sample.  Tests of this nature 
were considered necessary to provide evidence as to the stability, reliability and 
robustness of the regression model to variations in data sets. 
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has served to provide a detailed description of what steps were taken 
in preparation of the testing phase of this study.  These steps included the 
identification of the fraud sample (case group), the matching process to identify 
the non-fraud sample (control group), the measurement of the independent and 
control variables, and the research design and selection of analysis methods.  The 
chapter also provides information about what issues were considered when 
making the decision to implement each step.  The following chapter, Chapter 5, 
presents the results of the tests selected to analyse the data gathered during the 
performance of the steps aforementioned in this methods chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The analysis of data provided in this chapter pertains to research conducted into 
the relationship observed between selected corporate governance attributes and 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  Tests were performed with the 
objective of providing empirical evidence to answer the primary research 
question: 
Is there a relationship between corporate governance attributes and the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting? 
 
Firstly this chapter will present an analysis of the matching process and how 
effectively the fraud and non-fraud companies were matched.  The results of 
statistical analysis, including univariate tests to determine whether significant 
differences existed fraud and non-fraud companies, and correlation tests to 
evaluate if multicollinearity is present among the independent variables, will then 
be furnished.  This will be followed by the findings of a conditional logistic 
regression model containing the most parsimonious variables in each of the 
corporate governance categories.  Validation tests based on the regression of 
random sample sub-sets of matched pairs are presented lastly.  These test results 
are based on a sample of 76 fraud companies and a 1-1 matched sample of non-
fraud companies. 
 
5.2 Matching Analysis 
Consistent with prior research into fraudulent financial reporting that used a case-
control design, this study also matched by industry and time (Sharma, 2004; 
Uzun, Szewczyk, & Varma, 2004; Carcello & Nagy, 2004a, and Beasley, 1996).  
However, a study conducted by Persons (2005) outlined the significance of also 
matching by stock exchange when considering corporate governance attributes.  
Persons (2005) maintained that the differences in corporate governance 
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requirements placed upon listed companies from one exchange to another made it 
important to consider the stock exchange a company was listed on when 
employing a matched pair design.  Therefore, the matching process was 
undertaken with reference to the year the fraud was first reported as occurring, the 
primary Standard Industry Code (SIC) and stock exchange of the entity, and lastly 
the total assets of the company, as a proxy for size. 
 
As a consequence of matching on the first three criteria, the size criterion 
sometimes suffered, which resulted in the acceptable margins of difference (as 
determined by reference to earlier studies) being exceeded on occasion.  After 
matching for time, industry, and exchange it was not always possible to identify a 
non-fraud company within 30% in the dollar value of Total Assets of each fraud 
company.  In these cases the closest available match was utilised to a maximum 
limit of 55%.  Matches exceeding 55% difference in the dollar value of total 
assets between fraud and non-fraud companies were excluded from this study. 
 
The 113 pairs initially matched by using the SIC codes recorded on the SEC 
database was reduced to 76 pairs when it was found that the SIC coding system 
used by the SEC and Thompson ONE Financial databases occasionally differed.  
Originally SIC codes were gathered from the SEC database at the time the fraud 
company was identified.  These codes were then used in the Thompson Financial 
database as a search criterion to identify possible non-fraud matches.  Upon 
finding the inconsistency a number of the original pairs had to be eliminated and 
as a result only the 76 pairs that ended up being correctly matched by SIC code at 
the 2-digit level or higher were ultimately subject to analysis. 
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Matching Criteria 
PANEL A 
First Year of Fraud 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Pairs
2 8 10 17 23 12 2 2 76 
PANEL B 
Stock Exchange 
NASDAQ 
53 
NYSE 
21 
ASE 
2 
Total Pairs 
76 
PANEL C 
Standard Industry Code (SIC) 
Matched Pairs and 2 digit level 27 
Matched Pairs and 3 digit level 17 
Matched Pairs and 4 digit level 32 
TOTAL PAIRS 76 
Distribution of Fraud Amongst Industry Sectors 
13 1 1.3% Oil and Gas Extraction 
20 1 1.3% Food and Kindred Products 
23 3 3.9% Apparel and Other Textile Articles 
26 1 1.3% Paper and Allied Products 
27 2 2.6% Printing and Publishing 
28 3 3.9% Chemicals and Allied Products 
35 3 3.9% Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
36 8 10.5% Electronics and Electrical Equipment 
37 1 1.3% Transportation Equipment 
38 5 6.6% Measuring Instruments and Related Products 
48 5 6.6% Communications 
49 1 1.3% Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
50 4 5.3% Durable Goods - Wholesale 
51 4 5.3% Non-Durable Goods - Wholesale 
53 1 1.3% General Merchant Stores 
56 2 2.6% Apparel and Accessory Stores  
58 2 2.6% Eating and Drinking Establishments 
59 2 2.6% Miscellaneous Retail 
63 2 2.6% Insurance Carriers 
67 1 1.3% Holding Companies and Other Investment Offices 
73 19 25.0% Business Services 
78 1 1.3% Motion Pictures 
80 2 2.6% Health Services 
87 2 2.6% Engineering and Management Services 
TOTAL 76 100% 
PANEL D 
Size - Total Assets (millions of dollars) 
 Paired t-test 
Sample Type n Min Mean Median Max t statistic p-value 
All Companies 152 6.287 6543.228 249.579 306577.000   
Fraud Companies 76 6.458 7033.674 249.579 306577.000   
Non Fraud 
Companies 
76 6.287 6052.782 243.980 255018.000   
Paired Differences 76 0.171 984.139 5.556 51559.000 1.385 0.170 
TABLE 3 - Matching Criteria Frequency Table 
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The results of the matching process are presented in Table 3 above.  The table 
provides frequency details of the spread of fraud occurrences over time, 
composition of stock exchanges, SIC code matching accuracy, fraud distribution 
by sector and characteristics of company size.  All pairs were matched on the time 
criteria, which required the information used in the matching process to be based 
on the financial data recorded for each company in the year prior to the incidence 
of fraudulent financial reporting.  Panel A of the table shows the year on year 
distribution of the seventy-six fraud occurrences and reveals that just over 80% 
occurred in the four-year period between 1998 and 2001.  Panel B shows that 
nearly 70% (53) of all fraud companies included in the study were listed on the 
NASDAQ stock exchange, compared with only 28% (21) and 2% (2) listed on the 
NYSE and ASE respectively. 
 
The accuracy of matching fraud and non-fraud companies by SIC codes is 
presented in Panel C, along with a frequency table of fraud occurrences by 
industry sector.  Just under 50% of all pairs were matched at the 4-digit SIC level, 
giving an exact industry match for 32 pairs.  The remaining pairs were matched at 
the 3 and 2 digit SIC levels as illustrated in the Table 3. 
 
According to SIC codes, one industry sector was by far the most susceptible to 
fraud.  Of the 76 fraud cases identified in this study, a quarter of them (19) were 
from the Business Services sector.  This sector, which incorporates computer 
programming services and pre-packaged software, has also found prominence for 
fraudulent activities in prior research of a similar nature (Persons, 2005; Beneish, 
1999; Bonner, Palmrose, & Young, 1998; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996).  
Other than the next highest-ranking sector, Electronics and Electrical Equipment, 
which accounted for 10.5% (8) of the cases, fraud was fairly evenly spread 
amongst the remaining industry sectors. 
 
Panel D of Table 3 shows the spread of Total Assets for all companies included in 
the study.  The range for the paired differences in Total Assets (being fraud minus 
non-fraud) was calculated at $0.171 million to $51,559 million, with a mean of 
$984.139 million.  Although not significant when testing the mean paired 
difference of Total Assets with a paired t-test (p=0.170), the Wilcoxon signed-
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rank test for medians determined significance at the p=0.1 (90%) level.  This has 
been taken into account by including Total Assets as a control variable in further 
tests. 
 
5.3 Statistical Analysis 
Each stage of the statistical analysis, being univariate, correlation, logit 
regression, and validation tests, along with the results from performing these tests, 
is discussed in further depth below. 
 
5.3.1 Univariate Tests 
Due to the matched case-control design of this research, performing univariate 
tests in a paired format was essential.  In addition, as many of the variables of 
interest were not normally distributed it was appropriate to perform non-
parametric tests of comparison.  However, since some variables did conform to 
parametric conditions, and to aid in facilitating comparison with past and further 
studies, it was deemed appropriate to perform both parametric and non-parametric 
tests.  The results of parametric paired t-tests and non-parametric paired Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests are presented in Table 4. 
 
As a consequence of earlier research testing variables of a similar nature, this 
study was able to propose directional hypotheses (see Table 1).  Therefore, all 
univariate test results are reported as one-tailed other than those yielded by control 
variables, which are reported as two-tailed, due to the inability to predict the 
direction of the relation between these variables and the dependent variable.  The 
results presented in Table 4 below are ordered by the four categories of corporate 
governance used in this study and reported as significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% p-
levels (denoted as ***, **, and * respectively). 
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Matched Pairs Comparison Tests  
FULL SAMPLE (n = 76 pairs) 
Deferenced Variable Differenced 
Mean 
Differenced 
Median 
Paired t-tests Paired Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test 
One-Tailed 
Significance  
Two-Tailed Results 
   t statistic p-value z statistic p-value t-test Wilcoxon t-test Wilcoxon 
Audit Committee Variables:          
NmbACMem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 -0.258 0.398    
NmbIndAC -0.026 0.000 -0.197 0.422 -0.052 0.479    
%IndAC -1.469 0.000 -0.579 0.282 -0.736 0.231    
NmbACFE -0.053 0.000 -0.532 0.298 -0.439 0.330    
%ACFE -1.294 0.000 -0.444 0.329 -0.082 0.467   
NmbACMeet -0.224 0.000 -0.829 0.205 -0.822 0.206    
AvgACTen -0.193 0.000 -0.324 0.373 -0.085 0.466    
AvgACDtrships 0.260 0.000 1.169 0.123 -1.120 0.131    
Board of Director Variables:     
NmbDtrs -0.750 -1.000 -2.084 0.020 -1.988 0.023 ** **  
NmbIndDtrs -0.855 -1.000 -2.785 0.003 -2.759 0.003 *** ***  
%IndDrts -4.618 -2.446 -2.031 0.023 -1.762 0.039 ** **  
CEO=Chair 0.197 0.000 2.633 0.005 -2.535 0.006 *** ***  
NomExist -0.132 0.000 -1.923 0.029 -1.890 0.029 ** **  
NmbNomMem -0.500 0.000 -1.608 0.056 -1.559 0.060 * *  
Ownership Variables:     
%InsDtrOwn 0.956 0.260 0.280 0.390 -0.062 0.475    
%OutDtrOwn -1.002 -0.020 -1.906 0.030 -1.347 0.089 ** *  
NmbOutBlock 0.276 0.000 1.210 0.115 -1.292 0.098  *  
%OutBlockOwn 3.949 5.345 1.601 0.057 -2.114 0.017 * **  
External Auditor Variables:     
AudTen -1.750 0.000 -0.991 0.162 -0.814 0.208    
Big6Aud -0.053 0.000 -1.424 0.079 -1.414 0.079 * *  
Control Variables:     
Total Assets 984.139 5.556 1.385 -1.734 * ** 0.170 0.083 
Leverage -0.456 0.000 -0.130 -0.138   0.897 0.891 
Age 0.079 0.000 1.180 -1.177   0.242 0.239 
Growth -938.026 14.155 -0.713 -3.148  *** 0.478 0.002 
TABLE 4 - Matched Pairs Comparison Tests 
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Audit Committee Functionality 
Table 4 presents the results of univariate paired t-tests and paired Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests for the eight (8) variables included in the Audit Committee 
Functionality category.  This study found no significance at the 10% level in any 
of the Audit Committee variables tested.  The paired comparison tests for the 
Audit Functionality variables did however collaborate the hypothesised relation 
these variables were expected to have on fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
The most significant result recorded in Table 4 by any of the Audit Committee 
variables was achieved by the variable representing the average number of outside 
directorships held by Audit Committee members (AvgACDtrships).  A one-tailed 
t-test produced a result of 1.169 (p=0.123), which indicates that as the number of 
directorships Audit Committee members hold in unaffiliated public companies 
rises, so does the likelihood of fraud.  Overall, the results of the paired 
comparison tests for Audit Committee variables did not however provide 
statistical support for hypotheses 1 through to 8 (see Table 1 for a complete list of 
hypotheses posed). 
 
Board of Director Composition 
As can been seen in Table 4, all variables depicting the second corporate 
governance category, Board of Director Composition, yielded significant results.  
These results were achieved, at identical levels of significance, for both the paired 
t-tests and the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.  The difference between fraud and non 
fraud companies was most pronounced in the number of independent directors 
(NmbIndDtrs) that sat on the company’s board, and whether duality existed 
between the position of CEO and Chairperson (CEO=Chair).  These two variables 
exhibited significance at p=0.003 and p=0.006 respectively, and confirm both 
hypotheses 10 and 12. 
 
The number of directors on a company’s board (NmbDtrs) and the percentage of 
those directors who are deemed to be independent (%IndDtrs) are significance at 
the 5% p-level.  Furthermore, the existence of a nominating committee 
(NomExist) tested positive for significance at the 5% level, while a difference, 
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significant at 6% (p=0.056), was also found to exist between the number of 
members on nominating committees (NmbNomMem) in fraud companies as 
opposed to those of non-fraud companies.  Collectively, these results support 
hypotheses 9, 11, 12 and 13 respectively. 
 
Ownership Structure Variables 
Whereas stock ownership by inside directors (%InsDtrOwn) does not significantly 
differ between fraud and non-fraud companies, the percentage of stock holdings 
owned by outside directors does (%OutDtrOwn).  The paired t-tests presented in 
Table 4 confirmed that stock ownership by outside directors in fraud companies 
was significantly lower than in non-fraud companies, giving support to hypothesis 
16 (see Table 1).  Furthermore, when considering outside blockholders of stock in 
fraud and non-fraud companies, the percentage of ownership (%OutBlockOwn) 
shows a significant difference between the two.  Although this difference was 
hypothesised to have a negative relation on the presence of fraud, the results of 
the comparison test show a significant positive relation.  This result indicates that 
as the percentage of ownership by outside blockholders increases so to does the 
likelihood of fraud.  Finally, no significant difference was detected between the 
number of outside blockholders of stock in fraud and non-fraud companies 
(NmbOutBlock), leaving hypothesis 17 unsubstantiated. 
 
External Auditor Factors 
The test results presented in Table 4 show that the length of tenure an external 
auditor is retained by a fraud or non-fraud company does not differ significantly, 
therefore finding no support for hypothesis 19 (see Table 1).  On the other hand 
both the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test produced the same 
significant result (p=0.079) when testing for a difference in the retaining of a Big 
6 accounting firm as the companies external auditor (Big6Aud).  This result 
confirms the conjecture that non-fraud companies were more likely to engage the 
services of a Big 6 auditor than fraud companies, and provides support for 
hypothesis 20. 
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Control Variables 
A number of control variables were subjected to univariate t-tests and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests to determine whether additional company characteristics, not 
related to variations in corporate governance attributes, were present between the 
sample of matched fraud and non-fraud companies.  The two-tailed comparison 
tests for two of the control variables, Leverage and Age, did not identify any 
statistically significant difference between the matched pairs.  Furthermore, 
neither the paired t-test nor the Wilcoxon found any significant differences at the 
95% confidence level when testing the Total Assets variable.  Test results did 
however indicate with 91.7% confidence (p=0.083) that the median difference in 
Total Assets was moderately higher for fraudulent companies than for their non-
fraudulent counterparts. 
 
The final control variable, Growth, produced inconclusive results, such that no 
significance at all was detected through the paired t-test and very high 
significance (p<0.001) was identified via the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  This 
variability could have been caused by the data for this variable being heavily 
skewed and therefore more inclined towards the Wilcoxon test.  This biasing may 
have resulted as a consequence of the time period utilised by this study.  In this 
regard certain industries and not others may have experienced a particularly strong 
period of growth during this time frame.  As a consequence this may have served 
to skew the data and offer inconsistent results.  However, due to the contradictory 
nature of the results it was deemed appropriate to remove this variable from 
further testing. 
 
Summary 
Those variables, both independent and control, that either were significance or 
were the most significant in each category were further investigated, firstly for 
correlation between the predictor variables in tests for multicollinearity (see 
Tables 4 and 5), and then as covariants in logistic regression (see Tables 6 and 7).  
Variables that lacked significance at the 90% level were omitted from further 
testing.  However, on the basis that this study is focused on detecting associations 
between the four proffered categories of corporate governance and fraudulent 
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financial reporting it was considered appropriate that at least one variable from 
each category was represented in further testing. Therefore, the AvgACDtrships 
variable, being the most significant variable in the Audit Committee Functionality 
category, was included in subsequent multivariate tests. 
 
5.3.2 Correlation Analysis 
Tests of correlation amongst the independent variables were undertaken to rule 
out the possibility of multicollinearity causing problems during the regression 
analysis stage.  As the data set used by this study did not conform to parametric 
assumptions, in that it was not normally distributed, it was applicable to use 
Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation to determine if multicollinearity existed 
amongst the variables.  Tables 4 and 5 below present the results of two 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient matrixes. 
 
Table 5 provides the correlation results when all variables determined to be 
significant in the univariate tests are included.  Several variables in this matrix 
show signs of quite substantial multicollinearity.  The most severe cases of 
correlation (> 0.8) arose between the number of independent directors 
(NmbIndDtrs) and the total number of directors on the board (NmbDtrs), with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.805.  Likewise, the existence of a nominating 
committee (NomExist) and the number of members on that committee 
(NmbNomMem) were highly correlated (cc=0.897).  A reasonably strong 
indication that the percentage of independent directors (%IndDtrs) and the number 
of independent directors on the board (NmbIndDtrs) may be correlated (cc=0.604) 
was also ascertained. 
 
It was determined that coefficients of 60% or below were insignificant and thus 
were not cause for concern with regard to multcollinearity.  Conversely, variables 
with coefficients exceeding 60% were considered to exhibit collinearity 
characteristics that could potentially corrupt the results if both affected variables 
were included together in a regression equation.  Therefore, the latter variable in 
each of the above-mentioned correlates, being NmbDtrs, NmbNomMem and 
NmbIndDtrs, were removed from further analysis.  Table 6 presents the results of 
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the Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation matrix following the removal of these 
highly correlated variables.  Results show that no correlation coefficients are 
above 0.50 and nearly all (91%) are below 0.25, indicating that multicollinearity 
was no longer an issue with the remaining variables. 
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Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Matrix 
(n = 76 pairs) AvgAC 
Dtrships 
NmbDtrs NmbInd 
Dtrs 
%IndDtrs CEO= 
Chair 
NmbNom 
Mem 
NomExist %OutDtr 
Own 
%OutBlock 
Own 
Big6Aud 
NmbDtrs Correlation Coefficient 0.140          
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.229          
NmbIndDtrs Correlation Coefficient 0.201 0.805***         
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.082 0.000         
%IndDtrs Correlation Coefficient 0.145 0.078 0.604***        
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.211 0.500 0.000        
CEO=Chair Correlation Coefficient -0.186 -0.046 -0.057 -0.030       
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.107 0.693 0.625 0.799       
NmbNomMem Correlation Coefficient 0.089 0.065 0.046 0.027 0.015      
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.447 0.574 0.693 0.816 0.895      
NomExist Correlation Coefficient 0.040 0.005 0.001 0.023 0.039 0.897***     
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.733 0.966 0.995 0.843 0.739 0.000     
%OutDtrOwn Correlation Coefficient -0.032 0.162 0.313*** 0.348*** 0.171 0.063 0.107    
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.781 0.161 0.006 0.002 0.140 0.592 0.357    
%OutBlockOwn Correlation Coefficient -0.140 -0.194 -0.092 0.188 0.040 -0.007 0.015 0.096   
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.228 0.093 0.428 0.104 0.732 0.950 0.897 0.410   
Big6Aud Correlation Coefficient 0.272*** -0.077 0.022 0.044 -0.008 -0.029 -0.046 -0.002 -0.049  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 0.507 0.848 0.707 0.942 0.801 0.695 0.988 0.674  
Total Assets Correlation Coefficient -0.064 0.080 0.105 0.022 -0.014 -0.081 -0.056 0.049 0.244 -0.018 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.583 0.494 0.368 0.851 0.908 0.485 0.633 0.673 0.034 0.879 
*** Correlation is higher than 0.25 
TABLE 5 - All Significant Variables Identified in Univariate Tests 
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Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Matrix 
(n = 76 pairs)  AvgAC 
Dtrships
%IndDtrs CEO= 
Chair 
Nom 
Exist 
%OutDtr 
Own 
%OutBlock 
Own 
Big6Aud
%IndDtrs Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.145       
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.211       
CEO=Chair Correlation 
Coefficient 
-0.186 -0.030      
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.107 0.799      
NomExist Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.040 0.023 0.039     
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.733 0.843 0.739     
%OutDtrOwn Correlation 
Coefficient 
-0.032 0.348*** 0.171 0.107    
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.781 0.002 0.140 0.357    
%OutBlock 
Own 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-0.140 0.188 0.040 0.015 0.096   
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.228 0.104 0.732 0.897 0.410   
Big6Aud Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.272*** 0.044 -0.008 -0.046 -0.002 -0.049  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 0.707 0.942 0.695 0.988 0.674  
Total Assets Correlation 
Coefficient 
-0.064 0.022 -0.014 -0.056 0.049 0.244 -0.018 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.583 0.851 0.908 0.633 0.673 0.034 0.879 
*** Correlation is higher than 0.25 
TABLE 6 - All Significant Variables Identified in Univariate Tests minus Correlates 
 
5.3.3 Logit Regression Analysis 
When taking into consideration the matched case-control design that was 
implemented in this study, it was found that more accuracy in interruption could 
be obtained by using a conditional logistic regression model.  Hosmer & 
Lemeshow (1989) provide a detailed explanation of the reasons for applying this 
type of model, particularly when using a research design of a comparable nature 
to this study.  Furthermore, Lipsitz, Patzen & Ewell (1998) proposed that using 
conditional logistic regression in a case-control design study could eliminate the 
nuisance matching effects.  Tables 6 and 7 below present the results of two 
regression equations that are based on the application of such a model utilising the 
multinominal regression option in SPSS. 
 
Firstly, the results of a regression equation incorporating the eight variables that 
remain after addressing collinearity issues will be analysed.  This model is then 
refined and re-executed on the full sample of 76 matched pairs.  Analysis of the 
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results of validation tests performed on the regression equation, and executed 
using six randomly selected subsets of the full sample, then conclude this section. 
 
Initial Model 
All remaining variables, after issues of mullicollinearity had been taken into 
account, were included in a conditional regression equation.  As a rule of thumb, 
it is suggested that at least 10 to 15 cases are required in a data set for each 
independent variable included in the regression equation (Fields, 2005).  
Consequently, it was anticipated that due to the number of independent variables 
included in the initial model, some modification through elimination of potentially 
non-significant variables deemed surplus to the equation would be necessary to 
achieve an optimal model.  This initial model did however provide evidence of the 
relationships existing between the dependent variable and the various 
independent/predictor variables in the equation. 
 
Conditional Logistic Regression 
Fraud = b1 (AvgACDtrship) + b2 (PerIndDtrs) + b3 (CEOChair) + b4 (NomExist) + b5 
(%OutDtrOwn) + b6 (%OutBlockOwn) +b7 (Big6Aud) + b8 (Total Assets) + e 
Differenced 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Est. 
Coeff. 
Std. Error Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B)
       Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
AvgACDtrships + 0.330 0.162 4.134 0.042 1.391 1.012 1.911
PerIndDtrs - -0.030 0.016 3.479 0.062 0.971 0.941 1.002
CEOChair + 1.332 0.496 7.206 0.007 3.790 1.433 10.027
NomExist - -0.678 0.490 1.915 0.166 0.507 0.194 1.326
PerOutDtrOwn - -0.099 0.073 1.823 0.177 0.906 0.785 1.046
PerOutBlockOwn - 0.030 0.015 4.169 0.041 1.031 1.001 1.061
Big6Aud - -1.404 1.014 1.918 0.166 0.246 0.034 1.791
Total Assets "+ / -" 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.499 1.000 1.000 1.001
Paired Differences  n = 76   
Chi-Square Test of Fit (8 degrees of freedom) 29.108 0.000   
Pseudo R-Square     
Nagelkerke  0.424   
Cox and Snell  0.318   
TABLE 7 – Initial Regression Model 
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Table 7 above presents the results of the initial regression model when executed 
on the full data set of 76 matched pairs.  The outcome is also depicted in equation 
1 below: 
 
Fraud = 0.330(AvgACDtrship) – 0.030(%IndDrts) + 1.332(CEOChair) 
– 0.678(NomExist) – 0.099(%OutDtrOwn) + 0.030(%OutBlockOwn) 
– 1.404(Big6Aud) + 0.000(Total Assets) + e 
 
The results are based on a multinominal logistic model excluding an intercept and 
using a main effects design, which includes all independent variables into the 
model at the same time.  The Chi-Square test of fit statistic indicates the model is 
significant (p<0.001), and the Nagelkerke (Cox & Snell) pseudo r-squared of 
0.424 (0.318) shows that the proportion of variance in fraud/non-fraud companies 
explained by the predictor variables is relatively strong.  However, two 
independent variables were considered worthy of further investigation because of 
their implied non-significance. 
 
The Total Assets variable was not only insignificant (p=0.499), it also had an 
estimated coefficient of zero.  This result would indicate that no variation in the 
dependent variable could be attributed to a change in Total Assets.  As such it was 
decided that this variable should be removed from the equation.  Furthermore, 
although the correlation that was observed between the %OutDtrOwn and 
%IndDtr variables in the Spearman’s rank-order test was not excessive (z=3.48), 
it was considered that multicollinearity between these two variables could be 
biasing the regression results.  This judgment was based on the performance of 
subsequent regression tests that included variations of the model incorporating, 
firstly, either the %OutDtrOwn or the %IndDtr variable and secondly, a model 
with neither variable included.  These tests indicated that some interaction was 
present between the two variables.  Taking these results into consideration, along 
with the fact that the %OutDtrOwn variable lacked significance (p=0.177), it was 
determined that the removal of this variable would further serve to increase the 
quality of the regression equation. 
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Optimal Model 
For the reasons established above, Total Assets and %OutDtrOwn were removed 
from the initial model, leaving six remaining predictor variables.  These variables, 
AvgACDtrships, %IndDrts, CEOChair, NomExist, %OutBlockOwn and 
Big6Aud, represent the most parsimonious variables and include at least one 
variable from each of the four governance categories investigated by this study. 
The reduction in variables also meant that the ratio between the number of 
predictors and the number of data sets was now adequately within the proportions 
suggested by Fields (2005) to achieve increased reliability.  For example, 76 
divided by 6 = 12.7 data sets per predictor, an important improvement over the 
initial model which calculated only 9.5 data sets per predictor (76/8 = 9.5). 
 
Conditional Logistic Regression 
Fraud = b1 (AvgACDtrship) + b2 (PerIndDtrs) + b3 (CEOChair) + b4 (NomExist) + b5 
(%OutBlockOwn) +b6 (Big6Aud) + e  
Differenced 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Est. 
Coeff. 
Std. Error Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B)
       Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
AvgACDtrships + 0.367 0.160 5.216 0.022 1.443 1.053 1.976
PerIndDtrs - -0.037 0.016 5.540 0.019 0.964 0.935 0.994
CEOChair + 1.226 0.470 6.820 0.009 3.408 1.358 8.555
NomExist - -0.807 0.482 2.801 0.094 0.446 0.173 1.148
PerOutBlockOwn - 0.032 0.015 4.787 0.029 1.033 1.003 1.063
Big6Aud - -1.359 1.004 1.834 0.176 0.257 0.036 1.837
Paired Differences  n = 76   
Chi-Square Test of Fit (6 degrees of freedom) 25.893 0.000   
Pseudo R-Square     
Nagelkerke  0.385   
Cox and Snell  0.289   
TABLE 8 – Optimal Regression Model 
 
Table 8 above presents the results of the optimal regression model when executed 
on the full data set of 76 matched pairs.  The outcome is also depicted in equation 
2 below: 
 
Fraud = 0.367(AvgACDtrship) – 0.037(%IndDrts) + 1.226(CEOChair) 
– 0.807(NomExist) + 0.032(%OutBlockOwn) – 1.359(Big6Aud) + e 
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The estimated coefficients produced by this model reveal that the percentage of 
independent directors on a company’s board (%IndDtrs), the existence of a 
nominating committee (NomExist), and the engaging of a Big6 auditor (Big6Aud) 
are negatively related to the likelihood of fraud.  Whereas, on average the number 
of directorships held by Audit Committee members (AvgACDtrship), the 
presence of a CEO who is also the Chairman of the Board (CEOChair), and an 
increase in the amount of stock owned by outside blockholders (%OutBlockOwn) 
are positively related to the occurrence of fraud.  A slight increase in coefficient 
values between equations 1 and 2 after the removal of the Total Assets and 
%OutDtrOwn variables was observed, and the relations between the dependent 
and independent variables remained stable among the two equations. 
 
The relation expressed by the signs of five of the coefficients, being 
AvgACDtrship, %IndDrts, CEOChair, NomExist and Big6Aud, were consistent 
with the hypotheses offered earlier in this study (see Table 1).  However, the 
coefficient for the %OutBlockOwn variable produced an unexpected result.  The 
expected direction of the relation between the percentage of outside blockholders 
ownership (%OutBlockOwn) and the incidence of fraud was anticipated to be 
negative, such that as the percentage of ownership increased the chances of fraud 
occurring would decrease.  In contrast however, the estimated coefficient of 0.029 
suggests a positive relation between blockholder ownership and fraud.  This 
implies that as outside ownership in a company increases so does the prospect of 
fraud. 
 
The Wald statistics for the variables in the optimal model, which indicate whether 
each independent variable is significantly different from zero, ranged from 6.82 to 
1.83, with corresponding significance values of 0.009 to 0.176.  As can be seen 
when comparing the results presented in Table 7 and 8, most of the Wald statistics 
improved slightly with the removal of the Total Assets and %OutDtrOwn 
variables.  This suggests that the remaining variables make a more significant 
contribution in accounting for the difference between fraud and non-fraud 
companies than was observed when these variables were included in the model.  
However, a minor drop in the chi-square test of fit (6df) to 25.893 and the 
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Nagelkerke (Cox and Snell) pseudo r-squared to 0.385 (0.289) was noted after 
withholding the two variables.  This insignificant reduction was most likely 
caused by a decrease in the number of degrees of freedom, from 8 in the initial 
model to 6 in the optimal model. 
 
Of particular import is the fact that the optimal model remains relatively similar in 
results to the initial model.  Not only does this further highlight the stability of the 
model but more importantly, it suggests that the model was not sensitive to the 
inclusion of the Total Assets variable.  Considering the difficulties in precisely 
matching on the Total Assets criterion, it is of notable consequence that the 
optimal model is not sensitive to this difference. 
 
Chief executives who also chair the board of directors and the percentage of 
independent directors sitting on the board offer the most distinct differences 
between fraud and non-fraud companies.  Likewise, these two variables were also 
found to be highly significant in distinguishing a fraud from a non-fraud 
company.  The exponentiated beta for the CEO=Chair variable illustrates that the 
odds of fraud occurring was 3.41 times more likely in a company that has a CEO 
who is also the Chairman of the board.  On the other hand, for every 1% increase 
in the percentage of independent directors on the board the odds of being a fraud 
company decreases by 0.96.  Moreover, we can be 95% confident that the actual 
exponentiated beta of the population for each of these variables rests between 
1.358 to 8.555 and 0.935 to 0.994 respectively. 
 
5.3.4 Validation Tests 
Due to the size of the data set used for this study it was inappropriate to conduct 
validation tests via a data split method as both sub-samples would be too small to 
provide accurate results (Fields, 2005).  Therefore, validation tests to confirm the 
robustness of the optimal model were achieved through a number of regressions 
executed on random samples of the existing database each incorporating 80% to 
85% of the full sample.  Results of these tests, which are presented in Table 9, are 
considered to provide evidence as to the stability, reliability and robustness of the 
optimal model to variations in data sets. 
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The random samples were selected via the SPSS random sampling feature.  The 
size of the sub-samples were stipulated as including at least 80% and 85% of the 
full sample of matched pairs.  (Two different size criterions were stipulated for the 
selection of the subsets, producing three random samples of at least 80% and a 
further three random samples of at least 85%.)  The size criteria for the sub-
samples was specifically chosen to ensure reliability would still be maintained 
with a data set of no less than 10 matched pairs per predictor variable.  Other than 
specifying the sample size criterion, the results of the conditional logistic 
regressions presented below are based on sample subsets of matched pairs chosen 
completely at random by the SPSS program. 
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Conditional Logistic Regression 
Fraud = b1 (AvgACDtrship) + b2 (PerIndDtrs) + b3 (CEOChair) + b4 (NomExist) +  b5 (%OutBlockOwn) +b6 (Big6Aud) + e 
 SAMPLED AT APPROX. 80% OF FULL SAMPLE SAMPLED AT APPROX. 85% OF FULL SAMPLE 
Differenced 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Random  
Sample 1 
Random  
Sample 2 
Random  
Sample 3 
Random  
Sample 4 
Random  
Sample 5 
Random  
Sample 6 
  Est. 
Coeff. 
Sig. Est. 
Coeff. 
Sig. Est. 
Coeff. 
Sig. Est. 
Coeff. 
Sig. Est. 
Coeff. 
Sig. Est. 
Coeff. 
Sig. 
AvgACDtrships + 0.421 0.020 0.613 0.010 0.405 0.033 0.357 0.038 0.368 0.027 0.383 0.026 
PerIndDtrs - -0.036 0.027 -0.039 0.041 -0.039 0.040 -0.034 0.036 -0.035 0.038 -0.049 0.011 
CEOChair + 1.615 0.003 2.187 0.002 1.716 0.005 1.753 0.002 1.480 0.005 1.285 0.013 
NomExist - -1.240 0.030 -1.598 0.018 -0.961 0.110 -0.900 0.096 -0.766 0.136 -0.346 0.504 
PerOutBlockOwn - 0.029 0.056 0.029 0.092 0.037 0.054 0.032 0.045 0.045 0.013 0.039 0.029 
Big6Aud - -1.426 0.166 -1.667 0.130 -1.350 0.203 -1.287 0.218 -1.278 0.223 -1.359 0.196 
 
Paired Differences n = 70 60 61 69 70 65  
Chi-Square Test of Fit (6 df) 27.430 0.000 27.124 0.000 25.053 0.000 25.308 0.000 26.562 0.000 21.547 0.001 
Pseudo R-Square   
Nagelkerke  0.432 0.485 0.449 0.409 0.421 0.376  
Cox and Snell  0.324 0.364 0.337 0.307 0.316 0.282  
TABLE 9 – Validation Test Results 
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Table 9 above presents the findings of the validation tests.  The number of pairs 
per sub-sample ranged from 60 to 70, and relatively similar results throughout the 
extent of the six tests were achieved.  Overall, the chi-square test of fit ranged 
from a high of 27.430 for random sample 1, to a low of 21.547 for random sample 
6, with all tests being significant at p<0.001.  On average the chi-square for the six 
sub-samples (25.504), is very closely aligned to that of the optimal model 
incorporating the full sample of 76 pairs (25.893).  The Nagelkerke (Cox and 
Snell) pseudo r-squared was also fairly stable over the six tests, giving results 
between 0.485 (0.364), for random sample 2, and 0.376 (0.282), for random 
sample 6. 
 
Consistent with the results of the optimal model containing the full sample of 76 
pairs, all of the sub-samples depicted the AvgACDtrships, %IndDtrs, and 
CEO=Chair variables as being significant at the p<0.05 level.  However, only 
random samples 4, 5 and 6 consistently showed the percentage of ownership held 
by outside blockholders (%OutBlockOwn) to be significant.  Conversely, random 
samples 1, 2 and 3 showed minor inconsistencies in the significance of the 
NomExist and %OutBlockOwn variables.  For instance, random sample 1, with a 
sample size of 70 pairs, showed the existence of a nominating committee to be 
significant at p=0.030 but failed to find significance based on the percentage of 
ownership held by outside blockholders (p=0.056).  In addition, random sample 2, 
with a sample size of 60 pairs, also produced similar results for the NomExist 
(p=0.018) and %OutBlockOwn (p=0.092) variables.  Whilst random sample 3, 
with a sample size of 61 pairs, found both NomExist and %OutBlockOwn to be 
insignificant at p=0.110 and p=0.054 respectively. 
 
The findings of random samples 1 and 2 indicate that a difference was present 
between the existence of nominating committees in fraud and non-fraud 
companies.  The regression results of these two sub-samples suggest that not 
having a nominating committee is significantly related to the occurrence of 
fraudulent financial reporting, which lends support for hypothesis 13.  The 
negative relation indicates that a company that has a nominating committee is less 
likely to commit financial reporting violations. 
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Despite the fact that the above results highlight some variation between the 
NomExist and %OutBlockOwn variables, these inconsistencies were considered 
to be minor, with the latter variable attaining significance of at least 10% p-level 
in all six tests.  It is also interesting to note that although the variations were all 
associated with the three random samples selected at the 80% threshold, it does 
not appear that the small sizes of the samples had too much of a bearing on the 
reliability of the results.  Random sample 5 with 70 pairs (largest= sub-sample 
size) had a chi squared of 26.562 and a Nagelkerke (Cox and Snell) pseudo r-
squared of 0.421 (0.316), while random sample 2 with 60 pairs (smallest sub-
sample size) had 27.124 and 0.485 (0.364) respectively.  Furthermore, no 
conflicting relation results were observed, with all tests producing identical 
relations between the dependent and independent variables as those produced by 
the full sample model.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
inconsistencies noted in the NomExist and %OutBlockOwn variables are purely 
random in nature. 
 
Based on the above results of the validation tests it is considered that the 
conditional logistic regression model posed by equation 2 (optimal model) is 
reliably stable and robust to random changes in data sets. 
 
5.4 Summary 
Of interest was the non-significance of all variables included in the Audit 
Committee Functionality category.  Both matched pair t-tests and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests offered the same non-significant results indicating that 
differences in Audit Committee governance attributes between fraud and non 
fraud companies do not exist.  Conversely, the Board of Directors Composition 
category provided the largest quantity of significant variables of any of the four 
governance categories, with all but one of the six variables tested in this group 
being significant at p<0.05. 
 
The ownership structure of fraud companies differs modestly from that of non-
fraud companies in the area of outside stock ownership.  Of particular interest was 
the positive relationship found to exist between the %OutBlockOwn variable and 
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fraudulent financial reporting, which conflicted with the hypothesised negative 
relationship expected.  The External Auditor category tested the significance of 
the retention of a Big 6 auditor in addition to the length of tenure of the auditor. 
The tests found a significant difference existed in the retention of a Big 6 auditor 
by non-fraud companies when compared to fraud companies. 
 
The initial regression equation incorporated eight variables, including at least one 
variable from each of the four governance categories, as well as the Total Assets 
control variable.  A modified equation, incorporating just six of the original 
twenty-four variables, was then presented as the optimal model to test the relation 
between corporate governance attributes and fraudulent financial reporting.  The 
logistic regression of the optimal model produced a chi-square test of fit of 25.893 
and a Nagelkerke (Cox and Snell) pseudo r-squared of 0.385 (0.289), suggesting 
that the model’s predictors were reasonably capable of explaining the variance in 
the dependent variable.  Four variables in the optimal regression equation 
produced statistically significant results at the p<0.05 level allowing for the 
acceptance of hypotheses 7, 10, 11, and 17.  Or, more specifically: 
• Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the 
average number of directorships held by AC members’ increases; 
• Fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to occur as the 
percentage of independent directors on a company’s board 
increases; 
• Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in 
company’s that have a CEO that is also the Chairman of the board 
of directors; and 
• Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur as the 
percentage of company ownership held by outside blockholders 
increases. 
 
Furthermore, validation tests performed on the regression model by using 
randomly selected sub-samples also highlighted an intermittent significance in the 
variable depicting the existence of a nominating committee.  Support for 
hypothesis 13, which proposed that fraudulent financial reporting is less likely to 
occur in companies that have a nominating committee was accordingly also 
achieved. 
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Chapter Six 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the major implications arising 
from the findings made by this study.  These implications will be explored and 
inferences drawn to possible ways in which enhancements might be made to 
relieve the continuing occurrence of fraud.  This chapter will also examine the 
study’s limitations and identify potential areas for future research. 
 
The study tested 76 matched pairs of fraud and non-fraud companies to 
distinguish differences between the pairs with regard to the selected independent 
variables depicting various attributes of corporate governance.  Hypotheses were 
proposed and statistically tested through the performance of both univariate and 
multivariate analysis.  This was followed by an examination of the results 
obtained.  The existence of significant differences was considered indicative of a 
relationship between fraudulent financial reporting and the respective corporate 
governance variable.  The findings identified support for a number of the 
hypotheses posed.  (For a full report on the test results see Chapter 5.) 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
While fraud is a broad legal term that encompasses a wide range of wrongful acts, 
this study has focused exclusively on actions that have lead to fraudulent financial 
reporting.  An understanding of this complex issue is considered pertinent to 
finding solutions to stem its occurrence.  From this perceptive the test results 
provide valuable and insightful information regarding aspects of corporate 
governance in public companies and how the strengthening of the oversight 
provided by governing bodies may have beneficial qualities relative to the 
occurrence of this type of fraud. 
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The findings of this study provide empirical evidence that a number of corporate 
governance attributes are significantly related to the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.  These findings contribute to the growing body of corporate 
governance and fraud literature and provide support for the many suggestions 
made in reference to improving the oversight and monitoring performed in public 
companies.  The results also highlight a number of concerns that may have 
implications on the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting in the future. 
 
One such area of concern was the fact that this study revealed that the increased 
emphasis placed on audit committees in the form of regulatory requirements may 
not have had an effect on the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  All eight 
variables included in the Audit Committee Functionality category lacked 
significance when paired t-tests and paired Wilcoxon signed-rank univariate tests 
were performed.  This lack of significance could be as a result of the listing 
requirements and other governance regulations that now make it mandatory to 
maintain an adequately functioning audit committee.  In this respect, companies 
listed on US stock exchanges are now obliged to have an audit committee 
comprised of at least 3 members, one of which must be an ACFE.  As these rules 
are compulsory rather than discretionary, it would appear that the distinction 
between fraud and non-fraud companies, in so far as this monitoring body is 
concerned, is no longer apparent.  This has future implications when taking into 
consideration that fraudulent financial reporting continues to occur in companies 
irrespective of the fact that most new audit committee regulations appear to have 
been complied with. 
 
The primary purpose of maintaining an audit committee is to oversee and monitor 
the financial reporting process of a company.  However, recently regulators and 
the public have raised serious doubts regarding the effectiveness with which this 
governance body has been undertaking their duties.  Shareholders rely 
substantially on the financial reporting process, and in particular the disclosures 
produced as a function of that process, to provide a fair and accurate presentation 
of a company’s financial condition.  As such, issues pertaining to the 
independence and competence of the audit committee members contributed 
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heavily to the substance of new regulations aimed at improving oversight and 
consequently strengthening the possibility of detecting any financial wrong doing. 
Bearing this in mind it is therefore alarming to observe the number of fraud cases 
that continue to occur unheeded.  This could be taken as a strong indication that 
regulation, at least with regard to this governance body, may not go far enough to 
ensure effective oversight. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the independence of board of director 
members, the duality of the CEO and Chairperson positions, and stock ownership 
by held by outside blockholders have a significant consequence on the incidence 
of fraudulent financial reporting.  The composition of the board of directors and in 
particular its top position, that of the Chairperson, was found to provide the 
strongest test results and are of notable importance.  These results confirm that 
effective corporate governance, in the form of an independent and impartially lead 
board of directors, are negatively related to the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  They also imply that other attributes of corporate governance, over and 
above those of the audit committee, may need to be looked at from a regulatory 
perspective. 
 
The independence of members on the board of directors has been substantially 
covered by prior research and the results of this study further collaborate earlier 
findings that fraudulent financial reporting is related to the independence of 
members on the board.  In particular the results indicate that as the independence 
increases the likelihood of fraud decreases.  It is surprising then, that the listing 
rules for the US national stock exchanges only require that a majority of 
independent directors form the board of a public company.  Perhaps the 
effectiveness of the board would be better served if all directors were required to 
be independent within the terms of the listing rules.  Whilst this aspect was not 
investigated in the present study, future research of the implications of this 
proposal may be warranted. 
 
The strengthening of corporate governance practices in public companies could 
also benefit from the compulsory separating of the CEO and chairman of the 
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board positions.  This study’s test results found a significant relationship existed 
between CEO and Chairman duality and the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  It is likely this occurs as a consequence of the substantial influence a 
CEO who also holds the chairman of the board position would be able to exert 
over the board of directors and its committees.  Regulators should seriously 
consider the lack of impartiality that this situation creates, along with the effects 
this may have on the decision-making process of a company.  Taking into account 
these findings, along with similar findings by earlier studies, it may be appropriate 
for regulators to contemplate the possibility of implementing legislation to 
prohibit these two very important and influential positions being performed by the 
same person. 
 
Differences were also identified between fraud and non-fraud companies 
concerning the existence of a nominating committee.  This attribute may 
furthermore be a consequence of duality of the CEO and chairman positions, such 
that this person may be able to exert more influence over who is selected for 
nomination to the board when a separate nominating committee does not exist.  
Under these circumstances the composition of the board and impartiality of the 
nominating process may be jeopardised.  This could result in persons tolerant or 
supportive to the CEO’s actions and more likely to sanction management 
decisions being favoured in the nomination process. 
 
Another result deserving of further discussion was the unexpected positive 
relationship between the percentage of outside blockholder ownership and fraud 
(as proposed by hypothesis 17).  The assumption based on earlier research which, 
suggested a negative relation occurs because blockholders often closely monitor 
the financial results of companies they hold ownership rights in, was not 
supported by the tests performed in this study.  Instead, a positive relationship 
between outside blockholders and fraudulent financial reporting was found to 
exist.  This implies that as outside ownership in a company increases so does the 
prospect of fraud. 
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In light of this contradiction it was considered that along with the proffered 
positive benefits enhanced monitoring by blockholders may bring, this increased 
scrutiny might also provide unwanted side effects.  If management is aware that 
blockholders are closely monitoring the financial affairs of the company, it may 
intensify the pressure felt by managers to ensure positive financial results are 
achieved.  This type of predicament may provide sufficient incentive to 
fraudulently report the company’s accounts, particularly in the event of a 
downturn in business.  As a consequence of this situation a positive relationship 
between the percentage of ownership held by outside blockholders and fraud, such 
as that detected in this study, is more likely to occur. 
 
The test results also identified a negative relationship between the retention of a 
Big 6 auditor and the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  Whilst the 
actions of external auditors are of consequence to the occurrence of fraud, it is not 
believed that this result occurs because of a perceived quality differentiation 
between Big6 and non-Big6 accounting firms.  Rightly or wrongly accounting 
firms that perform the annual audit are seen as providing a degree of protection 
and assurance to shareholders with regard to the detection of fraud.  Therefore, the 
fact that a difference exists between the retention of a Big6 accounting firm by 
non-fraud companies when compared to fraud companies is considered worthy of 
further investigation to examine more comprehensively why this association 
occurs. 
 
On the whole, the findings of this study support the proposition that the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance structure is associated with fraudulent 
financial reporting and that by strengthening governance practices in public 
companies this type of deceptive behaviour might be minimised.  The empirical 
evidence provided by the tests performed serves to confirm that relationships exist 
between a number of corporate governance attributes and fraud.  Specifically, it 
was identified that the average number of directorships held by audit committee 
members, the duality of the CEO and chairman of the board positions, and the 
percentage of company ownership held by outside blockholders are positively 
related to the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  Conversely, the 
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percentage of independent directors on a company’s board is negatively related to 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Furthermore, the tests conducted by this study indicate that while some of the 
recent regulatory changes made by the SEC and US stock exchanges may serve to 
enhance corporate governance, and with it the ability to curb fraudulent financial 
reporting, the findings also imply that additional strengthening may still be 
required.  It is believed that these findings are substantial and provide valuable 
information with regard to the effective functioning of the corporate governance 
structure.  With this in mind it is believed corporate governance bodies, 
accountants and regulators, along with the investing public, will gain benefit from 
the findings presented in this study. 
 
6.3 Limitations 
This study relied upon publicly available information to populate both the 
dependent and independent variables.  The necessary data was therefore only 
available for companies required by law to make public certain particulars relating 
to their operational and financial affairs.  As a consequence, only companies that 
are registered on one of the US national stock exchanges, and therefore required 
to lodge filings with the SEC, were included in the study.  Hence, extrapolation 
only applies to large publicly listed companies. 
 
Furthermore, due to the fact that size is a listing criterion for a company to 
become registered on a US stock exchange, the majority of entities investigated 
by this study were relatively large.  Smaller companies, on the other hand, along 
with privately held companies, were essentially excluded from the study by virtue 
of the necessary information required to populate the variables being unavailable.  
This form of exclusion may limit the ability to generalise the findings of the test 
sample to the complete population, since the results could be biased towards 
larger public companies. 
 
Another limitation of this study relates to the identification of fraud and non-fraud 
companies.  AAER’s issued by the SEC were used to identify fraud cases and 
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ultimately to select the companies included in the fraud sample.  This is a strong 
reliable source of fraud cases because the SEC is the sole US authority delegated 
with enforcement of the anti-fraud securities laws.  However, because the SEC 
has limited resources it must select which cases it will investigate and in due 
course, where sufficient evidence abounds, lay charges of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  This selection process means that not all suspected cases of fraud 
advance to the point where enforcement action is taken, and consequently an 
AAER issued.  Therefore, cases of fraud able to be identified through the issuance 
of an AAER cannot be taken to automatically imply that all other companies are 
non-fraudulent. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no method whereby fraudulent financial reporting can be 
quantified with precision (NCFFR, 1987).  As only cases of ‘detected’ fraud are 
available to study, there is no way of confirming that undetected fraud has not 
occurred in other companies.  Thus the possibility exists that a company that has 
committed financial statement fraud, but as yet has not been detected, may 
inadvertently be selected as a non-fraud company.  Unknowingly including such 
entities as non-fraud companies could bias the results in the direction of the fraud 
companies12, thereby again limiting the ability to generalise the findings to the full 
population. 
 
A further limitation was the ability to control for all possible characteristics that 
may influence the presence of fraud.  While the matching process served to limit 
variances in general company characteristics, and additional control variables 
were identified for inclusion in tests to control a further four potential influencers 
of fraud, it is highly probable that other elements not controlled in the tests may 
induce fraudulent financial reporting.  However, as this study does not serve to 
test causality, but rather the relation between fraud and attributes of corporate 
governance, the effect this limitation had on the findings is considered to be of 
minor consequence. 
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The quantity and thoroughness of the information available also served to limit 
the quality of the findings of some variables.  Some variables required 
information that while not mandatory to provide in the course of public 
disclosure, the details could be regarded as being helpful in determining the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance structure.  An example of such 
information is the length of tenure an external auditor has been retained by a 
company.  The fact that not all companies provided this information meant that 
the tests were possibly biased by the inclusion of a proxy of one year being used 
when no additional information was accessible to populate the auditor tenure 
variable.  This impacted on the ability to accurately infer the significance of 
auditor tenure and has limited the value able to be gained from interpreting the 
results of this variable. 
 
Finally, a study of this nature will always be susceptible to measurement 
subjectivity.  Where some independent variables cannot be populated by the 
existence of an exact answer reported in the information available on the 
company, measurement of the variable is based on specified criteria (see Chapter 
4 for the exact measurement criteria used for each variable).  Even though the 
criteria may be documented, in reality this type of measurement would still be 
subjective and biased by the author’s own viewpoint.  Hence, measuring 
subjectivity may further place limitations on the reliability of data upon which the 
results are based. 
 
6.4 Future Research 
The findings of this study provide evidence that a number of corporate 
governance attributes are significantly related to the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.  However, the results obtained do suggest that there are 
several areas that were not covered by this study but could potentially be of 
relevance to corporate governance and the occurrence of this type of fraud.  One 
possible avenue for future research that was highlighted by this present study 
                                                                                                                                                               
12 If a selected non-fraud company was subject to undetected fraud it is expected more similarities 
and less differences would exist between this company and its fraudulent matched pair.  Resulting 
in the findings being bias toward fraud companies. 
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includes the testing of additional attributes that may influence the effectiveness of 
the audit committee. 
 
Although earlier research has shown that increasing the effectiveness of an audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of fraud, the empirical evidence provided by this 
study indicates that no such relationship exists.  This contradiction in findings 
serves to suggest that perhaps the functioning of audit committees in non-fraud 
companies goes beyond that required simply by regulation, or conceivably, it may 
be other aspects within the audit committee not tested by this study that 
differentiate the effectiveness of this monitoring body.  If this is the case, 
variables based on regulatory requirements would understandably exhibit little 
variance and the true differences in the functioning of audit committees operating 
in fraud and non-fraud companies would necessitate the testing of additional 
variables. 
 
In this respect it is possible that qualitative attributes, such as management style or 
ethical values, may have a bearing on how an audit committee operates, and as 
such the effectiveness with which it oversees the financial reporting process.  It is 
considered that valuable information could be gained from testing whether an 
association exists between qualitative attributes and the effectiveness of the audit 
committee with regard to the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.  
Accordingly, future research to investigate what other aspects pertaining to audit 
committees may possibly differentiate fraudulent from non-fraudulent companies 
may be of substantial benefit, particularly in light of the current findings. 
 
Another prospective area for future research involves an investigation of the 
potential benefits associated with an entirely independent board of directors as 
opposed to the current majority requirement stipulated in listing rules.  Research 
that investigates whether any potential benefits, with regard to fraud occurrences, 
could be gained from implementing regulation to require the entire board of 
directors to be independent of the company they serve.  This study found that as 
the number of independent members on the board of directors increased the 
likelihood of fraud decreased.  Therefore, it is considered that the results of testing 
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a hypothesis based on the requirement for independence of all members would be 
useful to regulators.  A study of this nature could provide the evidence to prove an 
increase is needed, or conversely, it may rule out this action as bringing no 
substantial benefit to restraining the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
One already known positive side effect of requiring full independence of a board 
would however be the automatic prohibiting of the CEO also holding the position 
of the chairman of the board.  The advantages of prohibiting duality have been 
briefly discussed earlier in this chapter and more fully explained in Chapter 3. 
 
An additional area worthy of further research is that of the type of accounting firm 
retained by fraud and non-fraud companies as the appointed external auditor.  
While numerous studies have found that, when compared to fraud companies, 
non-fraud companies are more likely to retain the services of a Big6 auditor, it 
would be of interest to explore more thoroughly why this association occurs.  
Some earlier studies have speculated that this occurs as a result of Big6 auditors 
performing a superior quality audit than non-Big6 auditors.  Alternatively, it could 
be considered that this association may be caused more by avoidance issues than 
by any differentiation in audit quality.  In this respect it is possible that the 
relationship transpires because the engagement of a Big6 accounting firm may be 
avoided by management or board of directors of company’s that utilise 
questionable accounting practices.  Or, alternatively Big 6 accounting firms may 
avoid being retained by companies they consider to be risky or of dubious 
reputation.  However, these rationalisations are pure speculation, therefore, future 
research aimed at providing some empirical evidence as to why the association 
between Big 6 auditors and non-fraud companies exists could contribute 
substantially to the fraud and corporate governance literature. 
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Appendix A 
 
Discussion on Regulatory Studies 
1. The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR), also known as the 
Treadway Commission, was a private sector response to hearings held by a subcommittee of the 
US House of Representative’s.  These hearings pertained to aspects of the accounting 
profession, or more specifically, whether the audit system was meeting public expectations, and 
followed the failure of a number of US financial institutes in the mid 1980’s.  The subcommittee 
was tasked with determining whether corrective action was necessary for the then current 
system of public disclosure and financial reporting (Lange, u.d.). 
 
The National Commission, which was co-sponsored by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the Financial 
Executives Institute (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the now Institute of 
Management Accountants (IMA), was formed in 1985 to study the financial reporting system in 
US public companies.  Within this scope, the commission deemed its purpose was to distinguish 
causal factors that may contribute to fraudulent financial reporting and identify steps that could 
reduce its occurrence in the future.  Three objectives were posed by the study.  Firstly, to 
consider the forces and opportunities that may lead to fraudulent financial reporting and how 
this act could undermine the integrity of the reporting system.  Secondly, to examine the role of 
the independent accountants in detecting fraud, and finally, to identify corporate structure 
attributes that may foster acts of financial reporting fraud or may contribute to the failure of 
promptly detecting such acts (NCFFR, 1987). 
 
The Commission’s findings, which were presented in 1987, were based on both alleged and 
proven cases of fraudulent financial reporting between 1981 and 1986.  Amongst the cases, 119 
related to charges laid by the SEC against public companies and 42 against independent public 
accountants.  In addition, reviews of prior research, numerous interviews with experts, and 
comments received from the public were also used to supplement the findings of the research 
program. 
 
The NCFFR study helped to provide an understanding of why financial reporting fraud may 
occur when they identified a number of characteristics surrounding this type of deceptive 
behaviour, including the fact that it usually transpires as the result of certain environmental, 
institutional, or individual forces and opportunities.  The study found that, 
“A frequent incentive for fraudulent financial reporting that improves the company's 
financial appearance is the desire to obtain a higher price from a stock or debt 
offering or to meet the expectations of investors. Another incentive may be the desire 
to postpone dealing with financial difficulties and thus avoid, for example, violating a 
restrictive debt covenant. Other times the incentive is personal gain: additional 
compensation, promotion, or escape from penalty for poor performance” (NCFFR, 
1987, pg.23). 
 
In addition, the NCFFR identified that opportunities exist when fraudulent acts are relatively 
easy to commit and when detection is less likely.  The Commission reported the absence of 
vigilant board of directors or audit committees; weak or nonexistent internal controls; unusual or 
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complex transactions; use of subjective judgment in accounting estimates; and the 
ineffectiveness of internal audit, as opportunities that may provide motivation to commit 
fraudulent financial reporting.  Interestingly, it was concluded that the forces and opportunities 
that were present in fraud companies exist in all companies to some extent.  In other words, no 
company is completely immune from the possible incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
When studying the dimensions of previous cases of fraudulent financial reporting the 
Commission recognised that consistent with the motivations and opportunities identified, the 
majority of perpetrators held senior level management positions.  Although the methods 
implemented by persons in positions such as the chief executive officer, president or chief 
financial officer to manipulate the financial results were varied, actions that tended to inflate or 
smooth earnings and/or overstate assets were predominant.  Furthermore, it was found that while 
the initial fraudulent behaviour did not normally involve an overtly intentional act to distort, 
over time activities relating to the presentation of financial information became more and more 
questionable, eventually culminating in the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
These findings were instrumental in the Commission recommending measures, which focused 
on the ‘tone at the top’.  As a fundamental obligation of a public company is full and fair 
disclosure of corporate and financial information to the public, it is paramount that this 
information be accurate and be presented by a reliable source.  Therefore, because the ultimate 
responsibility for the financial reporting process resides first and foremost at the company senior 
management level it was deemed that, “Top management - starting with the chief executive 
officer - sets the tone and establishes the financial reporting environment” (NCFFR, 1987, pg.6).  
Accordingly, if the ‘tone at the top’ is deficient then the reliability of public disclosures with 
suffer. 
 
One way in which the Commission sought to overcome this predicament and ensure that the 
right tone was set was to recommend that top management take time to evaluate what factors 
they consider could contribute to the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting within their 
company.  In this way ensuring that top management were more knowledgable and responsive 
to the characteristics that may lead to this deceptive behaviour.  It was also recommended that 
“…all public companies should maintain internal controls that provide reasonable assurance that 
fraudulent financial reporting will be prevented or subject to early detection” (NCFFR, 1987, 
pg.11).  And finally, the study proposed that the ‘tone at the top’ could be improved by the 
development and introduction of written codes of conduct to encourage an adequate standard of 
ethical behaviour by both management and employees alike. 
 
The NCFFR also determined that the role of the independent accountant was vital in the 
detection and deterrence of fraudulent financial reporting and that Auditing Standards should 
better recognise this responsibility.  In this regard they considered that the independent 
accountant, in their role as external auditor of the company, has an obligation to the public.  This 
obligation exists because their responsibility extends further than just the contractual 
relationship between them and their client; it includes the organisation shareholders, creditors, 
customers and the rest of the investing public, insomuch as these individuals rely on the opinion 
provided by the auditor.  Therefore, the adequacy of auditing regulations and standards to 
safeguard that public trust is of primary importance. 
 
Research of earlier fraud cases indicated that where the independent accountant had charges laid 
against them it was due to an alleged failure to conduct the audit in accordance with Generally 
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Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).  These failures were commonly caused by a lack of 
sufficient competent evidential material being obtained, resulting in deviations from GAAS.  
Thus the Commission recommended that GAAS needed to be amended to take into account the 
need for accountants to “…take affirmative steps to assess the potential for fraudulent financial 
reporting and design tests to provide reasonable assurance of detection.  Among the affirmative 
steps recommended was assessment of the company’s overall control environment along with 
improved guidance for identifying risks and designing audit tests” (NCFFR, 1987, pg.13).  In 
determining the requirement to not only change the audit standards but also the processes by 
which these standards are set, the Commission considered that improved audit quality would 
expand the probability of auditors detecting the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
2. The COSO Study 
In 1999 the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
released a study aimed at providing an updated analysis and empirical evidence resulting from 
the examination of financial statement fraud occurrences in the US subsequent to the 1987 
NCFFR study.  The report, Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997: An Analysis of U.S. 
Public Companies, was designed to provide information that could be “…used to guide future 
efforts to combat the problem of financial statement fraud and to provide a better understanding 
of financial statement fraud cases” (COSO, 1999, pg.4).  The findings presented by the study 
identified that fraud primarily occurred in smaller companies and invariably involved the very 
top management of the organisation.  Apparent weaknesses within the audit committee and 
corporate boards of many fraud companies were also found to exist along with the fact that 
significant proportions of these companies were owned by founders and board members.  
Another insight related to the severe consequences suffered by companies found to have 
committed fraudulent financial reporting, many of which filed for bankruptcy, had significant 
changes in ownership or were delisted from national stock exchanges. 
 
Similar to the NCFFR report, the COSO study analysed allegations of fraudulent financial 
reporting brought against entities by the SEC.  The study used Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAER’s) to identify fraud cases, focusing predominantly on violations 
of the antifraud provisions found in section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act and rule 10(b)-5 
under section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934.  Violations of these provisions were 
considered to represent the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting and in this frame of 
mind any incidence of restatement caused strictly by error were not deemed to depict fraudulent 
activity and were therefore removed from further analysis. 
 
Examination of the nature of the frauds committed by the final sample of 200 fraudulent 
companies included in the COSO study indicated that the total amount of each fraud was 
relatively large when compared with the size of the company involved.  It was also found that 
the majority of fraud cases did not relate solely to a single fiscal period, many of the frauds 
affected at least two or more fiscal periods and involved the manipulation of both quarterly and 
annual financial statements.  Furthermore, the most frequently used method of financial fraud 
was the overstatement of revenues and assets.  Amongst the techniques used in the fraud cases 
examined, in excess of 50% overstated revenue by means of fictitious or premature recording of 
monies predominantly relating to transactions reported to have occurred towards the end of the 
financial period.  Frauds involving overstatement of assets chiefly resulted from understated 
receivable allowances, overstated inventory values or other tangible assets (for example 
property, plant and equipment), or the recording of non existent assets. 
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In a manner akin to the NCFFR report, the COSO study also identified the significance of the 
control environment in combating fraudulent financial reporting and in this regard reflected that, 
“The importance of the organisation’s control environment cannot be overstated…” (pg.8).  The 
report stressed the import of monitoring the pressures faced by senior management, particularly 
those generated as a consequence of compensation plans or expectations of the investing public.  
In recognition of these pressures on management the COSO report suggested that, “Boards of 
directors and audit committees need to consider the potential for these pressures when designing 
executive compensation plans for key executives” (1999, p.42).  It has been alleged that 
incentive based compensation plans, which are predominately tied to company performance, 
may encourage self-interest rather than promote the long-term shareholder goal of wealth 
maximisation.  Incentive and opportunities for personal gain could be the driver that compels 
some executives to commit corporate fraud. 
 
It was found that the nature of the company could also have some bearing on the incidence of 
fraudulent financial reporting, particularly given the findings that a number of fraud firms 
experienced periods of financial strain preceding the commencement of activities that resulted in 
fraud.  The COSO report therefore proposed that to counter this implication “…effective 
monitoring of the organisation’s going-concern status is warranted” (pg.8).  In this realm of 
though it was acknowledged that “…management may face market pressures for short-term 
performance and corresponding pressures to satisfy market expectations…” (SEC, 2003b, p.5). 
 
Expectations such as those mentioned above have been found to bring about both appropriate 
and inappropriate behaviour in mangers.  Executives may feel obligated to direct the company’s 
operations in such a way as to achieve targeted results, and in endeavouring to do so may resort 
to fraudulent activities when legitimate business operations are not expected to produce 
satisfactory results.  Management may also feel pressure to demonstrate that their leadership has 
resulted in a rise in shareholder value.  The COSO report established that an emphasis on 
achieving or bettering forecast results could influence a manager to commit fraud. 
 
3. Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) was made up of eleven members of various constituencies 
of the financial community, and sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD).  Following the voicing of concern regarding 
the adequacy of audit committees, the BRC was charged with the task of recommending 
appropriate action that could be taken to strengthen the oversight role of audit committees, 
particularly in relation to the corporate financial reporting process.  The BRC released their 
report and recommendations on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit committees in 
1999. 
 
While the report did not focus strictly on fraud per se, it did consider that many of its 
recommendations might aid in reducing the possibility of fraud.  Accordingly, it was considered 
that “…a more transparent and reliable financial reporting process ultimately results in a more 
efficient allocation of and lower cost of capital.  To the extent that instances of outright fraud, as 
well as other practices that result in lower quality financial reporting, are reduced with improved 
oversight…” (BRC, 1999, pg.19). 
 
The BRC furthermore believed that one of the principal factors underpinning oversight lies in 
the board, or its appointed committees, working together with management to achieve corporate 
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legal and ethical compliance.  In this regard an audit committees oversight responsibilities were 
taken to include “ensuring that quality accounting policies, internal controls, and independent 
and objective outside auditors are in place to deter fraud, anticipate financial risks and promote 
accurate, high quality and timely disclosure of financial and other material information to the 
board, to the public markets, and to shareholders” (BRC, 1999, pg.20).  These responsibilities 
confirm the establishment and functioning of an audit committee is vital to the financial 
reporting process, particularly in view of the ever-increasing complexity of many financial 
transactions, together with the intricacies trading in a global marketplace affords.  It was found 
that issues such as these suggest not only that the oversight role of the audit committee was 
critical at the present time, but would become even more so as the monitoring of financial 
implications resulting from management decisions grows progressively more complex in the 
future. 
 
Ten recommendations were developed and proposed by the BRC, amongst them the issue of 
independence was addressed.  The BRC recognised that board of directors from which audit 
committees are sourced “…must perform active and independent oversight to be, as the law 
requires, a fiduciary for those who invest in the corporation” (BRC, 1999, pg.6).  The BRC 
contented that an independent director, without financial, family or other personal ties, was 
more capable of objectively evaluating the suitability of management’s accounting, internal 
control, and reporting practices.  It would therefore follow that this type of independent 
objectivity might provide even greater benefits when considering the occurrence of financial 
statement fraud. 
 
Further recommendations by the BRC addressed the audit committees minimum size and 
competence.  To effectively discharge their oversight responsibilities it was recommended that 
an audit committee be made up of a minimum of three solely independent members.  Each audit 
committee member was furthermore required to be at a minimum financially literate, whilst at 
least one member had to be capable of providing expertise in accounting or related financial 
management.  It was deemed that financial literacy was the ability to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements, while accounting expertise was resolved to include prior 
employment experience in finance or accounting, a CPA certification, or comparable 
experience.  Comparable experience was benchmarked as that of a CEO or other senior officer 
position with financial oversight responsibilities. 
 
The BRC’s intensive study also made several recommendations in relation to the 
implementation of a formal audit committee charter, and issues relating to communications 
between the committee and the external auditor.  The report noted that the responsibilities of the 
audit committee should include being actively involved in the selection and retention of the 
external auditor, and accordingly evaluate the auditors independence from the company and its 
management.  The efficacy of the audit committee was also determined to be reliant on 
communication between the committee and the external auditor, such that the auditor’s 
judgement on the quality and acceptability of the accounting principals and financial records are 
capable of being openly discussed.  It was additionally considered that discussions between 
these two parties should include “such issues as the clarity of the company’s financial 
disclosures and degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s accounting 
principles and underlying estimates…” (BRC, 1999, pg.15). 
 
Disclosure and transparency is at the heart of the US capital markets, it is therefore a board’s, or 
more appropriately an audit committee’s, responsibility to ensure full and fair disclosure of a 
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company’s true financial performance.  This performance should be presented in such a way as 
to not deceive or manipulate the public, enabling capital investors to make informed investing 
decisions based on accurate and transparent financial information.  The BRC opined that 
engaging in accounting games, which by nature can lead to financial misrepresentations and 
fraud, might equate to a short-term fix but they invariably achieve nothing for the long-term 
financial credibility of the company. 
 
4. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 
In an attempt to repair some of the damage caused by fraudulent financial reporting the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants launched a ‘comprehensive anti-fraud and 
corporate responsibility program’.  One component of this program has been the issuance of 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99); Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit, which came into effect on the 15 December 2002. 
 
While SAS 99, which superseded SAS 82, does not increase the auditor’s responsibility to 
detect fraud it is more far-reaching and significantly expands the information gathering phase 
from that that would have been performed to satisfy the requirements of its predecessor.  Under 
SAS 99 the auditor remains “…responsible for planning and performing the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance that financial statements are free of material misstatements due to fraud” 
(SAS 82).  The new standard does however introduce some new concepts and specific 
requirements to be undertaken, as well as providing greater guidance on what is required of 
auditors to discharge their duty.  SAS 99 is aimed at achieving audit practices that encourage 
continuous consideration of fraud throughout the entire audit process. 
 
The key provisions of SAS 99 include an increased emphasis on professional scepticism and the 
requirement to undertake more open and candid discussions with management in regard to 
fraud.  Also included in the key provisions is the need to enhance the unpredicability of audit 
tests by specifically designing tests that will be unexpected by the client.  In addition, the key 
provision addressed the need for auditors to be more responsive to the risk of financial statement 
fraud occurring as a result of internal controls being overridden by management.  To be capable 
of fulfilling the requirements of the new standard it has been said that auditors will need to show 
greater professional scepticism and enhance their auditing skills, especially in the art of 
interviewing.  “Auditors must ask the right questions and question the answers, and obtain audit 
evidence that supports the answers.  Moreover, auditors who identify fraud risks must know 
how to change audit procedures to handle the situation” (The CPA Letter, 2002, pg.1).  It was 
found to be essential that auditors maintain a questioning mindset whilst ensuring audit evidence 
is critically evaluated, particularly in relation to the possible occurrence of fraudulent activities. 
 
Whereas auditors have always been required to understand their clients business operations and 
its systems of internal control, SAS 99 additionally requires auditors to view these systems in 
the context of fraud prevention and detection.  The breath and depth of the auditors 
understanding of the clients business, as well as the industry within which they operate, was also 
mentioned as a area that needed to be enhanced upon.  “Under SAS No. 99, auditors’ 
understanding of the entity’s business should be sufficient to allow them to identify unusual 
transactions outside the normal course of business” (Ramos, 2003, pg.9). 
 
The expansion of the audit skills and knowledge required by external auditors in their fight to 
successfully combat fraud and fulfil the requirements of SAS 99 is fairly comprehensive.  
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However, failure to detect fraudulent financial reporting during the course of an audit can 
expose the auditor to adverse legal and/or regulatory consequences.  This could result in the 
auditor suffering both substantial litigation costs and irreparable damage to their reputation. This 
auditing standard requires auditors to plan and perform audits with a questioning mind, 
recognising the possibility that fraud may be present.  Furthermore, the increased emphasis on 
identifying financial statement fraud necessitates amendments to the audit approach to ensure 
adequate fraud detection procedures are undertaken.  SAS 99 demonstrates the continuing 
importance to both the profession and society of the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of 
material fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
 152
Appendix B 
 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Audit Committee Functionality Variables: 
NmbACMem Number of Audit Committee Members 
NmbIndAC Number of Independent Audit Committee Members 
%IndAC Percentage of Independent Audit Committee Members 
NmbACFE Number of Audit Committee Financial Experts 
%ACFE Percentage of Audit Committee Financial Experts 
NmbACMeet Number of Audit Committee Meetings 
AvgACTen Average Audit Committee Member Tenure 
AvgACDtrships Average Audit Committee Member Directorships in other companies 
Board of Director Composition Variables: 
NmbDtrs Number of Directors on the Board 
NmbIndDtrs Number of Independent Directors on the Board 
%IndDtrs Percentage of Independent Directors on the Board 
CEO=Chair Dummy/Indicator Variable coded 1 if the Company CEO is also the Chairman of 
the Board, and 0 otherwise 
NomExist Dummy/Indicator Variable coded 1 if the Company has a Nominating Committee, 
and 0 otherwise 
NmbNomMem Number of Nominating Committee Members 
Ownership Structure Variables: 
%InsDtrOwn Percentage of Inside Director Ownership 
%OutDtrOwn Percentage of Outside Director Ownership 
NmbOutBlock Number of Outside Blockholders 
%OutBlockOwn Percentage of Outside Blockholder Ownership 
External Auditor Factors: 
Big6Aud Dummy/Indicator Variable coded 1 if the Company's External Auditor is one of 
the Big6 Accounting Firms, and 0 otherwise 
AudTen Number of Years the External Auditor has been retained by the Company 
Control Variables:  
Total Assets Total Assets (in Millions) in the year preceding the initial year of fraud 
Leverage Total Debts in the year preceding the initial year of fraud divided by Total  
Assets 
Age Dummy/Indicator Variable coded 1 if the Company has been listed on one of the 
US National Stock Exchanges for 5 years or more, and 0 otherwise 
Growth Average Change in Total Assets for the 2 year period preceding the initial year of 
fraud  
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Appendix C 
Sample Descriptions 
 
PANEL A 
ALL COMPANIES 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Minimum 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Std. Deviation
NmbACMem 152 1 3.26 3.00 6 0.995
NmbIndAC 152 1 3.07 3.00 6 1.114
%IndAC 152 33.33 93.5636 100.0000 100.00 15.70170
NmbACFE 152 0 0.47 0.00 2 0.650
%ACFE 152 0.00 14.3530 0.0000 66.67 19.92721
NmbACMeet 152 0 3.31 3.00 13 2.091
AvgACTen 152 1.00 5.9146 5.3300 21.50 3.87005
AvgACDtrships 152 0.00 2.1341 2.0000 8.00 1.46601
NmbDtrs 152 4 8.18 7.00 20 3.196
NmbIndDtrs 152 1 5.43 5.00 16 2.766
%IndDtrs 152 20.00 65.3140 66.6667 91.67 16.31611
CEO=Chair 152 0 0.66 1.00 1 0.474
NomExist 152 0 0.38 0.00 1 0.487
NmbNomMem 152 0 1.61 0.00 12 2.376
%InsDtrOwn 152 0.01 14.3627 8.0300 72.13 16.54256
%OutDtrOwn 152 0.00 2.0782 0.8450 24.10 3.50509
NmbOutBlock 152 0 1.66 1.00 7 1.590
%OutBlockOwn 152 0.00 15.0037 10.9500 89.70 15.86780
AudTen 152 1 5.55 1.00 72 11.601
Big6Aud 152 0 0.91 1.00 1 0.290
Total Assets 152 6.287 6,543.22783 249.57873 306,577.000 32,626.908141
Leverage 152 0.000 20.71616 13.96760 151.686 24.956518
Age 152 0 0.45 0.00 1 0.499
Growth 152 -29.897 955.46851 23.42009 101,771.250 8,358.129910
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PANEL B 
FRAUD COMPANIES 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Minimum 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Std. Deviation
NmbACMem 76 1 3.26 3.00 6 1.038
NmbIndAC 76 1 3.05 3.00 6 1.176
%IndAC 76 33.33 92.8289 100.0000 100.00 16.95532
NmbACFE 76 0 0.45 0.00 2 0.700
%ACFE 76 0.00 13.7061 0.0000 66.67 21.32743
NmbACMeet 76 0 3.20 3.00 13 2.286
AvgACTen 76 1.00 5.8179 5.4150 14.00 3.41637
AvgACDtrships 76 0.00 2.2641 2.0000 7.00 1.44092
NmbDtrs 76 4 7.80 7.00 20 3.319
NmbIndDtrs 76 1 5.00 4.00 12 2.713
%IndDtrs 76 20.00 63.0550 65.1515 90.00 16.81829
CEO=Chair 76 0 0.76 1.00 1 0.428
NomExist 76 0 0.32 0.00 1 0.468
NmbNomMem 76 0 1.36 0.00 11 2.273
%InsDtrOwn 76 0.04 14.6932 7.7800 69.79 17.12479
%OutDtrOwn 76 0.00 1.5539 0.8700 9.12 2.03182
NmbOutBlock 76 0 1.80 2.00 7 1.600
%OutBlockOwn 76 0.00 16.8626 12.1300 56.73 15.92675
AudTen 76 1 4.67 1.00 53 9.276
Big6Aud 76 0 0.88 1.00 1 0.325
Total Assets 76 6.458 7,033.67361 249.57873 306,577.000 35,582.049511
Leverage 76 0.000 20.48805 16.17556 149.920 23.399644
Age 76 0 0.49 0.00 1 0.503
Growth 76 -14.714 485.96785 30.65267 15,770.304 1,995.664746
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PANEL C 
NONFRAUD COMPANIES 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Minimum 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Std. Deviation
NmbACMem 76 1 3.26 3.00 6 0.957
NmbIndAC 76 1 3.08 3.00 6 1.055
%IndAC 76 33.33 94.2982 100.0000 100.00 14.41518
NmbACFE 76 0 0.50 0.00 2 0.600
%ACFE 76 0.00 14.9999 0.0000 66.67 18.54116
NmbACMeet 76 0 3.42 3.00 9 1.885
AvgACTen 76 1.00 6.0113 5.3300 21.50 4.29695
AvgACDtrships 76 0.00 2.0042 2.0000 8.00 1.48881
NmbDtrs 76 5 8.55 8.00 19 3.044
NmbIndDtrs 76 2 5.86 5.00 16 2.770
%IndDtrs 76 33.33 67.5729 68.3333 91.67 15.58152
CEO=Chair 76 0 0.57 1.00 1 0.499
NomExist 76 0 0.45 0.00 1 0.501
NmbNomMem 76 0 1.86 0.00 12 2.464
%InsDtrOwn 76 0.01 14.0322 8.9200 72.13 16.04623
%OutDtrOwn 76 0.00 2.6025 0.8200 24.10 4.47768
NmbOutBlock 76 0 1.53 1.00 5 1.579
%OutBlockOwn 76 0.00 13.1447 7.8500 89.70 15.69289
AudTen 76 1 6.42 1.00 72 13.542
Big6Aud 76 0 0.93 1.00 1 0.250
Total Assets 76 6.287 6,052.78206 243.98034 255,018.000 29,608.344584
Leverage 76 0.000 20.94427 11.43799 151.686 26.576515
Age 76 0 0.41 0.00 1 0.495
Growth 76 -29.897 1,424.96918 14.25705 101,771.250 11,671.276621
 
